ITN2: Islamic World News

Reasoned Comments: Saudis depraved indifference

2011-12-09T07:33:00.000-08:00

Reasoned Comments: Saudis depraved indifference: The manufacturing and toleration of supremacism by Ahmed E. Souaiaia* Even before 9-11, before the U.S. war in Afghanistan, and...

A Middle East run by Islamists: Should Western Powers Freak Out?

2011-12-03T10:28:00.001-08:00

http://readersupportednews.org/pm-section/135-135/8701-a-middle-east-run-by-islamists-should-western-powers-freak-out

In 39 days, three Arab countries held critical elections, Tunisia (October 23), Morocco (November 25), and Egypt (November 28-9). Although the elections in these countries have different contexts and implications, the three events have several things in common. First, the elections were made possible directly or indirectly by the Arab Awakening of early 2011. Second, before the Awakening, Western powers had labeled these three countries as “moderate,” a euphemism for undemocratic regimes run by a westernized elite. Last, these elections brought to power Islamist parties and groups that the west has labeled “extremists.” So should western governments now freak out?

Reasoned Comments (RC): An attack on Iran means price of oil above $250 a ...

2011-11-10T12:10:00.000-08:00

Reasoned Comments (RC): An attack on Iran means price of oil above $250 a ...: A Thomson Reuters' report An attack on Iran will bring oil price to above $250 a barrel according to a report published by an Israeli fina...

Reasoned Comments (RC): The women of al-Nahda: faces of the new Tunisian r...

2011-11-08T17:05:00.000-08:00

Reasoned Comments (RC): The women of al-Nahda: faces of the new Tunisian r...: by Ahmed E. Souaiaia* Before January 14, 2011, al-Nahda was the main opposition group in Tunisia. No one, even its most severe critics,...

Reasoned Comments: Fox News Does not air its own coverage of Occupy W...

2011-10-15T17:58:00.000-07:00

Reasoned Comments: Fox News Does not air its own coverage of Occupy W...: How is this for Fair and Balanced Coverage: Thus far Fox's only pieces on Occupy Wall Street have been poorly developed hit jobs like this o...

Reasoned Comments: The “very scary” Iranian Terror plot

2011-10-13T12:13:00.000-07:00

Reasoned Comments: The “very scary” Iranian Terror plot: BY GLENN GREENWALD The most difficult challenge in writing about the Iranian Terror Plot unveiled yesterday is to take it seriously eno...

Israel's political tsunami has arrived

2011-09-24T11:11:00.000-07:00

by Barak Ravid

Half an hour before Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas went up to the podium at the UN General Assembly, Salva Kiir, president of the world's youngest country, South Sudan, was giving his own speech. As he went on, a slow buzz began to spread throughout the hall.

World leaders, foreign ministers and ambassadors came in one after the other and filled the empty spots in the auditorium. The seats reserved for guests and journalists were also quickly taken. When Kiir finished his speech, everyone expected Abbas to speak next, but due to a change in the schedule the president of Armenia ascended the stage. The large crowd of people impatiently anticipating the day's main event heaved a communal grunt of dissatisfaction over the unexpected warm-up show.

Had a stranger stumbled into the General Assembly on Friday, they might have thought Lady Gaga – or at least Madonna – was about to perform, and not the somber Abbas. Dozens of people who couldn't find a seat stood along the walls of the hall, while others sat down on the stairs. When Abbas' name was announced, the crowd rose to its feet and received him with applause befitting nothing less than a rock star.

Abbas' speech was unrelenting. A few of the things he said would even make Yossi Beilin or Shimon Peres cringe. When he talked about Palestine as a land holy to several religions, he mentioned Muslims and Christians, but failed to mention the Jews. He spoke of Israel's ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in East Jerusalem and said that the IDF and settlers abuse farmers and sick people on their way to the hospital.

Yet all of this did not prevent the majority of the representatives in the hall to applaud Abbas, and even give him a standing ovation when he waved a copy of the letter he submitted earlier to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon requesting membership to the UN. When Abbas yelled over the podium "enough, enough, enough," the representatives of the world's nations believed him.

Israel's handling of the Palestinian bid reached an especially embarrassing peak during Abbas' speech. Israel's Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who entered the hall a few minutes before the speech began, decided once again to use an international diplomatic event for a little bit of internal politics.

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Muslims in America

2011-09-19T15:02:00.001-07:00

from:

http://myfellowamerican.us/

Erdoğan: Mavi Marmara raid was ‘cause for war'

2011-09-12T13:14:00.001-07:00

Israel's 2010 raid on a Turkish-owned aid ship in international waters, which resulted in the deaths of eight Turks and a Turkish-American, was a “cause for war,” but Turkey acted with patience, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has said.

“The May 31, 2010 Mavi Marmara event and the attack that took place in international waters did not comply with any international law. In fact, it was a cause for war. However, befitting Turkey's grandness, we decided to act with patience,” Erdoğan said, according to excerpts taken from an interview the prime minister gave to Al Jazeera and published by the Anatolia news agency late on Sunday.

Erdoğan reiterated that Turkey's warships will be seen more often in the Eastern Mediterranean, where the 2010 raid took place. He said last week that Turkish warships will escort aid ships headed to the Gaza Strip, currently blockaded by Israel.

Turkey has imposed sanctions on Israel after it refused to apologize for the killings, expelling the Israeli ambassador and suspending military agreements with the Jewish state. It has also said it would take measures to guarantee freedom of navigation in the Eastern Mediterranean. “We will see Turkish ships, I mean military ships, more often in international waters in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially in the exclusive economic zone [of Turkey],” Erdoğan told Al Jazeera.

He also said Israel “condemns itself to isolation” by refusing to offer Turkey an apology and not lifting the blockade of Gaza.

Erdoğan, who begins a tour of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya on Monday, had earlier made it clear that he wants to proceed to Gaza from Egypt's Rafah border crossing, but Egypt is reportedly reluctant to let the Gaza trip happen. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said on Sunday that Erdoğan's itinerary will be limited to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya.

“I know my brothers in Gaza are waiting for us. I am in yearning for Gaza as well. … Sooner or later, God willing, I will go to Gaza,” Erdoğan said. But he added that he did not want “unnecessary tensions” to break out over his desire to visit Gaza. “We are discussing this with our Egyptian brothers,” he said.

‘Assad losing legitimacy'

During the interview, Erdoğan also reiterated his criticism of the Syrian regime for its bloody crackdown on anti-regime protests and said President Bashar al-Assad's administration is about to lose its legitimacy. “The administration is unfortunately acting oppressively. The blood of the oppressed is being spilled and thousands of people are in jail as political prisoners,” Erdoğan said.

“Political leaders ought to establish their future on the basis of justice, not on atrocity and blood. We advise all Middle Eastern countries to strengthen democracy, human rights and freedoms,” he said. When asked whether he still speaks with Assad by phone, Erdoğan said: “I am not calling him anymore. But if he calls me, I'll talk to him.”

Libya rendition claims: David Cameron calls for inquiry

2011-09-05T07:45:00.000-07:00

Read more about this story.

Allegations that MI6 was involved in the rendition of Libyan terror suspects should be examined by an independent inquiry, David Cameron has said.

It comes after papers suggesting close ties between MI6, the CIA and the Gaddafi regime were found in Tripoli.

An anti-Gaddafi military leader says he wants the UK and US to apologise for organising his 2004 transfer to Libya.

An existing inquiry into allegations of UK security agencies' involvement in torture has said it will investigate.
'Deserves apology'

Abdel Hakim Belhaj says he was taken to Libya in a CIA and MI6 operation, after being arrested in Bangkok, and tortured and imprisoned.

He was then a terror suspect but is now in charge of the Libyan capital's military forces.

This appears to be confirmed by documents discovered in an abandoned office building in Tripoli by staff from Human Rights Watch.

The documents relating to Mr Belhaj have been seen by the BBC's Middle East editor Jeremy Bowen.

The Foreign Office said the government had a "long-standing policy" not to comment on intelligence matters.

Mr Belhaj told the BBC: "What happened to me and my family is illegal. It deserves an apology. And for what happened to me when I was captured and tortured.

"For all these illegal things, starting with the information given to Libyan security, the interrogation in Bangkok."

Mr Belhaj said that MI6 and the CIA did not witness his torture at the hands of the former Libyan regime, but did interview him afterwards.

A spokesman for the prime minister said that the existing Detainee Inquiry into rendition was "well placed" to investigate the allegations reported in recent days.

"It's not clear precisely what the allegations amount to," the spokesman added. "We don't have a clear picture from these documents, which is precisely why an inquiry like the [Detainee] inquiry might be well placed to consider the issue."

A statement from the Detainee Inquiry, to be chaired by Sir Peter Gibson, said that as part of its role of examining the extent of the government's involvement in, or awareness of, improper treatment of detainees, it would "therefore, of course, be considering these allegations of UK involvement in rendition to Libya as part of our work."
Source of concern

Andrew Tyrie, chairman of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, said: "These further allegations must be fully investigated by the Gibson inquiry. David Cameron was right to set this up. The inquiry itself must demonstrate that it is up to the job.

"Unfortunately, Sir Peter Gibson's early decisions - not to appoint an investigator, not to look at detainee transfer in theatre, not to sufficiently engage with the victims - do not inspire public confidence."

Sir Mark Allen, formerly MI6's director of counter-terrorism, has been reported to be the author of a letter to Moussa Koussa, thanking him for a "delicious" gift of dates and oranges, which was found among the recovered documents.

Mr Koussa served for years as Col Gaddafi's spy chief before becoming foreign minister. He defected in the early part of the rebellion, flying to the UK and then on to Qatar.

Rights groups have long accused him of involvement in atrocities, and had called on the UK to arrest him at the time.

Kim Howells, a former Foreign Office minister who became chairman of the Commons Intelligence and Security Committee, said his committee found no evidence of rendition by the UK.

But, he added, following the September 11 attacks, British intelligence would have been working closely with their Libyan counterparts.

"There were huge fears that Islamists - and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group was an Islamist organisation - were going to try and do the same thing in London or Glasgow or Cardiff or whatever," he said.

"And I think there was an attempt by the security services and intelligence services to try and get hold of any information that might give a clue as to whether there were bombers at large."

Jack Straw, who was foreign secretary between 2001 and 2006, told BBC Radio 4's World at One programme that he did not know whether allegations UK security services were involved in the rendition of Libyan terror suspects were "credible".

But Mr Straw said the claims were a source of concern and "must be examined in very great detail" by the Gibson inquiry.

He said the last time the the Joint Intelligence Committee examined the issue it decided the UK had not been involved "but no foreign secretary can know the details of what all the intelligence agencies are doing at any one time".

Philippe Sands, a professor of international law, said he would not be surprised to find out that British security services and politicians had been co-operating with Libyan officials in the fight against terrorism, but also said some questions needed to be asked.

"This letter [referring to Abdul Hakim Belhaj] appears to be inconsistent with assurances given by most senior folk at MI5 and MI6 about who knew what when," he said.

The CIA would not comment on the specifics of the allegations.

Other documents found by Human Rights Watch workers are reported to suggest that MI6 gave the Gaddafi regime details of dissidents.

These documents, which allegedly reveal details about the UK's relationship with the Gaddafi regime, have not been seen by the BBC or independently verified.

Meanwhile, China's government has admitted that Chinese arms manufacturers held talks as recently as July with representatives of Colonel Gaddafi's government who were seeking arms and ammunition as his forces battled rebels.

The meetings happened in China while a UN ban on such sales was in place. But China's Foreign Ministry has insisted that no actual weapons were supplied to Libya.

Other documents allegedly showing the CIA abducted several suspected militants from 2002 to 2004 and handed them to Tripoli were among thousands of pieces of correspondence from US and UK officials uncovered by reporters and activists in an office apparently used by Moussa Koussa.

Turkey PM: Israel ties won't improve without apology for Gaza flotilla raid

2011-08-17T08:25:00.001-07:00

Erdogan responds to Netanyahu's decision on Wednesday not to apologize for the IDF raid on Gaza-bound ship in 2010.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Wednesday that there will be no improvement in ties with Israel, unless it apologizes for the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid which killed nine Turkish activists.

Earlier on Wednesday, Haaretz reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu informed U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton that Israel will not apologize for the deadly raid on the Gaza-bound ship the Mavi Marmara in 2010.

Speaking with Clinton via telephone on Tuesday, Netanayhu said that Israel does not intend to adopt an outline to restore its relationship with Turkey.

An official in Jerusalem said that Netanyahu told Clinton that Israel does not oppose the publication of the report of the Palmer Committee, which investigated the events surrounding the flotilla, but that the date of the report's release depends on UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

The official added that the head of the UN investigatory committee, former New Zealand prime minister Jeffrey Palmer, will present the report to Ban Ki-moon next Monday and that the UN chief will release the report to the public the following day.

Killings in Norway Spotlight Anti-Muslim Thought in U.S.

2011-07-25T05:27:00.000-07:00

Killings in Norway Spotlight Anti-Muslim Thought in U.S.

By SCOTT SHANE

The man accused of the killing spree in Norway was deeply influenced by a small group of American bloggers and writers who have warned for years about the threat from Islam, lacing his 1,500-page manifesto with quotations from them, as well as copying multiple passages from the tract of the Unabomber.

In the document he posted online, Anders Behring Breivik, who is accused of bombing government buildings and killing scores of young people at a Labor Party camp, showed that he had closely followed the acrimonious American debate over Islam.

His manifesto, which denounced Norwegian politicians as failing to defend the country from Islamic influence, quoted Robert Spencer, who operates the Jihad Watch Web site, 64 times, and cited other Western writers who shared his view that Muslim immigrants pose a grave danger to Western culture.

More broadly, the mass killings in Norway, with their echo of the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City by an antigovernment militant, have focused new attention around the world on the subculture of anti-Muslim bloggers and right-wing activists and renewed a debate over the focus of counterterrorism efforts.

In the United States, critics have asserted that the intense spotlight on the threat from Islamic militants has unfairly vilified Muslim Americans while dangerously playing down the threat of attacks from other domestic radicals. The author of a 2009 Department of Homeland Security report on right-wing extremism withdrawn by the department after criticism from conservatives repeated on Sunday his claim that the department had tilted too heavily toward the threat from Islamic militants.

The revelations about Mr. Breivik’s American influences exploded on the blogs over the weekend, putting Mr. Spencer and other self-described “counterjihad” activists on the defensive, as their critics suggested that their portrayal of Islam as a threat to the West indirectly fostered the crimes in Norway.

Mr. Spencer wrote on his Web site, jihadwatch.org, that “the blame game” had begun, “as if killing a lot of children aids the defense against the global jihad and Islamic supremacism, or has anything remotely to do with anything we have ever advocated.” He did not mention Mr. Breivik’s voluminous quotations from his writings.

The Gates of Vienna, a blog that ordinarily keeps up a drumbeat of anti-Islamist news and commentary, closed its pages to comments Sunday “due to the unusual situation in which it has recently found itself.”

Its operator, who describes himself as a Virginia consultant and uses the pseudonym “Baron Bodissey,” wrote on the site Sunday that “at no time has any part of the Counterjihad advocated violence.”

The name of that Web site — a reference to the siege of Vienna in 1683 by Muslim fighters who, the blog says in its headnote, “seemed poised to overrun Christian Europe” — was echoed in the title Mr. Breivik chose for his manifesto: “2083: A European Declaration of Independence.” He chose that year, the 400th anniversary of the siege, as the target for the triumph of Christian forces in the European civil war he called for to drive out Islamic influence.

Marc Sageman, a former C.I.A. officer and a consultant on terrorism, said it would be unfair to attribute Mr. Breivik’s violence to the writers who helped shape his world view. But at the same time, he said the counterjihad writers do argue that the fundamentalist Salafi branch of Islam “is the infrastructure from which Al Qaeda emerged. Well, they and their writings are the infrastructure from which Breivik emerged.”

“This rhetoric,” he added, “is not cost-free.”

Dr. Sageman, who is also a forensic psychiatrist, said he saw no overt signs of mental illness in Mr. Breivik’s writings. He said Mr. Breivik bears some resemblance to Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, who also spent years on a manifesto and carried out his mail bombings in part to gain attention for his theories. One obvious difference, Dr. Sageman said, is that Mr. Kaczynski was a loner who spent years in a rustic Montana cabin, while Mr. Breivik appears to have been quite social.

Mr. Breivik’s declaration did not name Mr. Kaczynski or acknowledge the numerous passages copied from the Unabomber’s 1995 manifesto, in which the Norwegian substituted “multiculturalists” or “cultural Marxists” for Mr. Kaczynski’s “leftists” and made other small wording changes.

By contrast, he quoted the American and European counterjihad writers by name, notably Mr. Spencer, author of 10 books, including “Islam Unveiled” and “The Truth About Muhammad.”

Mr. Breivik frequently cited another blog, Atlas Shrugs, and recommended the Gates of Vienna among Web sites. Pamela Geller, an outspoken critic of Islam who runs Atlas Shrugs, wrote on her blog Sunday that any assertion that she or other antijihad writers bore any responsibility for Mr. Breivik’s actions was “ridiculous.”

“If anyone incited him to violence, it was Islamic supremacists,” she wrote.

Read the full article...

Read the accused document, A Declaration of European Independence

.

Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder

2011-05-18T06:43:00.000-07:00

Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder

By MARK MAZZETTI and EMILY B. HAGER

ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates — Late one night last November, a plane carrying dozens of Colombian men touched down in this glittering seaside capital. Whisked through customs by an Emirati intelligence officer, the group boarded an unmarked bus and drove roughly 20 miles to a windswept military complex in the desert sand.

The Colombians had entered the United Arab Emirates posing as construction workers. In fact, they were soldiers for a secret American-led mercenary army being built by Erik Prince, the billionaire founder of Blackwater Worldwide, with $529 million from the oil-soaked sheikdom.

Mr. Prince, who resettled here last year after his security business faced mounting legal problems in the United States, was hired by the crown prince of Abu Dhabi to put together an 800-member battalion of foreign troops for the U.A.E., according to former employees on the project, American officials and corporate documents obtained by The New York Times.

The force is intended to conduct special operations missions inside and outside the country, defend oil pipelines and skyscrapers from terrorist attacks and put down internal revolts, the documents show. Such troops could be deployed if the Emirates faced unrest in their crowded labor camps or were challenged by pro-democracy protests like those sweeping the Arab world this year.

The U.A.E.’s rulers, viewing their own military as inadequate, also hope that the troops could blunt the regional aggression of Iran, the country’s biggest foe, the former employees said. The training camp, located on a sprawling Emirati base called Zayed Military City, is hidden behind concrete walls laced with barbed wire. Photographs show rows of identical yellow temporary buildings, used for barracks and mess halls, and a motor pool, which houses Humvees and fuel trucks. The Colombians, along with South African and other foreign troops, are trained by retired American soldiers and veterans of the German and British special operations units and the French Foreign Legion, according to the former employees and American officials.

Barak to Haaretz: Iran won't drop nuclear bomb on Israel

2011-05-06T07:26:00.001-07:00

Published 00:42 05.05.11Latest update 00:42 05.05.11
Barak to Haaretz: Iran won't drop nuclear bomb on Israel
Though the Iranian government seems to have largely eluded the wave of revolutions in the Arab world, the defense minister thinks it too could collapse.

If Iran succeeds in developing nuclear weapons, it is unlikely to bomb Israel, Defense Minister Ehud Barak told Haaretz in an Independence Day interview.

Barak said Israel should not spread public panic about the Iranian nuclear program − a position that seems to put him out of step with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who in recent years has repeatedly compared the Iranian push to develop a nuclear bomb to the Third Reich’s development of increasingly sophisticated weapons.

When asked whether he thinks Iran would drop a nuclear bomb on Israel, Barak said: “Not on us and not on any other neighbor.”

“I don’t think in terms of panic,” he said. “What about Pakistan, some political meltdown happens there and four bombs wind up in Iran. So what? So you head for the airport? You close down the country? Just because they got a shortcut? No. We are still the most powerful in the Middle East.”

...

Commenting on his wealth, he said he was indeed a millionaire but “not a tycoon.”

“I’m no wealthier than Bibi Netanyahu or Arik Sharon,” he said. “I don’t feel that I’m more hedonistic than Ehud Olmert, or Yitzhak Rabin, or Shimon Peres.”
Read full article: http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/barak-to-haaretz-iran-won-t-drop-nuclear-bomb-on-israel-1.359870?trailingPath=2.169%2C2.225%2C2.226%2C

Israel defense minister predicts Iran won't bomb his country even if it gets nuclear weapon

2011-05-05T16:49:00.000-07:00

JERUSALEM — Israel's defense minister says even if Iran develops nuclear arms, it is unlikely to bomb Israel.

Defense Minister Ehud Barak's comments appear to be an attempt to prepare a jittery Israel for the possibility of Tehran getting a nuclear weapon. The remarks were published Thursday in the Haaretz newspaper.

Iran denies its nuclear program is designed to produce weapons, but that claim is widely disbelieved. Israeli leaders have long warned Iran might bomb Israel if it became a nuclear power.

Haaretz asked whether Barak thought Iran would drop a nuclear bomb on Israel. The minister responded: "Not on us and not on any other neighbor."

However, Barak cautioned that it's impossible to predict Iran's behavior.

Israel is believed to have its own stockpile of atomic bombs.

Report: U.S. considering strategic outreach to Hezbollah

2011-03-18T06:30:00.001-07:00

In an opinion piece appearing on the newspaper's online edition, columnist David Ignatius indicated that Washington was considering an effort similar to the one the U.K, implemented "during the 1990s with Sinn Fein, the legal political wing of the terrorist Irish Republican Army."

"That outreach led to breakthrough peace talks and settlement of a conflict that had been raging for more than a century," Ignatius wrote, adding that several U.S. officials were expected to endorse dialogue with political elements of both Hezbollah and the Taliban in an upcoming intelligence report.

Writing of the effect recent Mideast turmoil may have had on Obama's decision to accept these recommendations, the Washington Post writer said that the "political time bomb ticking away in the [intelligence report] is the question of whether the United States should seek some kind of direct or indirect engagement with Hezbollah — at least with its political wing."

"Officials who support this course argue that the organization is like the IRA or the PLO — with nonmilitary components that can be drawn into a dialogue," Ignatius added.

Ignatius quotes in his article one intelligence official, John Brennan, known for supporting a move toward dialogue with the Lebanese militant group, as saying that while "Hezbollah started out as purely a terrorist organization back in the early ’80s," it has "evolved significantly over time."

"The bottom line," the Washington Post article concluded, "is that after a decade of American wars in the Middle East, the Obama administration is increasingly looking for ways to talk with adversaries and draw them into a process of dialogue."

"The world is changing, and perhaps so should U.S. policy," he added.

Report: U.S. considering strategic outreach to Hezbollah

2011-03-18T06:29:00.001-07:00

In an opinion piece appearing on the newspaper's online edition, columnist David Ignatius indicated that Washington was considering an effort similar to the one the U.K, implemented "during the 1990s with Sinn Fein, the legal political wing of the terrorist Irish Republican Army."

"Officials who support this course argue that the organization is like the IRA or the PLO — with nonmilitary components that can be drawn into a dialogue," Ignatius added.

"The world is changing, and perhaps so should U.S. policy," he added.

U.S. sends oil lobbyist to negotiate transition in Egypt

2011-02-08T06:30:00.000-08:00

President Obama sent the known oil industry lobbyist to Egypt, former vice chairman of the American International Group (AIG), Frank Wisner Jr., to negotiate the transition from dictatorship to democracy. President Obama should have taken into account the factor of proximity of the chosen negotiator with the energy industry and his intimate relationship with the financial market by considering AIG's role as the primary insurer of the old "toxic securities" housing crisis, and the family tradition of Wisner to negotiate "transition to democracy in oil-producing countries."

Frank Wisner (father) was the administrator of Operation Ajax which resulted in the toppling of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953. Wisner the father managed the financial resources of the coup and planted lies in the press, while bribing military and religious individuals. The crime of Mohammad Mossadegh against democracy was to nationalise Iranian oil production, controlled since the beginning of the twentieth century by an English company, British Petroleum (BP).

After the coup was prepared in the CIA basement, the transition to democracy brought to power a monarch, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who ruled until the Islamic revolution.

Pahlavi, following the USA's understanding of democracy, negotiated annulling the nationalist legislation of Mossadegh, but in the name of freedom from competition, did not allow a monopoly of BP, authorising the presence U.S. companies in Iran.

Frank Wisner Jr., following in the footsteps of his father, was an official of the U.S. government for 36 years acting as ambassador in different countries finally retiring in the 90s. He assumed the position of counselor for Enron, at that time, Enron Oil & Gas. Since 1999, Wisner also assumed the position of Administrative Counselor at EOG Resources oil and gas, a company spun off from Enron, having subsidiaries in different parts of the world, including Egypt.

Before assuming the position of Enron adviser, Wisner Jr. was known to increase business in the countries where he served as ambassador with former conglomerates when the contract for administration of plants in India, estimated at 2 billion dollars, were ready for completion.

Wisner's office was responsible for providing advice to the government of dictator Mubarak during the privatisations of

the iron and steel industry companies and he provided advice during the development of a new regulatory framework of that country.

Wisner's business in Egypt also included participation in the administrative council of Commercial International Bank, an Egyptian institution handling the financing and administration of large local fortunes.

The revolt in Egypt began among the young, poor and unemployed revealing the bankruptcy of the neoliberal model. The economic elites are too frightened to try to find an honourable exit for their protector, Mubarak. This is translated into maintaining their privileges and what they receive from the U.S.A. Wisner is a negotiator for political transition, a protector and expert with deep knowledge of their financial interests, as a matter of fact, the same U.S. messenger.

To reassure his internal and external clients, Wisner soon after he arrived in Egypt claimed that an orderly transition does not mean the exit of Mubarak from the government. Of course he was not implying by this statement to keep power in the hands of the dictator. The crisis in the streets has weakened Mubarak and could also take the economic model.

The solution of the power brokers went to the maintenance of Mubarak in the palace associated with the elevation of the confidence man of the U.S. and former chief of intelligence, Omar Suleiman, to the position of vice president responsible for negotiating with members of the opposition about reform, policies and maintaining order. Especially the economic order. Immediately, Suleiman won the image of a man serious and lucid, something similar to the "ethical" ministry of President Collor in Brazil, responsible for an efficient transition, maintaining the interests of finance capital.

The rebellion of the poor and unemployed young people of Egypt would be closed, depending on the U.S. and local elite, considering a deal for promoting reform including freedom of the press, amnesty and free elections. Naturally the next government, following this scenario, must be responsible for maintaining the economic model, mitigated perhaps by the introduction of policies compensatory for the poorest of the population. This would be the ideal solution for U.S. geopolitical interests in the North Africa and Middle East region. Mubarak could well enjoy his retirement and his son would resume his role as a banker in England. They would be the rings and the fingers.

President Obama's 2011 state of the union address

2011-01-26T08:21:00.001-08:00

Obama: " And we saw that same desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will of the people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator. And tonight, let us be clear: The United States of America stands with the people of Tunisia, and supports the democratic aspirations of all people."

Amid Protests, Ex-Lebanon Leader Assails New Premier

2011-01-25T06:55:00.000-08:00

Saad Hariri, whose government was toppled afterHezbollah and its allies withdrew from it this month, declared the appointment of a new prime minister chosen by the Shiite Muslim movement on Tuesday a “coup d’état,” as angry protesters took to the streets in Lebanon, burning tires and attacking the office of one of Mr. Hariri’s foes.

Read article...

APN to Obama: Don't Veto UN Resolution on Settlements

2011-01-20T10:37:00.001-08:00

Washington, DC -- Americans for Peace Now (APN) today issued the following statement regarding the pending resolution in the United Nations Security Council supporting the peace process and the two-state solution, and condemning Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank and East Jerusalem:

"APN has long argued that Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank and East Jerusalem must stop. This activity undermines the prospects for peace and a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It undermines confidence in negotiations and is a boon to extremists. It threatens Israel's security and creates instability on the ground. And it paints Israelis as a people more interested in perpetuating and cementing the occupation than in making peace.

"It is indefensible that the Netanyahu government, heedless of the damage settlement activity does to Israel's own interests and indifferent to the Obama Administration's peace efforts, has not only refused to halt settlement activity but has opened the floodgates, including in the most sensitive areas of East Jerusalem. In this context, the move by the United Nations Security Council to censure Israel's settlement activity should surprise no one. By following a different course, the Netanyahu government could have avoided this painful development.

"It is not too late for the Israeli government to change course and to stop backing settlement activity. Such a change is needed to ensure Israel's security and viability as a Jewish state and as a democracy. This resolution can help Israel's leaders and public to grasp this fundamental truth.

"This UN action needs to be considered on its merits: both the context and the content of the resolution matter. The context here is Israel's dogmatic refusal to refrain from settlement activity that is destructive to peace and to Israel's future. The content of the action is a resolution whose text is consistent with longstanding U.S. policy regarding settlements, and explicitly supports negotiations and the two-state solution.

"Given this context and content, APN calls on the Obama Administration to not veto this resolution in its current form. Vetoing this resolution would conflict with four decades of U.S. policy. It would contribute to the dangerously naive view that Israeli settlement policies do no lasting harm to Israel. And it would send a message to the world that the U.S. is not only acquiescing to Israel's actions, but is implicitly supporting them."

APN is America's leading Jewish organization advocating for peace for Israel.

Turkey has the vigor that the EU badly needs

2011-01-18T12:31:00.000-08:00

by Recep Tayyip Erdogan

At the end of this century’s first decade, we can observe how the locus of power has shifted in world politics. The G20 is replacing the G7 as the overseer of the global economy. The need to restructure the U.N. Security Council to be more representative of the international order is profoundly pressing. And emerging powers such as Brazil, India, Turkey, and others are playing very assertive roles in global economic affairs.

The European Union cannot be the one sphere that is immune to these changes in the balance of power. The financial crisis has laid bare Europe’s need for greater dynamism and change: European labor markets and social-security systems are comatose. European economies are stagnant. European societies are near geriatric. Can Europe retain power and credibility in the new world order without addressing these issues?

Meanwhile, as a candidate for EU membership, Turkey has been putting its imprint on the global stage with its impressive economic development and political stability. The Turkish economy is Europe’s fastest-growing sizable economy and will continue to be so in 2011. According to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development forecasts, Turkey will be the second-largest economy in Europe by 2050. Turkey is a market where foreign direct investment can get emerging-market returns at a developed-market risk. Turkey is bursting with the vigor that the EU so badly needs.

And it’s not only economics. Turkey is becoming a global and regional player with its soft power. Turkey is rediscovering its neighborhood, one that had been overlooked for decades. It is following a proactive foreign policy stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East and the Caucasus. Turkey’s “zero-problem, limitless trade” policy with the countries of the wider region aims to create a haven of nondogmatic stability for all of us. We have visa-free travel with 61 countries. This is not a romantic neo-Ottomanism: It is realpolitik based on a new vision of the global order. And I believe that this vision will help the EU, too, in the next decade.

Our intense diplomatic efforts have yielded fruit in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the Balkans, and also in regard to the Iranian nuclear program. Turkey has been an active player in all the major areas of global politics and we do not intend to surrender this momentum. Once it becomes a member of the EU, Turkey will contribute to European interests in a wide range of issues, from foreign and economic policy to regional security and social harmony.

Even though the case for Turkey’s membership of the EU is self-evident and requires little explanation, the accession process has been facing resistance orchestrated by certain member states. Unfortunately, the negotiation process is not currently proceeding as it ought to. Eighteen out of 22 negotiation chapters pending for discussion are blocked on political grounds. This is turning into the sort of byzantine political intrigue that no candidate country has experienced previously. In this treatment, Turkey is unique.

Our European friends should realize that Turkey-EU relations are fast approaching a turning point. In the recent waves of enlargement, the EU smoothly welcomed relatively small countries and weak economies in order to boost their economic growth, consolidate their democracies, and provide them with shelter. Not letting them in would have meant leaving those countries at the mercy of political turmoil that might emerge in the region. No such consideration has ever been extended to Turkey. Unlike those states, Turkey is a regional player, an international actor with an expanding range of soft power and a resilient, sizable economy. And yet, the fact that it can withstand being rebuffed should not become reason for Turkey’s exclusion. Sometimes I wonder if Turkey’s power is an impediment to its accession to the Union. If so, one has to question Europe’s strategic calculations.

It’s been more than half a century since Turkey first knocked at Europe’s door. In the past, Turkey’s EU vocation was purely economic. The Turkey of today is different. We are no more a country that would wait at the EU’s door like a docile supplicant.

Some claim that Turkey has no real alternative to Europe. This argument might be fair enough when taking into account the level of economic integration between Turkey and the EU—and, in particular, the fact that a liberal and democratic Europe has always been an anchor for reform in Turkey. However, the opposite is just as valid. Europe has no real alternative to Turkey. Especially in a global order where the balance of power is shifting, the EU needs Turkey to become an ever stronger, richer, more inclusive, and more secure Union. I hope it will not be too late before our European friends discover this fact.

Erdogan is prime minister of Turkey.

Abbas threatens to seek global recognition if Mideast talks fail

2010-12-07T08:40:00.001-08:00

Palestine has other options if peace negotiations with Israel eventually fail, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said on Monday in Ankara, describing global recognition of the Palestinian state as the most important alternate option.
There is no sign of will on the Israeli side to either restart talks or stop the building of new settlements, Abbas said at a joint press conference following talks with Turkish President Abdullah Gül.

“We cannot maintain peace negotiations if settlement building is not stopped. We have other options, and we have informed Turkey and the Arab countries that if the talks cannot be restarted, then we will pass on to implementing those options,” Abbas said, while President Gül highlighted that putting an end to the construction of new settlements was “vital” for restarting talks. Direct peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians have faltered following the end of a temporary ban on Jewish settlement building in the West Bank. Abbas says he will not return to negotiations while Israel continues to build on land the Palestinians want for a future state.

But Israel has so far refused to impose a new ban. Abbas answered in the negative when asked by a journalist whether “dissolution of the Palestinian government” was one of the options he mentioned.

“However, if negotiations end with failure, then we have five or six options including, particularly, the recognition of Palestine by other world states,” Abbas added, in remarks translated from Arabic to Turkish by an interpreter. The Palestinian leader cited Brazil’s recent recognition of the state of Palestine based on the borders before Israel seized control of the West Bank in 1967 and Argentina’s declaration of intention to do the same thing. “We will implement our options successively. We hope that we will not have to choose difficult options,” Abbas also said.

Brazil announced its decision last week, with the Foreign Ministry saying the recognition was in response to a request made by Abbas to President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva earlier this year. As of Monday, secretary-general of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Yasser Abed Rabbo stated that the recognition of an independent Palestine by the state of Brazil has encouraged others, like Argentina, to follow suit. Rabbo also said Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner confirmed in a telephone call to Abbas on Sunday that her country would recognize an independent Palestine within the pre-1967 borders.

The Palestinian Authority was established after an interim peace deal with Israel in 1993 gave Palestinians limited autonomy in the West Bank, territory Israel captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and where Palestinians want to establish a state.

Last Friday, Abbas already said if peace negotiations collapse, the Palestinians might seek unilateral UN recognition of a state in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, territories Israel captured in 1967. Dismantling the Palestinian Authority would be a last resort, Abbas told Palestine TV in an interview broadcast late Friday.

Palestinian officials have express increasing frustration with the stalemate in the Washington-sponsored talks with Israel, which reached an impasse shortly after they resumed in September over the issue of Jewish settlements. On Thursday, a Palestinian official said Washington had officially informed them that attempts to secure a new Israeli settlement freeze had failed, but US officials have refused to confirm or deny the report.

Gül expressed pleasure over Brazil and Argentina’s decisions for recognition while underlining that Turkey has already recognized the Palestinian state. “Without doubt, it is a fact that not only a Palestinian government exists, but also a Palestinian state exists. We would like everybody else to recognize [the Palestinian state] like we have done. East Jerusalem will be the capital and Palestine will stand on its own two feet; we share this view with everybody,” Gül said when asked whether Turkey would exert any particular effort for global recognition of the Palestinian state.

Both Abbas and Gül stressed that national unity among rival Palestinian groups is a must for resolving the Palestinian issue.

Abbas had separate bilateral meetings with both Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu on Sunday. Palestinian Ambassador to Turkey Nabil Maarouf was quoted by Palestinian media as saying that Erdoğan told Abbas he would urge all countries with which Turkey has diplomatic ties to support such a move.

Earlier on Monday, Abbas attended a ceremony in Ankara organized by the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) for sending off five trucks loaded with humanitarian assistance to Palestinian children. “The trucks going from Ankara to Ramallah and Gaza taking assistance to Palestinians are proving one particular thing if nothing else: Turkish people’s determination to help the Palestinian people despite martyrs they have lost,” Abbas said at the press conference, in an apparent reference to Israeli forces’ killing of eight Turks and one Turkish-American on an aid ship trying to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza on May 31.

Plans for the construction of water purification facilities in Palestine and the building of an industry zone in the West Bank city of Jenin by Turkey were among other issues discussed during talks between Abbas and the Turkish leaders.

Majority of Muslims want Islam in politics, poll says

2010-12-06T07:01:00.000-08:00

A majority of Muslims around the world welcome a significant role for Islam in their countries' political life, according to a new poll from the Pew Research Center, but have mixed feelings toward militant religious groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah.

According to the survey, majorities in Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan and Nigeria would favor changing current laws to allow stoning as a punishment for adultery, hand amputation for theft and death for those who convert from Islam to another religion. About 85% of Pakistani Muslims said they would support a law segregating men and women in the workplace.

Muslims in Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria and Jordan were among the most enthusiastic, with more than three-quarters of poll respondents in those countries reporting positive views of Islam's influence in politics: either that Islam had a large role in politics, and that was a good thing, or that it played a small role, and that was bad.

Turkish Muslims were the most conflicted, with just more than half reporting positive views of Islam's influence in politics. Turkey has struggled in recent years to balance a secular political system with an increasingly fervent Muslim population.

Many Muslims described a struggle in their country between fundamentalists and modernizers, especially those who may have felt threatened by the rising tides of conservatism. Among those respondents who identified a struggle, most tended to side with the modernizers. This was especially true in Lebanon and Turkey, where 84% and 74%, respectively, identified themselves as modernizers as opposed to fundamentalists.

In Egypt and Nigeria, however, more people were pulling in the other direction. According to the poll, 59% in Egypt and 58% in Nigeria who said there was a struggle identified with the fundamentalists.

Despite an overall positive view of Islam's growing role in politics, militant religious organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah spurred mixed reactions. Both groups enjoyed fairly strong support in Jordan, home to many Palestinians, and Lebanon, where Hezbollah is based. Muslim countries that do not share strong cultural, historical and political ties to the Palestinian cause, such as Pakistan and Turkey, tended to view Hezbollah and Hamas negatively.

Al Qaeda was rejected by strong majorities in every Muslim country except Nigeria, which gave the group a 49% approval rating.

The poll was conducted April 12 to May 7 in seven countries with large Muslim populations. About 8,000 people were interviewed face to face, and the survey has a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points for Pakistan and 4 percentage points for the other countries.

...

Brazil formally recognises Palestinian statehood

2010-12-05T16:11:00.001-08:00

Brazil has been accused of undermining the Middle East peace process after it formally recognised Palestinian statehood in the West Bank and Gaza.

Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva, in his last month as Brazil's president, caused anger in Israel and the United States by officially acknowledging Palestinian sovereignty over territory occupied by Israel since 1967.
By breaking ranks with his South American allies, President Lula appeared to be consolidating his legacy as the leader that turned Brazil into a major force on the world stage.
But the move was denounced by Israel as a unilateral attempt to bypass the peace process that would "harm trust" between the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships.

President Lula's decision, announced in a public letter to Mahmoud Abbas, his Palestinian counterpart, is the latest evidence of Brazil's growing interest in the politics of the Middle East.
In recent years, Brazil has been involved in unofficial "back channel" negotiations between Israel and Syria. In March, President Lula also became the first Brazilian leader officially to visit the Holy Land.
The trip was not without its controversies. Avigdor Lieberman, the Israeli foreign minister, refused to meet the president after he turned down an invitation to lay a wreath at the grave of Theodor Herzl, the father of modern political Zionism.
President Lula's decision also earned the anger of pro-Israel members of Congress, who called it "severely misguided" and said it would serve to "undermine peace and security in the Middle East".
Brazil's foreign ministry defended the move, saying it still believed a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinian leadership was "essential".
More than 100 states, mostly from Asia, Africa and the Middle East, have recognised Palestinian statehood, and Brazil becomes the last of the BRIC group of emerging powers – Brazil, Russia, India and China – to do so.
But Israel fears that other South American countries could now follow suit and there was speculation that Peru do so in the next few days.

Helen Thomas says Zionists control U.S. foreign policy

2010-12-03T14:11:00.001-08:00

Source: Detroit Free Press

DETROIT | Helen Thomas said Thursday that she stands by her comments about Israel she made earlier this year that led to her resignation as a national columnist.

And she went further, saying that Zionists control U.S. foreign policy and other institutions. The local Jewish community condemned her remarks.

In an interview, Thomas, 90, said that criticizing Israel led to her resignation and ostracism in Washington.

“I can call a president of the United States anything in the book, but I can’t touch Israel, which has Jewish-only roads in the West Bank,” Thomas said. “No American would tolerate that — white-only roads.”

Thomas, a longtime White House correspondent who grew up in Detroit as the daughter of Lebanese immigrants, was in Dearborn for a workshop on anti-Arab bias.

In a speech inside a center in Dearborn, she talked about “the whole question of money involved in politics.”

“Congress, the White House and Hollywood, Wall Street are owned by the Zionists. No question, in my opinion,” she said. “They put their money where their mouth is. We’re being pushed into a wrong direction in every way.”

Jewish groups have called Thomas’ earlier remarks unfair and bigoted. They slammed Thursday’s remarks as well.

“Ms. Thomas repeated the anti-Semitic stereotypes that have been used for more than a century to incite hatred of Jews. Her comments should be condemned by all people who oppose bigotry,” said Robert Cohen, executive director of the Jewish Community Relations Council of Metropolitan Detroit.

Asked by the Free Press how she would respond to those who say she’s anti-Semitic, Thomas said: “I’d say I’m a Semite. What are you talking about?”

In the interview, she said the Iraq war was “built on lies. No weapons of mass destruction. No ties to al-Qaida. What is this? Why are we killing those people? And why are we there?”

Thomas resigned from Hearst Newspapers in June after telling a rabbi on camera that Israelis should “get the hell out of Palestine“ and “go home” to “Poland, Germany and America and everywhere else.”

wikileaks documents: Emirati crown prince broaches invasion of Iran

2010-12-02T09:17:00.001-08:00

Monday, 16 May 2005, 09:12
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 002178
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/16/2015
TAGS PREL, MASS, PHUM, ELAB, IR, IZ, XF">XF, SA, PK, FR">FR, TC
SUBJECT: MBZ ON IRAQ, IRAN, PAKISTAN
REF: ABU DHABI 1008
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison. For reasons 1.4 (a), (b), and (d).

Summary
Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed hosts top officials for a weekly forum on regional issues. He is ominous about the Iran nuclear crisis, at one point declaring that it would take an invasion of ground forces to eradicate Iran's nuclear installations.

1. (U) Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed,s weekly Sunday "VIP Majlis" provided an excellent opportunity for a visiting National Defense University delegation to observe first-hand the UAEG,s informal consultative process. MbZ, brothers MinState Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan and Interior Minister Sheikh Saif, and Labor Minister al Ka'abi were joined by several dozen prominent Abu Dhabi officials and businessmen for the weekly gathering at Bateen Palace.

NDU

---

2. (U) NDU President Lt. Gen. Dunn and National War College Deputy Commandant Ambassador Wahba briefed MbZ on several new NDU initiatives, including opportunities for UAE students in the Information Resources Management College program, which emphasizes threats, vulnerabilities, and risks in a net-centric environment. Ambassador Sison praised the UAE's selection of NDU candidates, noting that several were serving in key positions today: GHQ Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff MG Mohammed Hilal al-Kaabi, GHQ Director of General Procurement Obaid Al Ketbi, Deputy Commander UAE Air Force Brigadier Ali, and MbZ's aide Yousef al Otaiba had all benefited from NDU programs.

Iraq

------

3. (C) Ambassador Sison noted that day's visit to Iraq by Secretary Rice, highlighting the Secretary's encouragement

SIPDIS for continued momentum in the political process and her meetings with PM al-Jaafari and KDP leader Barzani. MbZ voiced disdain for al-Jaafari, citing (again) his concerns over the Prime Minister's ties to Iran. These concerns were aimed at Jaafari's Dawaa Party colleagues, as well. While agreeing that it was important for Iraq's Sunni Arabs to be more involved in the political process and in drafting the constitution, MbZ complained that "there wasn't one worthwhile Sunni" on the scene. He criticized new Sunni Defense Minister Dulaimi as being "in it for himself." Nor did MbZ have anything good to say about former Iraqi Finance Minister Mahdi's nomination as one of two Vice Presidents, complaining that Mahdi "did not work for the people of Iraq." Nonetheless, MbZ said he agreed with the USG's efforts to encourage the various Iraqi factions to work together. The UAE would continue to help train Iraqi police forces at the UAE's police academy in Al Ain and provide reconstruction assistance. It was important for the region as a whole that the U.S. and its allies "got it right" in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, he underscored. (Note: MbZ aide Yousef al Otaiba had a few days earlier shared with Ambassador concerns passed by former PM Allawi that Dulaimi was "devious," "bad news," "very close" to Iranian intelligence, and had been introduced to the Iranians by Chalabi. Yousef had also noted the UAEG,s impression Mahdi had not always been a "team player" in the government of former PM Allawi. End note.)

Iran

----

4. (S) Turning to Iran, MbZ voiced certainty that the EU-3 efforts with Iran would break down and that Iran would resume its nuclear activities ) if it had not already done so. Repeating concerns first voiced to us in February (reftel), MbZ appeared convinced that it was only a matter of time before Israel or the U.S. would strike Iranian nuclear facility targets. U.S. installations in the Gulf could be targeted by Iran in the aftermath of such an action, he warned. MbZ agreed with the USG,s tough line with Tehran and the Europeans. A nuclear-armed Iran would destabilize the Gulf region and possibly allow terrorist access to WMD. MbZ asked Lt. Gen. Dunn whether it would be possible for &anyone8 to "take out" all locations of concern in Iran via air power; Lt. Gen. Dunn voiced doubt that this would be possible given the dispersed locations. "Then it will take ground forces!" MbZ exclaimed. Ambassador noted that the UAE's Director of Military Intelligence, BG">BG Essa al Mazrouei, would pay counterpart visits this week to CENTCOM, J-2, DIA, and CIA for discussions on Iran and Iraq-related matters. MbZ said he looked forward to sharing "contingency planning" scenarios in future conversations.

Pakistan

--------

5. (C) Ambassador asked about MbZ's visit the week before to Lahore to meet with Pakistani President Musharraf. MbZ chuckled and asked why the USG "always" convinced the Pakistanis to delay news of the capture of senior Al Qaeda operatives such as Abu Faraj al Libbi. MbZ went on to congratulate Washington for its decision to allow U.S. firms to bid for contracts to provide F-16s and other defense technology to Pakistan. It was important to support Musharraf as he battled the terrorists, he emphasized. While the Indians had and would continue to balk at the decision, the region needed Musharraf to stay strong. There was no alternative leader in sight, MbZ opined. Besides, he continued, the F-16 decision would not tip the military balance between India and Pakistan. Even if it had, India's strength as a stable democracy would ensure that it would not ever be in as "risky" a situation as its neighbor. MbZ then slapped his knee and said "you,ll never guess what Musharraf asked me...he asked me whether the UAE had received approval for the Predator!" (Note: the USG's inability to meet the UAE's request for an armed Predator remains a sore point for MbZ, although he has not directly raised the issue with us for some time.)

Gyrocopter, GAWC

----------------

6. (SBU) MbZ also referred to his interest in exploring selling the UAE's "gyrocopter" (a helicopter-supported UAV co-developed with Austrian company Schiebel) to the U.S. Air Force, an idea he first floated during Gen. Moseley,s visit for the May 3 F-16 ceremony. MbZ noted that his aide would pass detailed gyrocopter specifications to the Embassy this week. (Note: We will be exploring this initiative with CENTAF and CENTCOM in relation to force protection aerial surveillance system needs at Al Dhafra airbase for the 380 th Air Expeditionary Wing. End note.)

7. (C) Lt. Gen. Dunn complimented MbZ on the Gulf Air Warfare Center (GAWC), which he and the NDU group had toured that morning. MbZ expressed satisfaction over the relationship between the UAE and U.S. Air Forces, but expressed disappointment that more GCC countries had not joined recent GAWC classes. Ambassador noted the recent robust participation by Saudi Arabia in the GAWC's fourth class, which had included six Saudi F-15s and two young pilots who were also members of the Saudi royal family. MbZ asked whether the two high-ranking Saudis had actually completed all requirements for graduation or had been "passed through." Ambassador confirmed that they had completed all course requirements. MbZ commented that "the real reason" the Saudis had turned out for the GAWC class had been "to see what the UAE was up to" with the F-16 Block 60 and other procurement successes. Although Egypt and Jordan wished to join in the next GAWC class, MbZ added, they also wanted the UAE Air Force to pay fuel costs. MbZ said he had asked both countries "to go talk to ADNOC," the state-owned Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.

France

------

8. (U) MbZ noted that he would travel to Paris June 18-20 to meet with President Chirac, recalling that he had canceled his trip to France at the last minute in mid-January.

Camel Jockeys

-------------

9. (SBU) On the margins of the MbZ conversation, Ambassador thanked Interior Minister Sheikh Saif for his assistance the week before in allowing G/TIP visitor Feleke Assefa access to camel jockey rehabilitation and social support centers. Ambassador noted that a Tier 3 ranking remained a possibility despite the UAEG,s vigorous efforts since mid-March with UNICEF, IOM, and others. A trafficking in persons reassessment would take place in August, she noted, and it was important for the UAE to continue the good work it was doing in solving the problem. MbZ aide Yousef al Otaiba promised to forward a copy of the UAE-UNICEF TIP implementing agreement and budget. (Note: he has done so; we have forwarded the document electronically to G/TIP and NEA/ARPI. End note.)

Labor and the FTA

-----------------

10. (SBU) Labor Minister al Ka'abi noted he had received reports that the U.S. and UAE sides had moved closer on the text of the labor chapter of the FTA during the last day of negotiations. He reiterated the UAEG,s concern that it receive some recognition of its unique demographic situation, as only 15 percent of the population held Emirati citizenship. SISON

wikileaks docs: Saudi king urges US strike on Iran

2010-12-02T09:16:00.000-08:00

Sunday, 20 April 2008, 08:47
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000649
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP, DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AND S/I
SATTERFIELD
EO 12958 DECL: 04/19/2018
TAGS EAID, ECON, EFIN, IZ, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, SA, IR
SUBJECT: SAUDI KING ABDULLAH AND SENIOR PRINCES ON SAUDI
POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
Classified By: CDA Michael Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia repeatedly asks America to attack Iran to stop its nuclear programme. He warns that if Tehran develops a nuclear weapon, then so will the Saudis and other countries in the region.

1. (S) Summary: US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus met with Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, General Presidency of Intelligence Chief Prince Muqrin bin Abd al-Aziz, and Interior Minister Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz during their April 14-15 visit to Riyadh. The Saudi King and senior Princes reviewed Saudi policy toward Iraq in detail, all making essentially the same points. They said that the Kingdom will not send an ambassador to Baghdad or open an embassy until the King and senior Saudi officials are satisfied that the security situation has improved and the Iraqi government has implemented policies that benefit all Iraqis, reinforce Iraq's Arab identity, and resist Iranian influence. The Saudis evinced somewhat greater flexibility regarding the issues of economic and humanitarian assistance for Iraq and debt forgiveness. In a conversation with the Charge' on April 17, Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel al-Jubeir indicated that the King had been very impressed by the visit of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, and al-Jubeir hinted that the Saudi government might announce changes to its Iraq policy before the President's visit to Riyadh in mid-May. End Summary.

Positive Signs in Iraq

2. (S) In all their meetings with the Saudi royals, both Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus conveyed the progress in Iraq and confirmed the negative role Iran is playing in Iraq. They characterized the recent ISF-led operations in Basra and Baghdad as having a striking effect against the Shia militias, most importantly turning Iraqi public opinion away from the militias. While Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's decision to take action against the militias was described as hasty and not well-planned, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus emphasized that any tactical shortfalls were overshadowed by the greater positive effect of unifying Iraq and demonstrating the GOI's, and most specifically al-Maliki's, determined resolve to take on the Shia militias, especially Jaysh al-Madhi. Concurrently, these operations unequivocally demonstrated Iran's subversive activities in Iraq and its broader regional ambitions. Throughout all their discussions, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus stressed the importance and urgent need for the Saudis to join us in supporting Iraq.

The Saudi Embassy Issue

3. (S) King Abdullah, the Foreign Minister, and Prince Muqrin all stated that the Saudi government would not send an ambassador to Baghdad or open an embassy there in the near future, citing both security and political grounds in support of this position. The Foreign Minister stated that he had considered dispatching an ambassador and had sent Saudi diplomats to Baghdad to identify a site for the Saudi embassy. However, he said. "the King simply forbade us to go any farther." King Abdullah confirmed this account in a separate meeting with Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus. The King asserted that the security situation in Baghdad was too dangerous for him to risk sending a Saudi ambassador there. "He would immediately become a target for the terrorists and the militias," he said.

4. (S) The King also rejected the suggestion that by sending a Saudi ambassador to Baghdad he could give essential political support to the Iraqi government as it struggles to resist Iranian influence and subversion. He expressed lingering doubt on the Iraqi government's willingness to resist Iran. He also repeated his frequently voiced doubts about Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki himself by alluding to his "Iranian connections." The Saudi monarch stated that he does not trust al-Maliki because the Iraqi Prime Minister had "lied" to him in the past by promising to take certain actions and then failing to do so. The King did not say precisely what these allegedly broken promises might have been. He repeated his oft heard view that al-Maliki rules Iraq on behalf of his Shiite sect instead of all Iraqis.

5. (S) However, in a potentially significant move, the King did not reject the idea of dispatching a Saudi ambassador to Baghdad completely. Instead, he said that he would consider

RIYADH 00000649 002 OF 003

doing so after the Iraqi provincial elections are held in the autumn. The conduct of these elections would indicate whether or not the Iraqi government is truly interested in ruling on behalf of all Iraqis or merely in support of the Shia, King Abdullah asserted.

Grudging Acknowledgment of Change in Iraq

6. (S) The Foreign Minister signaled another potential softening in Saudi policy by saying that the Kingdom's problem was not with al-Maliki as a person but rather with the conduct of the Iraqi government. The King himself admitted that the Iraqi government's performance has improved in recent months and grudgingly accepted the point that al-Maliki and his security forces have indeed been fighting extremists, specifically Shia extremists in both Basra and Baghdad and Sunni extremists and Al Qaeda in Mosul. However, the King and the senior Princes argued that more time would be required to judge whether the recent change in Iraqi behavior was lasting and sincere. The King suggested that much of the Iraqi government's improved performance is attributable to US prodding rather than change in Iraqi attitudes.

7. (S) The Foreign Minister also suggested that the USG should prod Ayatollah Sistani to speak out in favor of a unified Iraq and national reconciliation among different Iraqi sects and groups. "You have paid a heavy price in blood and treasure, and Sistani and his people have benefited directly. You have every right to ask this of him," Prince Saud al-Faisal said.

Possible Saudi Economic Assistance

8. (S) The King, Prince Muqrin, and the Foreign Minister all suggested that the Saudi government might be willing to consider the provision of economic and humanitarian assistance to Iraq. Prince Muqrin asked Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus to send him a list of the kinds of assistance that the US government would like to see the Kingdom provide Iraq. Al-Jubeir later told the Charge' that this assistance would be separate from the USD 1 billion in aid that the Saudi government had promised at the Madrid Conference but still not delivered due to security worries. He said that the Madrid commitment consisted of $500 million in trade credits and $500 million in project assistance with strict conditionally, along the lines of what the World Bank would require. Al-Jubeir added that the assistance the Saudi government might provide via Prince Muqrin would initially be in the range of $75-$300 million.

Possible Debt Relief

9. (S) The King noted that Saudi debt relief for Iraq "will come at some point," although he did not say when. Al-Jubeir told the Charge' that debt relief is a real possibility. He also noted that the Saudi government might make changes to its Iraq policy, perhaps including both assistance and debt relief, prior to the President's visit to Riyadh.

The Need to Resist Iran

10. (S) The King, Foreign Minister, Prince Muqrin, and Prince Nayif all agreed that the Kingdom needs to cooperate with the US on resisting and rolling back Iranian influence and subversion in Iraq. The King was particularly adamant on this point, and it was echoed by the senior princes as well. Al-Jubeir recalled the King's frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons program. "He told you to cut off the head of the snake," he recalled to the Charge', adding that working with the US to roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for the King and his government.

11. (S) The Foreign Minister, on the other hand, called instead for much more severe US and international sanctions on Iran, including a travel ban and further restrictions on bank lending. Prince Muqrin echoed these views, emphasizing that some sanctions could be implemented without UN approval. The Foreign Minister also stated that the use of military pressure against Iran should not be ruled out.

RIYADH 00000649 003 OF 003

12. (S) Comment: Saudi attitudes toward Iraq, from the King on down, remain marked by skepticism and suspicion. That said, the Saudis have noticed recent events in Iraq and are eager to work with the US to resist and reverse Iranian encroachment in Iraq. The King was impressed by Ambassador Crocker's and General Petraeus' visit, as were the Foreign Minister, GPI Chief, and Interior Minister. Cautious as ever, the Saudis may nevertheless be willing to consider new measures in the areas of assistance and debt relief, although further discussions will be required to make these ideas a reality. End Comment. 13. (U) This cable was reviewed and cleared by Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus. GFOELLER

wikileaks docs: Ehud Barak sets deadline to resolve Iran nuclear ambitions

2010-12-02T09:15:00.000-08:00

Tuesday, 02 June 2009, 06:19
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001177
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/01/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, MOPS, IR, KWBG, IS
SUBJECT: CODELS CASEY AND ACKERMAN MEET WITH DEFENSE
MINISTER BARAK
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
Israeli defence minister warns that failure to prevent Iran getting nuclear weapons will trigger an arms race in the region. He estimates that the window of opportunity to thwart Tehran's nuclear ambitions is about to close.

1. (C) Summary: Post hosted two CODELS during the week of May 25: one from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee led by Senator Casey, the other from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs led by Congressman Ackerman. Both delegations met with Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who conveyed similar points on the Peace Process and Israel's concerns about Iran. End summary.

Peace Process

-------------

2. (C) Barak began his meeting with the Casey delegation by apologizing for being late due to what he described as an "internal debate" at the Prime Minister's office regarding the development of a response to President Obama's upcoming speech in Cairo. He noted there are "perceived gaps" between the USG and the GOI regarding the Peace Process, and explained the GOI's internal debate is focused primarily on how to ensure that the U.S. and Israel "trust each other." Barak expressed confidence that PM Netanyahu is sincere in wanting to "seize this opportunity and move forward" with the Palestinians, but alluded to members of the coalition who do not agree with this course of action.

3. (C) From his perspective, Barak told the Casey delegation that the GOI was in no position to dictate policy to the Palestinians or the USG regarding the Peace Process -- "it takes two to tango, and three to negotiate," he said. Barak noted that it is the GOI's responsibility to ensure that "no stone is left unturned" regarding the Peace Process; if efforts to achieve peace ultimately fail, then the GOI must be able to state that every effort was pursued. He said he personally had no objection to "two states for two nations," and panned Arab arguments for a bi-national state in Israel. Barak said Israel envisions "two peoples living side by side in peace and good neighborliness" as the final goal.

4. (C) With the Ackerman delegation, Barak focused on the need for a regional approach to the peace process. He supports a regional initiative for peace and cooperation for the entire Middle East region to be launched by Israel. He stressed as well the need to build trust and convince the U.S. administration that the new Israeli government is "serious in its efforts toward peace."

5. (C) Barak commented on political developments in the West Bank and Gaza in both meetings. He said the GOI continues to review its policy, and then added that the Palestinian Authority has much to accomplish in terms of law enforcement, a functioning judiciary, and regaining control of Gaza before a "balanced" Palestinian state can be created. He has been extremely impressed with the work of U.S. Security Coordinator Gen. Dayton training PA security forces, and commended Salam Fayyad's concrete, practical approach.

6. (C) Barak made clear in these meetings that he feels the Palestinian Authority is weak and lacks self-confidence, and that Gen. Dayton's training helps bolster confidence. He explained that the GOI had consulted with Egypt and Fatah prior to Operation Cast Lead, asking if they were willing to assume control of Gaza once Israel defeated Hamas. Not surprisingly, Barak said, the GOI received negative answers from both. He stressed the importance of continued consultations with both Egypt and Fatah -- as well as the NGO community -- regarding Gaza reconstruction, and to avoid publicly linking any resolution in Gaza to the release of kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.

Iran/North Korea

----------------

7. (C) In his meeting with CODEL Casey, Barak said the GOI believes its "keystone" relations with the USG remain strong. He described the integral role the USG plays in preserving Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), especially when faced with threats posed by Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas. He noted that the GOI's positions on Iran are well known, and described North Korea's recent nuclear test as a "second wake-up call" (the first being the AQ Khan network). Barak asked rhetorically how a lack of firm response to North Korea would be interpreted by Iran's leadership, speculating the USG would be viewed as a "paper tiger."

8. (C) In both meetings, Barak said "no option should be removed from the table" when confronting Iran and North Korea; engagement will only work in conjunction with a credible military option, he said. Barak said he was

TEL AVIV 00001177 002 OF 002

personally skeptical that engagement would lead to an acceptable resolution, and argued in favor of a paradigm shift to confront the triple threat posed by nuclear proliferation, Islamic extremist terrorism, and rogue/failing states. He said a strategic partnership with China, Russia, India, and the EU is essential in facing these threats. Barak argued that failure to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran would result in a nuclear arms race in the region as Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia look to acquire nuclear weapons.

9. (C) When asked if the USG and GOI have fundamental differences of opinion when assessing Iran's nuclear program, Barak said we share the same intelligence, but acknowledged differences in analysis. He suggested that the USG view is similar to presenting evidence in a criminal court case in which a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty. As such, USG standards are tougher -- especially following the failure to find WMD in Iraq -- while end-products such as the 2007 NIE unintentionally take on a softer tone as a result. Barak said the fate of the region and the world rests on our ability to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons -- as such, the standards for determining guilt should be lower as the costs are higher.

10. (C) In both meetings, Barak described Iranians as "chess, not backgammon players." As such, Iran will attempt to avoid any hook to hang accusations on, and look to Pakistan and North Korea as models to emulate in terms of acquiring nuclear weapons while defying the international community. He doubted Tehran would opt for an open, relatively low-threshold test like the recent one in North Korea. Rather, Iran will seek ways to bypass the NPT while ensuring its program is redundant and well-protected to prevent an irreparable military strike. Barak estimated a window between 6 and 18 months from now in which stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons might still be viable. After that, he said, any military solution would result in unacceptable collateral damage. He also expressed concern that should Iran develop nuclear capabilities, other rogue states and/or terrorist groups would not be far behind.

Pakistan

--------

11. (C) Barak reinforced his message regarding Pakistan in both meetings. He described Pakistan as his "private nightmare," suggesting the world might wake up one morning "with everything changed" following a potential Islamic extremist takeover. When asked if the use of force on Iran might backfire with moderate Muslims in Pakistan, thereby exacerbating the situation, Barak acknowledged Iran and Pakistan are interconnected, but disagreed with a causal chain. To the contrary, he argued that if the United States had directly confronted North Korea in recent years, others would be less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons programs. By avoiding confrontation with Iran, Barak argued, the U.S. faces a perception of weakness in the region.

12. (U) CODELS Casey and Ackerman did not have the opportunity to clear this message.

********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM

US embassy cables: US steps up pressure on Turkey over Iran

2010-12-02T09:13:00.001-08:00

Thursday, 25 February 2010, 11:05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000302
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE
EO 12958 DECL: 02/21/2020
TAGS PREL, PARM, MNUC, MASS, IR, TU
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS WITH U/S
SINIRLIOGLU
REF: ANKARA 263
Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
In a tense conversation, a senior US envoy presses Turkish officials to support US-led action to convince the Iranian government that it is on the wrong course. The Turks insist their mediation efforts are the best way forward but are forced to concede that most countries in the region see Iran as a threat.

1. (C) Summary: During February 18 "Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue" meetings in Ankara, Turkish MFA Undersecretary Sinirlioglu:

-- Appealed for "simultaneity" between Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process; -- Registered increasing GoT dissatisfaction with Iraqi PM Malaki; -- Expressed hope USF-I CG Odierno's engagement would elicit substantive cooperation from the KRG against the terrorist PKK; -- Urged higher profile USG involvment in the Cyprus reunification talks, and; -- Confirmed GoT interest in further dialogue on missile defense.

End Summary.

IRAN

----

2. (C) Burns strongly urged Sinirlioglu to support action to convince the Iranian government it is on the wrong course. Sinirliolgu reaffirmed the GoT's opposition to a nuclear Iran; however, he registered fear about the collateral impact military action might have on Turkey and contended sanctions would unite Iranians behind the regime and harm the opposition. Burns acknowledged Turkey's exposure to the economic effects of sanctions as a neighbor to Iran, but reminded Sinirlioglu Turkish interests would suffer if Israel were to act militarily to forestall Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons or if Egypt and Saudi Arabia were to seek nuclear arsenals of their own. He said the international community's patience with Iran had been met with the Iranian refusal, since October, to work with the P5-plus-1, the clandestine enrichment facility near Qom and Tehran's recent decison to enrich its low-enriched uranium to 20%. The IAEA's creative proposal to fabricate new fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor had stumbled on a technically unfeasible Iranian counter-offer for a simultaneous exchange in Iran of Iranian fuel for fuel assemblies. Carefully constructed sanctions, Burns argued, targeting the increasingly pervasive economic power of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, would convey the international community's unity and determination. "We'll keep the door open to engagement," he stressed. A visibly disheartened Sinirlioglu conceded a unified message is important. He acknowledged the countries of the region perceive Iran as a growing threat: "Alarm bells are ringing even in Damascus."

ARMENIA

-------

3. (C) Sinirlioglu appealed for "simultaneity" between Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process. He emphasized "a strong reaction" against the protocols among ruling party MPs had to be overcome before the government would hazard a ratification effort. He warned Congressional passage of an Armenian genocide resolution would "complicate" his government's domestic political calculations regarding ratification. He said if something acceptable to Azerbaijani President Aliyev can found, then "we can move" the protocols forward. Sinirlioglu suggested Azerbaijan and Armenia's announcement of an agreed framework for Minsk Group progress would provide the GoT with the necessary political cover. Burns inquired about the prospect for progress on a natural gas deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Sinirlioglu implied

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Aliyev is holding an agreement hostage to Turkey's handling of the protocols: "He doesn't trust us."

IRAQ

----

4. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's increasing dissatisfaction with PM Malaki and fear that he is tending "to get out of control." "He is preoccupied with his political survival;" nevertheless, Sinirlioglu continued, the GoT is in frequent contact with him. The MFA hosted Maliki advisors Sadiq al Rikabi and Tariq al Najmi to meetings 10 days prior. Sinirlioglu lamented Iran's efforts to influence the election. He noted Saudi Arabia is also "throwing around money" among the political parties in Iraq because it is unwilling to accept the inevitability of Shia dominance there. "We want a free, transparent and fair election," he said, "we need to forestall a deepening of the sectarian divide."

5. (C) After the March 7 elections, Sinirlioglu said, Turkey would initiate an effort to connect Iraqi gas fields to the Turkish grid via a 300 kilometer pipeline, costing USD 500 million. He asserted the pipeline could begin pumping within two years. He alleged Iranian opposition to the pipeline because most of Iraq's gas fields are in Kurdish and Sunni areas. Sinirlioglu advocated a second pipeline that would give Iraqi oil an alternative to the Gulf as a route to Europe once the country is able to meet its OPEC quota. He asserted the piplines' construction would pull the several Iraqi communities together into a common project. The creation of new "common assets," he said, could be more important for its politically unifying effect than its economic impact.

6. (C) Sinirlioglu registered his appreciation for USF-I Commanding General Odierno's recent visit. He hoped for the early drafting of an action plan that would elicit more cooperation from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leadership harboring in northern Iraq: "We want the KRG to understand that working with us is important."

ISRAEL

------

7. (C) Burns focused on Turkey's strained relationship with Israel. Sinirlioglu argued "the problem is not bilateral, but general." He attributed increasing regional country frustration with Israel to the stalled Peace Process, especially on the Palestinian track. He blamed the lack of progress on Israeli intransigence, which caused regional stake-holders to question Netanyahu's goals. He contended the "humanitarian situation in Gaza," which is not a punishment of Hamas, but of the Gazan people, fed Turkish popular anger against Israel. Even so, bilateral cooperation with Israel is continuing. Turkey is acquiring Israeli military equipment, notably Heron UAVs. Direct flights between the two countries are routine. Two-way trade is healthy, he said, tourism has dropped recently, but "will recover." Sinirlioglu described Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak's mid-January visit as "very good." He noted the MFA is exploring the possibility of arranging a meeting between the two prime ministers on the margins of an international gathering. Returning to a GoT obsession, he recalled the Turkey-brokered Syria-Israel proximity talks, "which were shattered by Cast Lead," Israel's December 2008 military operation in Gaza. Burns noted Syria places high value on Turkey's role as a mediator and repeated Senator Mitchell's statement that Turkey-brokered proximity talks can make an important contribution to the Peace Process.

ANKARA 00000302 003 OF 005

SYRIA

-----

8. (C) Sinirlioglu contended Turkey's diplomatic efforts are beginning to pull Syria out of Iran's orbit. He said a shared hatred for Saddam had been the original impetus for their unlikely alliance. "Now, their interests are diverging." Once again pitching Israel-Syria proximity talks, Sinirlioglu contended Israel's acceptance of Turkey as a mediator could break Syria free of Tehran's influence and further isolate Iran.

EU, CYPRUS and GREECE

---------------------

9. (C) Sinirlioglu said Turkey's EU accession is being obstructed by the politically motivated objections of several member states, notably France, Austria and Cyprus. He reserved special criticism for President Sarkozy. He accused France of changing the rules mid-game. He contended French opposition to Turkey's membership is "deepening the cultural divide" between Christian Europe and the Muslim world: "A wider audience is watching this."

10. (C) He regretted perceived Greek Cypriot complacency regarding the island's reunification talks: EU "membership makes them invulnerable." Greek Cypriots, he said, want the world to forget the progress achieved by the Annan Plan in 2004. They pretend relations between the island's two communities are an internal affair, even though, by treaty, it's been an international issue for 50 years. Talat's cross-voting proposal, Sinirlioglu continued, should have been a breakthrough, but the Greek Cypriots failed to react. Downer is frustrated, Sinirlioglu alleged, and so are the Turkish Cypriots. He implied the island's Turkish community would register its frustration by voting out Talat as TRNC "president" in April. He renewed Turkey's appeal for higher profile direct USG involvement in the negotiations.

11. (C) Sinirlioglu welcomed Greek PM Papandeou's belated response to Erdogan's October 30 letter seeking a frank new discussion of the two neighbors' several long-running disputes. He conceded Papandreou's delay is understandable in light of his likely preoccupation with Greece's acute financial crisis. Based on Papandreou's response, Sinirlioglu said, Turkey expects to begin new talks with Greece soon.

AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN and INDIA

-------------------------------

12. (C) Burns opened the discussion on Afghanistan with praise for Turkey's military, training and development contributions there. Sinirlioglu said Turkey had chosen to focus on three Afghan challenges: "the marriage of Wahhabism and Pashtun nationalism"; the chronic antagonism between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and; the country's security forces deficit. He said Turkey plans to address the first by ramping up its education programs in Afghanistan; the second by pursuing its trilateral Ankara Process, which sponsors meetings of senior Afghan and Pakistani ministerial and intelligence counterparts, and; the third by establishing a police training center in Kabul that aims for a throughput of 5160 trainees per year. Keying off the last point, AMB Tacan Ildem, who recently concluded an assignment as Turkey's NATO PERMREP, declared the EUPOL police training effort in Afghanistan a failure. He said the EU's criticism of Turkey's unwillingness to work directly with EUPOL is unjustified. He argued, since Turkey does not have a security agreement with the EU and is excluded from the

ANKARA 00000302 004 OF 005

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the GoT lacks a legal basis on which to cooperate with EUPOL. "We would like the EU to involve us not as a third country, but, in view of our accumulated rights," as a candidate for membership. He urged the USG not to coordinate bilateral agreements to support EU operations but, instead, to route all cooperation with the EU on security issues through NATO.

13. (C) Deputy Undersecretary for South Asian Affairs Engin Soysal led the discussion on Pakistan. He described the Ankara Process and the recent Turkey-sponsored Afghanistan Neighbors Summit as Turkish efforts to assert regional responsibility for South Asia's inter-linked problems. He said Turkey had not invited India to the neighbors summit in deference to Pakistani sensitivities; however, he claimed, Pakistan understands attempting to exclude India from the nascent South Asian regional structures would be a mistake. He reported Indian Prime Minister Singh had requested President Gul's assistance with Pakistan during the latter's visit to New Delhi the previous week. Acting on that request, Gul had phoned Pakistani President Zardari, who was skeptical of Indian intentions. Gul is planning to visit Pakistan later this year. Soysal said Iran is proposing a quadrilateal summit, which would include Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but that proposal had yet to generate enthusiasm.

14. (C) Soysal, Turkey's former ambassador to Pakistan, said the Pakistani military, though displeased with Zardari, remains unwilling to intervene; nevertheless, senior officers' patience may not be infinite. Zardari needs to increase the democratic legitimacy of parliament. Soysal offered. Nawaz Sharif has become a much more constructive player.

15. (C) Soysal urged a NATO training role in Pakistan. Picking up from Soysal, Tacan Ildem suggested NATO invite Pakistani military officers to courses at Oberammergau.

BOSNIA

------

16. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's determination to resist perceived EU efforts to exclude Turkey from the Balkans, particularly Bosnia. He identified effecting rapprochement between Bosnia and Serbia as Turkey's immediate diplomatic goal for the region. Towards that end, Sinirlioglu said, we convinced Haris Siladjdzic, who had been in Ankara the day before, to cease references to Serbian "genocide." The United States and Turkey have "agreed to disagree" on the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Bosnia; nevertheless, "we value your involvement in the Balkans."

BILATERAL EUROPEAN RELATIONS, NATO

----------------------------------

17. (C) Burns inquired about Turkey's bilateral relations with Europe. Sinirlioglu briefly recapped Turkey's unhappiness with Sarkozy. He described his country's relationship with Austria as infected by the latter's ethnic prejudice. He complained Belgium and Denmark are reluctant to suppress terrorist PKK-affiliated organizations active in their countries. Tacan Ildem added that, as part of the 2009 POTUS-brokered deal that had overcome Turkish objections to the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO Secretary General, Denmark had promised to clarify its legal requirements prerequiste to acceding to Turkey's request for the closure of Roj TV, a PKK mouthpiece. This still needed to be done, Ildem said.

18. (C) Picking up from Ildem, Sinirlioglu recalled the

ANKARA 00000302 005 OF 005

POTUS-brokered deal had included an understanding that a qualified Turk would be considered for Assistant Secretary General. Instead, he said, a German of uncompelling merit was selected. "We suspect a deal between Rasmussen and Merkel." Ildem complained high-level positions should be part of NATO reform: "We missed an opportunity with the selection of the Assistant Secretary General." Sinirlioglu added: "We let Rasmussen have Secretary General, because we trusted you."

MISSILE DEFENSE

---------------

19. (C) Sinirlioglu inquired about Russia's reaction on missile defense. Burns said the Russians are much more relaxed towards the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and we hope to have more conversations on missile defense bilaterally and, eventually, within the NATO-Russia Council. Sinirlioglu recalled PM Erdogan's request in his recent meeting with SECDEF Gates that the Iranian threat not be highlighted to justify PAA.

20. (U) Participants:

Turkey

Undersecretary Feridun Sinirliolgu Deputy Undersecretary Engin Soysal Ambassador Reha Keskintepe, Director General for the Americas Ambassador Tacan Ildem, Director General for International Security Affairs Ambassador Aydin Sezgin, Director General for Intelligence and Security Affairs Ebru Barat Gokdenizler, Deputy Director General for the Americas Serhat Aksen, Department Head, Americas

United States

Undersecretary William Burns Ambassador James Jeffrey Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow Bridget Brink, NSC Daniel O'Grady, Political Counselor Tamir Waser, P Staff Jeremiah Howard, Deputy Political Counselor - Notetaker

21. (U) Undersecretary Burns has cleared this cable.

Jeffrey

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"

wikileaks docs: Iraqi Shia Muslims resist Iranian influence

2010-12-02T09:12:00.000-08:00

Monday, 14 December 2009, 09:57
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003195
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IR, NEA/I, AND NEA/FO LIMBERT, CORBIN.
EO 12958 DECL: 12/06/2019
TAGS PGOV, PECON, PREL, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ: THE VIEW FROM NAJAF
Classified By: Political M/C Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
US diplomats visiting the Shia holy city of Najaf try to gauge attitudes to Iran. They find evidence of growing resistance to Tehran's meddling in the country's internal affairs, not least among the Shia establishment led by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who rejects the late Ayatollah Khomeini's concept of vilayat-e-faqih - the absolute rule of the jurist (ie the supreme leader). Key passage highlighted in yellow.

Read related article
1. (C) SUMMARY: Local interlocutors from Najaf's social, economic, political and military circles discussed with Post's Senior Iran Watcher (IW) and PRToffs the scope of Iranian influence in the province, the role of the Shia clerical establishment (Marja'iyyah), notably Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, and the challenges confronting the province's farmers who are unable to compete with Iranian-subsidized produce. Interlocutors generally cautioned against a premature U.S. departure and agreed that Iran remains an influential force in Najaf, leveraging its ties with Iraqi political groups to extend its influence. Iran remains wary of Sistani's social and political clout among Shias, notably in Iran, given the Grand Ayatollah's rejection of the Iranian regime's adherence to clerical rule (vilayat-e-faqih). END SUMMARY

2. (C) During a recent visit to Najaf [Sources removed] shared their views on the state of political and economic development in the province and Iran's role.

Provincial Council Chairman

---------------------------

3. (C) [Name removed] asserted that Iraqis throughout the country were growing increasingly frustrated with foreign interference, notably from Iraq's neighbors. He singled out Saudi Arabia and Iran as the biggest culprits, but noted that a "mental revolution" was underway among Iraqi youth against foreign agendas seeking to undermine the country's stability, pointing to such trends in Anbar against the Saudis, Najaf against the Iranians, and Mosul against the Turks.

4. (C) [Name removed] echoed other interlocutors' concerns about a premature U.S. departure from Iraq and risks of a political and security vacuum. He noted that Iran had formed the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) political coalition comprised of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Sadrists, among others, in an effort to bolster ISCI's image as the pan-Shia party of choice in the elections.

5. (C) [Name removed] expressed concerns about rumors circulating in Najaf that the USG was sponsoring a Baathist conference in the U.S. IW dismissed the news as baseless rumors intended to undermine the USG-GOI relationship. (NOTE: A recent press report in an ISCI-owned media also mentioned a proposed Baathist conference scheduled to be held in Washington in February. END NOTE).

Keeping the U.S. Bogged Down

----------------------------

6. (C) [Name removed] described Iran as a threat to Iraqi stability, commenting that the Iranian government's (IRIG) goal is to keep the U.S. bogged down in Iraq in order to discourage U.S. military reprisals against the IRIG for its nuclear program. He commented that Iran fears Iraq's potential influence in the region, and will continue to support local proxies to exert its influence and undermine Iraq. "Iran does not offer its support for free," [Name removed] noted, there will be a price to pay for each proxy in exchange for Iranian support.

7. (C) [Name removed] is supportive of Maliki's decision to forego (at least for now) a political alliance with the INA that is dominated by the pro-Iranian Sadrist Trend and ISCI. Joining the INA will only undermine the integrity of Iraqi security institutions as ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists will try to fill key security positions with their own supporters, many of whom are unprofessional and sectarian, [Name removed] cautioned. The Badr Organization, heavily influenced by Iran, continued to maintain a very effective intelligence arm, according to [Name removed]. Many former Iraqi fighter pilots who flew sorties against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war were now on Iran's hit list (NOTE: According to [Name removed], Iran had already assassinated 180 Iraqi pilots. END NOTE).

8. (C) [Name removed] also noted that Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) elements often resort to bribes (USD 10-20K) to secure the release of supporters in GOI detention and that the Najaf anti-terrorism unit regularly receives cash offers to release detainees. He asserted that [Name removed] also alleged that the Iraqi police were responsible for placing an IED close to the PRT base in November. "He (police chief) is a bad guy. After all, he is still part of the militia (Badr)," [Name removed] asserted.

Sistani: "What Do the Americans Want?" ----QDI>RpQd%'MkQQto pulse the cleric on his views about matters of political consequence. [Name removed] explained that Sistani's son, Muhammad Ridha, serves as the main conduit of information between his father whenever a religious/political message needs to be conveyed to Shia imams in the country.

12. (C) Sistani does not allow Iranian students to enroll in the howzeh (religious seminary) in order to prevent IRIG infiltration, [Name removed] asserted. [Name removed] himself is suspicious of Iranian intentions and asserted that the imams were "in the pocket of the Iranians", despite their proclaimed loyalties to Sistani.

The Sadrists

------------

13. (C) Regarding the Sadrists, [Name removed] recalled fondly his time as a student of the late Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (Moqtada Al-Sadr's father), commenting that, unlike his radical son, the late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He Qthe late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He criticized Moqtada for failing to capitalize and build on his father's legacy. [Name removed] also praised the efforts of Sadr's father and sought to distinguish between "good" and "bad" Sadrists; the former being adherents of Sadr's father. [Name removed] believes the Sadrists are politically weak and continue to splinter as former JAM elements form their own groups. (NOTE: [Name removed] believes [Name removed] is a closet Sadrist despite his public alliance with Maliki's coalition. [Name removed] commented that the Iranians had told the wayward Moqtada to stay-put in Iran for the time being. END NOTE).

Farmers: Iran and Syria Waging Economic Warfare

--------------------------------------------- --

14. (C) [Name removed] commented that most farmers support PM Maliki for his increasingly non-sectarian political message and success in improving security. However, he complained that Iran and Syria were waging economic warfare on Iraqi farmers by flooding provincial markets with low cost/quality produce that are heavily subsidized by their respective governments.

15. (C) Iraq's neighbors were pursuing such measures in order to prevent economic development, thereby forestalling the continued success of Iraq's new democracy, [Name removed] alleged. These problems were further aggravated by water shortages due to the ongoing drought, the high cost of fuels, outdated farming techniques, and power shortages, he noted. [Name removed] confirmed that the Najaf Provincial Council had recently voted to ban the import of foreign tomatoes into Najaf in an effort to bolster local producers. (NOTE: 60 percent of Najaf's labor force works in agriculture. The sector is the province's most important revenue generating industry, followed by religious tourism. END NOTE).

16. (C) [Name removed] railed against Iran's pervasive commercial influence in Najaf, noting that many Iranian-owned companies secure favorable contracts in the province by capitalizing on ties with local politicians. [Name removed] also criticized Iraqi politicians "for being ignorant and overly-reliant on clerics" for their political welfare.

COMMENT

-------

17. (C) Najaf, as the epicenter of Shia Islam, carries significant importance for Iran and its overall campaign to expand its sphere of influence in Iraq and the region. The city is home to many Iranian pilgrims and traders eager to profit spiritually and financially from the city's religious and commercial offerings. There is general awareness and acknowledgment among many Iraqis that Iran's influence, albeit a historic reality, does not always translate into mutual benefit for Najafis. Many also acknowledge that Iran will continue to capitalize on its ties to the city in order to foster greater socio-economic dependencies. The extent of its ability to influence the ways of the Marja'iyyah are more limited, particularly during Sistani's tenure, given the clerical establishment's unrivaled theocratic and geographic prominence when compared to its "sister city" Qom. HILL

wikileaks docs: US fails to dissuade Turkey from Iran 'meddling'

2010-12-02T09:10:00.001-08:00

Tuesday, 17 November 2009, 17:08
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001654
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE
EO 12958 DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS KNNP, PREL, TU, IR
SUBJECT: TURKEY: A/S GORDON PRESSES FM DAVUTOGLU ON IRAN
REF: ANKARA 1626
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4(b,d)

Summary
In a clearly difficult meeting, senior US diplomat Philip Gordon tries to persuade the Turkish foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, that his efforts to mediate a compromise over Iran's nuclear programme may not be entirely helpful or wise – and are effectively enabling the Iranians to play for time without serious negotiations. Gordon's efforts do not meet with success.

1. (S) Iran dominated A/S Gordon's 40-minute meeting November 12 with Foreign Minister Davutoglu. The FM had just gotten off the phone with El-Baradei and had discussed in detail the IAEA proposal to send Iran's low enriched uranium to Turkey. El-Baradei had said he would "call Washington" that same morning. This had followed two long "harsh" sessions with the Iranians in Istanbul on Sunday evening. The Iranians have said they are willing to meet with Solana, but have told the Turks that they have serious problems with Cooper and the British. They have "more trust" in the U.S. The Iranians would also prefer to get fuel from the U.S. rather than the Russians.

2. (S) Davutoglu said the Iranians: a) are ready to send a delegation to Vienna to work out the specifics on this proposal; b) have given their "full trust" to Turkey; c) continue to face serious domestic problems inside Iran. He said the Turks actually see Ahmadinejad as "more flexible" than others who are inside the Iranian Government. Ahmadinejad is facing "huge pressure" after statements from some P5 members to the effect that a nuclear deal would succeed in weakening Iran,s nuclear capability -- which is interpreted by some circles in Iran as a virtual defeat.

3. (S) Given this context, the Turks had asked Ahmadinejad if the core of the issue is psychological rather than substance. Ahmadinejad had said "yes," that the Iranians agree to the proposal but need to manage the public perception. Accordingly, the Iranians are proposing that the first 400 kilos be transferred to Kish Island -- thereby keeping it on Iranian soil -- and would receive right away an equivalent amount (30-50 kilos) of enriched fuel. The second stage would focus on the management of Iranian public opinion, after which Tehran would proceed with the Turkey option for the remaining 800 kilos, probably in two tranches. Davutoglu said Baradei agreed to consider this.

4. (S) Davutoglu noted that he had spoken to NSA General Jones Wednesday, who had said that we should perhaps suggest to the Iranians that they transfer 600 kilos to Kish Island and 600 kilos to Turkey simultaneously. A/S Gordon said he could not give an official response to the proposal as this is the first time we heard it, but that he anticipates much skepticism about providing fuel to Iran before all the LEU has been taken out. It would be better to get all 1200 kilos out right away.

5. (C) Davutoglu noted that these are two different proposals. The first is Iran's request for fuel for its nuclear reactor. Even if this takes place, he said, we still need to work on limiting Iran's nuclear enrichment capability. If we succeed with this proposal, he said, it will create "confidence" and a "new momentum" and would allow room for negotiation.

6. (C) Noting that Davutoglu had only addressed the negative consequences of sanctions or the use of military force, Gordon pressed Davutoglu on Ankara's assessment of the consequences if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. Davutoglu gave a spirited reply, that "of course" Turkey was aware of this risk. This is precisely why Turkey is working so hard with the Iranians. President Gul himself had spent two hours Sunday with Ahmadinejad in Istanbul.

7. (C) Gordon noted that while we acknowledge that Turkey can be helpful as a mediator, some of the Prime Minister's recent public comments raise questions about how Turkey sees this issue. Davutoglu said he is aware of these concerns, but contended that the Guardian newspaper had not accurately presented its recent interview with the Prime Minister. The PM's comments had been taken out of context. Erdogan had been asked if he views Iran as a friend. If he had said "no," it would not have been possible to convince Tehran to cooperate on this latest proposal. Only Turkey can speak bluntly and critically to the Iranians, Davutoglu contended, but only because Ankara is showing public messages of friendship.

8. (C) Gordon pushed back that Ankara should give a stern public message about the consequences if UN resolutions are ignored. Davutoglu countered that Erdogan had given just such a statement in Tehran when he visited. He emphasized that Turkey's foreign policy is giving a "sense of justice" and a "sense of vision" to the region. Turkey has provided a "third option" in addition to Iran and the Saudis (who he contended are viewed as "puppets" of the US). The result, he said, is that we "limit Iranian influence in the region." We

ANKARA 00001654 002 OF 002

need a "pro-Western approach AND a sense of justice."

9. (C) A/S Gordon has cleared this cable.

JEFFREY

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"

Wikileaks documents: Iran elections: 'People are going to be sorry'

2010-12-02T09:09:00.000-08:00

Monday, 15 June 2009, 13:08
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000757
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/IR AND SCA/CEN
EO 12958 DECL: 06/15/2019
TAGS IR, TX, PGOV, PREL, PHUM
SUBJECT: IRAN POST-ELECTION: [Source removed] CALLS

Summary
A confidential source in Turkmenistan tells US diplomats that the results of the 2009 Iranian election represent a "coup d'etat" by the clerical establishment, and that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is "another Pinochet", referring to the late Chilean dictator.

RESULTS A "COUP D'ETAT;" SAYS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD DEMAND A RECOUNT

ASHGABAT 00000757 001.2 OF 002

Classfied By: Charge Richard Miles, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) In a conversation today with Iran Watcher, a [Source removed] in Ashgabat labeled the announcement of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's victory in Friday's presidential election a "coup d'etat," and called Iran's incumbent President "another Pinochet." [Name removed] said that based on calculations from Mousavi's campaign observers who were present at polling stations around the country and who witnessed the vote counts, Mousavi received approximately 26 million (or 61%) of the 42 million votes cast in Friday's election, followed by Mehdi Karroubi (10-12 million). According to his sources, Ahmadinejad received "a maximum of 4-5 million votes," with the remainder going to Mohsen Rezai. He said that more than anything else, the huge turnout of voters on Friday was a reflection of the Iranian electorate's overwhelming "anti-Ahmadinejad" sentiments.

PRECINCT RESULTS OBSCURED

2. (C) [Name removed] said that in a clear departure from established electoral rules and practice in Iran, including the procedures followed in the 2005 presidential election and last year's legislative elections, the authorities embargoed the results from individual precincts and announced instead that they must be conveyed directly to the central election authorities, who would announce the overall results after all the votes were counted. The Iranian authorities knew, he said, that attempts to falsify individual precinct counts could be countered by observers from the Mousavi and the other campaigns, so in order to engineer a "lopsided" Ahmadinejad victory, they had no choice but to conceal the precinct results. In his words, "People know who they voted for and the observers know who won in each precinct."

ARAB REACTION: A HUGE DISAPPOINTMENT

3. (C) [Name removed] said that Iranians are puzzled by the muted reaction thus far of the U.S. and EU governments, as well as "very disappointed" by the number of Arab rulers who have sent messages to Ahmadinejad congratulating him on his "victory." He said that the international community should acknowledge the illegitimacy of the election and demand that the Iranian authorities release and account for the results from each precinct. He said the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) was behind the "coup." Even Supreme Leader Khamenei, he said, to whom the IRGC owes allegiance, is "not totally in control" of the IRGC. Citing the IRGC's warnings against a "velvet revolution" in the days leading up to the election, it would appear that the IRGC has taken on "a life of its own."

IRANIAN DIPLOMATS GET 4TH OF JULY INVITATION INSTRUCTIONS

4. (C) During a visit to the Iranian Embassy in Ashgabat last Friday to vote, [Name removed] said that, without exception, "everyone he spoke to" who was there to cast their ballot said they were voting for Mousavi. [Detail removed]

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: "OUR ONLY OPTION"

5. (C) [Name removed] said that the Iranian authorities, particularly the IRGC, are "merciless" and, "unlike the government in 1979," will use any level of force necessary to put down Iranians who attempt

ASHGABAT 00000757 002.2 OF 002

to demonstrate or force an annulment of the election. Instead, he said, the most effective means to counter the results will be in the form of peaceful, civil disobedience. "The people need to act in concert and 'shut down the country.'" "If no one goes to work and the government cannot function," he said, "this will cause them to think again."

6 (C) COMMENT: During our conversation our interlocutor recalled the words of his father [detail removed] during the lead-up to the 1979 revolution. He said that his father warned him against joining the revolution and to "watch out for the Islamists." "Once they get power," he had said, "they'll never relinquish it. People are going to be sorry." END COMMENT. MILES

WIKIleaks cables: Jordan wary of US engagement with Iran

2010-12-02T09:07:00.001-08:00

Thursday, 02 April 2009, 05:49
S E C R E T AMMAN 000813
SIPDIS
NEA/ELA AND INR/TCA
EO 12958 DECL: 04/02/2029
TAGS PREL, PINR, IR, JO
SUBJECT: WARY OF U.S.-IRAN ENGAGEMENT, JORDAN OFFERS WORDS
OF CAUTION
REF: A. STATE 25892 B. 08 AMMAN 3329 C. AMMAN 668 D. 08 AMMAN 3189 E. 08 AMMAN 2660 F. 08 AMMAN 3372
Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
US ambassador reports Jordanians believe engaging with Iran will reward hardliners and undermine Arab moderates - without convincing Iran to cease support for terrorism, end its nuclear programme or drop its hegemonic aspirations. Best way to counter it is to achieve a two-state solution and make sure that Iraq is not overwhelmed by Iranian influence.

1. (S) Summary: This cable responds to Ref A request for evaluations of third-country reactions to possible U.S. engagement with Iran. Jordan's leaders believe such engagement would reward regional hardliners while undermining Arab moderates - without convincing Iran to cease its support for terrorism, end its nuclear program or drop its hegemonic aspirations. Jordanian officials argue that the best way to counter Iran's ambitions is to weaken the salience of its radicalism on the Arab street by fulfilling the promise of a "two-state solution," resolving other Arab-Israeli disputes, and making sure that Iraq's political and security institutions are not overwhelmed by Iranian influence when the U.S. drawdown is complete. If U.S.-Iran engagement does proceed in earnest, Jordan hopes to be closely consulted in advance and for its interests to be taken into account. End Summary.

Beware the Iranian Tentacles ... and Cut Them Off

--------------------------------------------- ----

2. (S) The metaphor most commonly deployed by Jordanian officials when discussing Iran is of an octopus whose tentacles reach out insidiously to manipulate, foment, and undermine the best laid plans of the West and regional moderates. Iran's tentacles include its allies Qatar and Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian territories, an Iraqi government sometimes seen as supplicant to Tehran, and Shia communities throughout the region. While Jordanian officials doubt dialogue with the U.S. will convince Iran to withdraw its "tentacles," they believe they can be severed if Iran is deprived of hot-button issues that make it a hero to many on the Arab street, such as its championing of the Palestinian cause.

3. (C) According to the GOJ analysis, Iran's influence derives from the perception that Tehran is able to "deliver" while moderates are not. The main failure of moderates as cited by radicals is ongoing Palestinian suffering and dispossession despite an international consensus favoring a viable, independent Palestinian state living peacefully next to Israel. The MFA's Deputy Director of the Arab and Middle East Affairs Department, Muwaffaq Ajlouni, put it this way: "Iran is not welcomed in the Arab world, but it is taking advantage of helpless people." From Jordan's perspective, the U.S. would benefit from pressing Israel to proceed to final status negotiations, which would garner Arab support to deal with shared security concerns about Iran.

4. (S) In Lebanon, the GOJ fears Iran's Hizballah proxy has been given too much rope and could be poised to increase its political influence during upcoming parliamentary elections. The King sees the Lebanon-Israel War of 2006 as having benefited Iran and Hizballah, by allowing a Sunni Arab street enamored of "resistance" to see past its suspicions of the Shia. And then-Foreign Minister Salah Al-Bashir in late 2008 described the spring 2009 vote as "when we will know who won last May," referring to the outcome of the Doha Accords that put an end to Lebanese infighting. Much like with the Palestinian issue, Jordanian leaders have argued that the only way to pull the rug out from under Hizballah - and by extension their Iranian patrons - would be for Israel to hand over the disputed Sheba'a Farms to Lebanon. With Hizballah lacking the "resistance to occupation" rationale for continued confrontation with Israel, it would lose its raison d'etre and probably domestic support.

5. (S) In Iraq, signs of growing security and political stability over the past year in particular have served somewhat to calm Jordanian nerves about Iran's interference. The King and others have cited indications that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki is showing himself to be a national rather than a parochial or Iranian-controlled leader. During the U.S.-Jordan Political Dialogue in November 2008, FM Bashir noted that the Iraqi government had a "tendency to appease Iran," but he saw increased Jordanian (and Sunni Arab) diplomatic engagement with Baghdad as a potential bulwark against Iran (Ref B). Positive trends notwithstanding, many of our Jordanian interlocutors stress that the U.S. should leave Iraq only when it "makes sense," and thereby avoid a political and security vacuum that could be easily filled by Iran (Ref C).

Prepare for Iran to Disappoint

------------------------------

6. (S) Jordan's leaders are careful not to be seen as dictating toward the U.S., but their comments betray a powerful undercurrent of doubt that the United States knows how to deal effectively with Iran. Foreign Minister Nasser Joudeh has suggested the Iranians would be happy to let talks with the U.S. continue for ten years without moving them forward, believing that they can benefit from perceived acceptance after years of isolation without paying a price.

7. (S) Upper House President Zeid Rifai has predicted that dialogue with Iran will lead nowhere, arguing that if the U.S., the EU, and the Arab states agree that under no circumstances should Iran be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon, military force becomes the only option. "Bomb Iran, or live with an Iranian bomb. Sanctions, carrots, incentives won't matter," was how he put it to visiting NEA DAS David Hale in November. While Rifai judged a military strike would have "catastrophic impact on the region," he nonetheless thought preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would pay enough dividends to make it worth the risks (Ref D).

8. (C) Speaking to PolOffs in early February 2009, Director of the Prime Minister's Political Office Khaled Al-Qadi noted that the Gaza crisis had allowed Iranian interference in inter-Arab relations to reach unprecedented levels. He urged the U.S. to "understand the history," explaining that "after the Israelis, the Iranians are the smartest. They know where they are going and what they are doing." He doubted there would be any diplomatic breakthrough before Iran's June elections, partly because Iranian pragmatists cannot be practical due to religious and ideological considerations. He hoped any dialogue would be aimed at weakening hardliners, many of whom believe their "Great Satan" rhetoric.

Talk If You Must, But Don't Sell Us Out

---------------------------------------

9. (S) If direct U.S.-Iran talks must happen, the Jordanian leadership insists it not be at the expense of Arab interests, particularly those of moderates like Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority. Furthermore, they worry that engagement will set off a stampede of Arab states looking to get ahead of the curve and reach their own separate peace with Tehran. King Abdullah counseled Special Envoy George Mitchell in February that direct U.S. engagement with Iran at this time would just deepen intra-Arab schisms and that more "countries without a backbone" would defect to the Iranian camp. The Prime Ministry's Qadi has assessed that Iran sought to "transform the Israeli-Arab conflict into an Islamic-Israeli conflict" and that this strategy was already working with Syria and Qatar. Even more conspiratorially, then-FM Bashir in September 2008 highlighed Arab fears to a visiting CODEL that the United States and the West would allow Iran to play a hegemonic role in Iraq and throughout the region in exchange for giving up its nuclear program (Ref E).

10. (S) Asked late last year whether he advocated engaging Iran or working against its interests without engagement, the King told visiting U.S. Senators that U.S. should undertake both approaches concurrently but that engagement needs to be done "smartly" by setting benchmarks for behavior (Ref F). International Affairs Director at the Royal Court Jafar Hassan on April 1 operationalized Jordan's position as follows: the U.S. must not only consult its friends in the region, but declare that it is doing so publicly as a signal to Iran that the Arabs are full parties to the U.S. policy review. He called for the U.S. and the Arabs to work together to determine what deliverables are required from Iran, what subjects are appropriate for discussion, and also to set clear redlines. (Note: Hassan said Jordan was trying to work with its friends in the region to develop a joint-Arab strategy, but that this has yet to materialize. End Note.)

11. (S) Comment: Believing the U.S. is predisposed toward engagement with Iran, Jordanian officials have avoided forthrightly rejecting such overtures, but they remain anxious that Iran will be the only one to benefit - at their expense. Given Jordanian skepticism that Iran's regional ambitions can be reined in, they probably see establishing benchmarks as a way to keep U.S.-Iranian engagement limited and short-lived. Re-engagement could trigger a review of Jordan's relationship with Iran and with Islamic groups like Hamas, with which Jordan held limited security talks last year. When asked periodically whether by engaging with Hamas, Jordan was undermining PA President Mahmoud Abbas,

official interlocutors simply pointed out that Israel meets with Hamas through Egypt, that Syria and Iran are actively engaged with Hamas, and that Jordan cannot be disengaged. End Comment.

Visit Amman's Classified Website at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman Beecroft

Wikileaks documents cables: US fury at Armenia over arms transfers to Iran

2010-12-02T09:06:00.000-08:00

Wednesday, 24 December 2008, 21:58
S E C R E T STATE 134490
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/23/2018
TAGS ETTC, MASS, OPDC">OPDC, PARM, PREL, AM,
SUBJECT: (S) LETTER FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE
REGARDING 2003 ARMENIAN ARMS PROCUREMENT FOR IRAN
REFS: A. YEREVAN 657, B. State 97802
Classified By: EUR/FO DAS Garber, Reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and (d).

Summary
In a hard-hitting letter, senior US officials threaten wide-ranging US retaliation, including sanctions, if the Armenian government does not halt arms transfers, which they say have resulted in Iranian proxies killing US soldiers in Iraq.

1. (U) Please deliver the following letter from Deputy Secretary Negroponte. There will be no signed original. Embassy should also propose discussions with the Government of Armenia in coming weeks. Suggested dates and team composition will be provided septel. Embassy Yerevan is requested to report response.

2. (Secret/Rel Armenia) Begin Letter:

Dear Mr. President:

We value our positive relationship with your government, as we explore a range of shared interests, especially an agreement on Nagorno Karabakh and normalization of Armenia's relations with Turkey. At the same time, we are dismayed by a serious and, indeed, deadly - arms re-export case.

Secretary Rice, Assistant Secretary Fried, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza, and Ambassador Yovanovitch have raised with you our deep concerns about Armenia's transfer of arms to Iran which resulted in the death and injury of U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Notwithstanding the close relationship between our countries, neither the Administration nor the U.S. Congress can overlook this case. By law, the transfer of these weapons requires us to consider whether there is a basis for the imposition of U.S. sanctions. If sanctions are imposed, penalties could include the cutoff of U.S. assistance and certain export restrictions.

To avoid such sanctions, it is essential that you present compelling evidence that your government is now in partnership with us to ensure such transfers do not occur in the future.

To convince the United States that this will not happen again, we seek a written agreement from Armenia, memorializing its intent to implement measures that will prevent Armenia from becoming a source of weapons for Iran or other states or groups involved with terrorism and/or weapons proliferation. Such measures include:

-- Reform the Armenian Export Control Commission so its members are full time employees who exclusively work on export controls;

-- Establish, at each point of entry into Armenia, Armenian teams dedicated to detecting and interdicting dual-use commodities and other contraband;

-- Periodically accept unannounced visits by U.S. experts to assess the work of the teams;

-- Harmonize Armenia's export control legislation with that of the EU;

-- Update and make public Armenian export control lists, incorporating the control lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, and other international control regimes;

-- Ensure that Armenian-based brokers do not facilitate arms related transfers; and

-- Consult with the United States on transfers to countries that are not member states of NATO or the EU, or participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement.

We are prepared to send a team as early as possible in the New Year to discuss this proposal further. It is my hope that we can work together to forge a positive outcome which provides your government the opportunity to strengthen Armenia's export controls and for my government to assist you in this effort.

Sincerely, John D. Negroponte

End text of letter.

3. (S) Background: In 2003, Armenia facilitated Iran's purchase of rockets and machine guns. In 2007, some of these weapons were recovered from two Shia militant attacks in which a United States soldier was killed and six others were injured in Iraq. The Secretary discussed our concerns with President Sargsian on the margins of the UN General Assembly, but he denied any transfer occurred. The direct role of high-level Armenian officials and the link of the weapons to an attack on U.S. forces make this case unique and highly troubling. These transfers may provide a basis for sanctions pursuant to U.S. legal authorities. We propose a series of steps that Armenia will need to take to prevent future transfers, which will be weighed in the consideration of sanctions. We hope to use the threat of sanctions as a tool to generate Armenian responsiveness so that we will not be forced to impose sanctions measures.

4. (S) The Deputy Secretary is writing to President Sargsian and indicating that a team will be sent to Armenia to seek written agreement that Armenia will take steps to ensure that it does not become a source of weapons for Iran or other states or groups of concern. The team will also present additional information that will make clear why the United States is convinced that the transfers happened and make it unreasonable for Sargsian to continue his denials. We anticipate that the team will travel to Yerevan in the coming weeks, to provide sufficient time for the incoming Administration to be briefed on the situation.

5. (S) Objective: Our objective is to prevent Armenia from becoming a source of weapons for Iran or other states or groups of concern, without derailing a possible Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. Embassy Yerevan should seek to convey the seriousness with which the United States views this issue and emphasize that the transfer of arms to Iran and subsequently to terrorists in Iraq, in particular transfers that resulted in the death of an American serviceman, cannot be overlooked by the United States.

6. (U) Please contact EUR/PRA Matt Hardiman and ISN/CATR Margaret Mitchell with any questions or follow-up issues related to this case and slug any reporting on this issue for ISN and EUR. RICE

WIKIleaks cables: Egypt spy chief promises pressure on Hamas

2010-12-02T09:04:00.000-08:00

Wednesday, 02 January 2008, 18:07
S E C R E T CAIRO 000009
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, IS, IZ, SY, EG
SUBJECT: CODEL VOINOVICH MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Stuart Jones Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D)

Summary
General Omar Soliman, head of Egyptian intelligence, tells US ambassador that Cairo will keep up pressure on Palestinian Islamist movement. He sees Iran as a "significant threat" to Egypt and advises other Arab countries to keep their distance from it.

1. (S) Summary. EGIS Chief Omar Soliman told Ambassador and a visiting Codel led by Senator George Voinovich December 31 that he is optimistic progress will be made on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. However, Soliman was concerned with continuing Israeli criticism of Egyptian anti-smuggling efforts. He was worried that the Egyptians would not be able to work out an arrangement with the Israelis for Hajj pilgrims to return to Gaza. On Iran, Soliman said that the USG's release of the National Intelligence Estimate had altered the calculus through which Arab states are interacting with Iran. On Iraq argued that the Iraqi government needed to amend its constitution and that Prime Minister Malaki should not deal with the Iraqi people in a "sectarian way." End summary.

2. (S) Soliman led off the New Year's Eve meeting by telling the Codel that the region is at a special, critical juncture. Egypt is America's partner. Sometimes we have our differences. But Egypt will continue to provide the USG with its knowledge and expertise on the critical regional issues, such as Lebanon and Iraq. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the core issue; Soliman contended a peaceful resolution would be a "big blow" to terrorist organizations that use the conflict as a pretext. For this reason, President Mubarak is committed to ending the Israeli-Arab "stalemate."

3. (S) Soliman applauded the Administration's efforts, commenting that Annapolis had given hope and begun a process. The timing is right for progress based on four factors. First, the PA leadership is moderate and willing to negotiate. Second, Hamas is isolated and politically cut off in Gaza. Third, the Israelis are ready for peace; Soliman assessed that the GOI coalition is broad and strong, and larger than Rabin's coalition of the mid-nineties. Fourth, Arab states are ready to see an end to "the struggle."

4. (S) Soliman stressed that Egypt stands ready to help the U.S. effort. The GOE knows both the Palestinians and the Israelis, and knows the obstacles to peace. Soliman recommended two steps be taken. First, both the Israelis and Palestinians must be pressed hard to sign an agreement, which the U.S. and international community could endorse, to be implemented at the proper time. Second, the U.S. should insist that "phase one" of the Roadmap should be completed before the end of 2008.

5. (S) Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Soliman opined that the Palestinian Authority was ready to sign an agreement, but that establishment of a state may take between 1-3 years. While Hamas is isolated politically and unable to stop an Israeli-PA agreement, it remains entrenched in Gaza, and it was unclear to Soliman how long that would last. At one point in the discussion, Soliman seemed to imply Hamas may remain in control of Gaza for more than a year; at another juncture, he told Senator Voinovich that if negotiations proceeded briskly, Hamas may be forced to cede power in Gaza in 3-4 months. The bottom line for Hamas, according to Soliman, is that they must be forced to choose between remaining a resistance movement or joining the political process. They cannot have it both ways, he said.

6. (S) Palestinian training: Soliman reiterated GOE willingness to train and support Palestinian security forces. He claimed that the GOE had training facilities ready, but that he was waiting for an answer from U.S. Security Coordinator General Keith Dayton. (Note: We have advised Soliman that initial training of Palestinian security forces will take place in Jordan, and that we will revisit the option of training in Egypt this spring. End note). He continued that the GOE would keep pressure on Hamas but will maintain "low-level" contacts with Hamas. Egypt, he said, wants Hamas isolated. The Qassam rocket attacks must stop. When they do stop, the GOE will ask Israel to "meet quiet with quiet."

7. (S) Border issues: Senator Voinovich asked Soliman why the Israelis continue to report problems with Egypt's anti-smuggling efforts. Soliman said that the Israelis do not complain to him directly, and that GOI-GOE cooperation and exchange of information continues. He was at a loss as to why Israeli politicians continue to criticize Egypt publicly. The GOE would like the USG to be included in the GOI-GOE LAWIO discussions, but the Israelis continue to object. "They don't want a witness in the room," Soliman said. Nevertheless, Soliman was willing to turn the page. "We have a short time to reach peace. We need it. We need to wake up in the morning with no news of terrorism, no explosions, and no news of more deaths. We want everyone happy. That is the Egyptian dream."

8. (S) Syria: Congressman Turner asked if Iran and/or Syria might be play a spoiler role. Soliman answered that Syria wants desperately to halt the United Nations special tribunal on the Hariri assassination. At the same time, the SARG is ready to negotiate with the Israelis, and Soliman believed that the GOI also is ready. Syria, Soliman said, can be induced to play a constructive role but added that there are no guarantees, however, on Syrian performance.

9. (S) NIE: Regarding the USG's National Intelligence Estimate of Iran's nuclear program, Soliman was concerned that many in the Arab world were recalculating their position vis a vis Iran based on an assumption that the NIE represented a USG policy shift. Soliman said the Egyptians are working to correct this misimpression among Arab states. "We tell the Arab world: Don't be happy with the NIE and don't warm up to Iran. We know that the United States will never allow Iran to have a nuclear bomb."

10. (S) Iran: Soliman said that Iran remains a significant threat to Egypt. It continues to influence Shiaa in Iraq and the Gulf. Iran is supporting Jihad and spoiling peace, and has supported extremists in Egypt previously. If they were to support the Muslim Brotherhood this would make them "our enemy," he said. The GOE continues to press the Iranian regime to turn over extremists given "safe harbor" in Iran. This issue, he said, will remain an obstacle to improving Egyptian-Iranian relations. (Soliman met with Iranian former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani earlier in the week. Larijani was in Egypt on a week-long "private visit."

11. (S) Iraq: Soliman said he remains concerned that the Maliki government in Iraq is not representing all Iraqis (i.e. the Sunni population). The GOE has urged Maliki not to deal with the Iraqi people in a sectarian way, and to amend to constitution to allow greater Sunni representation. In addition, the Iraqi government must remove militias from the ranks of the army and police. In the long run, Soliman did not think that the decrease in violence would be sustainable absent these two steps. In addition, Iranian influence is problematic. Soliman said that the GOE had worked to reconcile 21 clans and tribes in Iraq, with good results, and that this kind of efforts had to continue. He assessed that both Sistani and Sadr were practical men, and able to be dealt with.

12. (U) Delegation composition:

Senator George Voinovich (R-OH) Congressman Mike Turner (R-OH) Congressman Steve Pearce (R-NM) Congressman Rob Bishop (R-UT) Congressman Phil Gingrey (R-GA)

13. (U) The delegation did not clear this message. Ricciardone

WIKIleaks cables: Mossad chief wants to 'detach' Syria from Iran

2010-12-02T09:03:00.000-08:00

Thursday, 26 July 2007, 13:52
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002280
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND.
EO 12958 DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS PTER, PREL, KNNP, KWBG, EFIN, IR, IS
SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND TAKES STOCK OF BMENA REGION WITH
MOSSAD DIRECTOR DAGAN
Classified By: Charge d'affaires Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (B/D).

Summary
US homeland security chief briefs that Israel wants a concerted international effort to enforce UN resolutions in Lebanon as a means of removing Syria from Iranian influence. Spy chief says Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states all fear Iran but want someone else "to do the job".

1. (S) SUMMARY: Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (AFHSC), met Mossad Director Meir Dagan on July 12 for a general discussion of regional security threats. On the Iranian nuclear program, Dagan proved surprisingly optimistic about the effects of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and their impact on Iranian elites. On most other fronts, however, Dagan expressed deep skepticism regarding any near-term solutions. Dagan believes that the Syrians were emboldened by the Second Lebanon War, and argued for a concerted international effort to enforce UNSC resolutions in Lebanon as a means of removing Syria from Iranian influence. In Dagan's personal opinion, present attempts to prop up the government of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad will fail, and "an entirely new approach" with the Palestinians is required. Dagan and Townsend surveyed political developments in North Africa, Turkey, and the Gulf, and shared concerns about Pakistan's ability to withstand the challenge of Islamic radicals. END SUMMARY.

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Financial Sanctions Offer Hope on Iran

--------------------------------------

2. (S) Mossad Director Meir Dagan began his two-hour meeting with Townsend by expressing satisfaction with sanctions against Iran. Dagan said UNSC Resolutions 1737 and 1747 caught the Iranians off-guard, and were having an impact on the Iranian elite and financial community. The resolutions had been particularly successful through their indirect consequences, explained Dagan, by stigmatizing Iranian businesses and discouraging risk-averse Europeans from being connected with Iran. Dagan praised ongoing GOI-USG cooperation on this front, and added that domestic economic problems were creating additional pressure on the regime.

3. (S) With regard to their nuclear program, Dagan said the Iranians are attempting to convey a "false presentation" that they have mastered the uranium enrichment process. The reality is that they are not there yet, said Dagan, and they are paying a heavy political price (sanctions) for something they have yet to achieve. Dagan noted growing antipathy in Russia towards Iran and its nuclear program, and said the Iranians were shocked by Russian statements accusing them of supporting terrorism against the United States. In Dagan's view, there is no ideological conflict within the Iranian leadership (all wish to see the destruction of Israel), but there is a growing divide on tactics with some supporting a retaliatory position against the West and others favoring new policies of moderation. Recognizing the growing strength of the moderate camp, Dagan said that the militant followers of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are now trying to target supporters of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as spies.

--------------------------------------------- -

Gulf States Await Action (From Others) on Iran

--------------------------------------------- -

4. (S) According to Dagan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States all fear Iran, but want someone else "to do the job for them." Townsend and Dagan discussed the current state of affairs in the Saudi royal court, where the Mossad Chief accused Foreign Minister Saud bin Faysal of playing a "very negative role." He also pointed to the recent visit of the Saudi King Abdullah to Jordan as a historical first and turning point for relations between the two countries. Townsend agreed, and said that the Saudi king has a sense of urgency on the political front. Dagan characterized Qatar as "a real problem," and accused Sheikh Hamid of "annoying everyone." In his view, Qatar is trying to play all sides -- Syria, Iran, Hamas -- in an effort to achieve security and some degree of independence. "I think you should remove your bases from there...seriously," said Dagan. "They have confidence only because of the U.S. presence." Dagan predicted, with some humor, that al-Jazeera would be the next cause of war in the Middle East as some Arab leaders (specifically Saudi Arabia) are willing to take drastic steps to shut down the channel, and hold Sheikh Hamid personally responsible for its provocations.

----------------------------

Syria Taking Dangerous Risks

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5. (S) Dagan echoed other reports that Syria expects an Israeli attack this summer, and has raised its level of readiness. Despite the fact that Israel has no intention of attacking, said Dagan, the Syrians are likely to retaliate over even the smallest incident, which could lead to quick escalation. Dagan believes that Syria's strategic alliance with Iran and Hizballah has not changed, and that Assad views these policies as both "successful and just." There is a tendency to assume that Syria can be separated from Iran, said Dagan, and that this offers the key to weakening Hizballah. Dagan argued that the opposite is true: by enforcing UN resolutions on Lebanon and increasing efforts to disarm Hizballah, the international community can remove the glue that binds Iran and Syria. Enforcing the resolutions would put additional pressure on Assad, who fears being tried for the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri above all else. The advantage of such an approach, continued Dagan, is that the legal ground is already in place for action by the UNSC. This credible threat could sufficiently frighten Syria away from Iran and towards more natural allies in the Arab League.

---------------------------------------------

Deep Pessimism on Relations With Palestinians

---------------------------------------------

6. (S) Departing from official GOI policy, Dagan expressed his personal opinion that after more than a decade of trying to reach a final status agreement with the Palestinians, "nothing will be achieved." Only Israeli military operations against Hamas in the West Bank prevent them from expanding control beyond Gaza, lamented Dagan, without which Fatah would fall within one month and Abbas would join his "mysteriously wealthy" son in Qatar. Offering what he believed to be a conservative estimate, Dagan said that USD 6 billion had been invested in the Palestinian Authority since 1994. "What did it accomplish, other than adding a few more people to the Fortune 500?" asked Dagan. Although he expressed his personal faith in Salam Fayyad, Dagan said that the Palestinian Prime Minister had no power base. Fatah as a party would have to completely reorganize itself in order to regain credibility, argued Dagan, but instead they have turned once again to the "old guard." The Mossad Chief suggested that a completely new approach was required, but did not provide Townsend any additional details.

--------------------------------------

Pakistan...and Other Regional Concerns

--------------------------------------

7. (S) Townsend and Dagan then embarked on an informal tour of the region, comparing notes on countries critical to combating terrorism. Dagan characterized a Pakistan ruled by radical Islamists with a nuclear arsenal at their disposal as his biggest nightmare. Al-Qaeda and other "Global Jihad" groups could not be relied upon to behave rationally once in possession of nuclear weapons, said Dagan, as they do not care about the well being of states or their image in the media. "We have to keep (President Pervez) Musharaf in power," said Dagan. In North Africa, Dagan contended that Qaddafi needs to be pushed more in order to put Libya on the right track. Qaddafi faces little domestic pressure, said Dagan, but has traditionally responded to outside threats and runs foreign policy based on his emotions. The only reason Qaddafi moderated his position to begin with, said Dagan, was that he feared that he was "in the crosshairs" for regime change. Dagan viewed the situation in Algeria as more serious, with the south of the country becoming increasingly dangerous and the leadership uncertain as it faces radical Islamic forces. Morocco is coping better with these issues "in spite of the king," said Dagan, who appears to take little interest in governing. In Turkey, Dagan said that Islamists there are not of the same cloth as others in the region, but he does fear that they are slowly breaking down the secular character of the state and could become more radical over time. Dagan argued that if the Turkish military received more direct support from the United States, it would be better able to prevent the rise of Islamists.

********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ********************

TEL AVIV 00002280 003 OF 003

CRETZ

WIKIleaks cables: Israeli optimism erodes in face of regional enemies

2010-12-02T09:01:00.000-08:00

Monday, 08 January 2007, 16:38
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000064 
SIPDIS 
SIPDIS 
EO 12958 DECL: 01/05/2017 
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, IS, KWBG 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 13-15 
VISIT TO ISRAEL
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

Summary

The US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, was told in this briefing that the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, believed negotiations with Syria would be a trap as Damascus would use them to end international pressure on it and gain a freer hand in Lebanon. No negotiations would be possible until Syria reduced support for terrorism and/or took steps to secure the release of Israelis held by Hamas and Hezbollah. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

1. (S) Madam Secretary, internal tensions among GOI leaders have intensified since your last visit and have reached the point that there appears to be little coordination or even dialogue among the key decision makers. Therefore, we will need to be sensitive to perceptions that we are favoring one faction over another. The divisions at the top here are part of an increasingly gloomy public mood, with a new corruption allegations making headlines virtually daily, and a growing sense of political failure despite Israel's strong economy and a sustained success rate in thwarting suicide attacks. Prime Minister Olmert's approval ratings were only 23 percent in the latest poll, and Israeli interlocutors across the political spectrum are speaking openly of a crisis of public confidence in the country's leadership at a time when Israelis feel an urgent need for strong leadership to face the threats from Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizballah.

OPTIMISM ERODING

----------------

2. (S) The year 2007 has started off badly for Israelis. The good feeling generated by PM Olmert's long-delayed December 23 summit meeting with Abu Mazen quickly dissipated under the weight of reports of a new settlement in the Jordan Valley (now suspended by Peretz), continued Qassam rocket attacks on Sderot and neighboring kibbutzim, foot-dragging on both sides in implementing the transfer of tax revenues, lack of progress on the release of Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and the unpleasant atmospherics of the January 4 Olmert-Mubarak summit, which was overshadowed by a botched IDF daylight raid in the center of Ramallah in which four Palestinians were killed.

3. (S) The Ramallah operation, which was authorized by the IDF's West Bank commander without informing the Minister of Defense, served as a stark reminder of the lack of coordination between Israel's military and its civilian leadership. When it comes to Israel's strategy for dealing with Palestinians, it increasingly seems that military is military, civilian is civilian and never the twain shall meet! Despite Olmert's belated embrace of Abu Mazen as a peace partner, there is growing concern that moderate Arab willingness to maintain the embargo on Hamas may be eroding, and that Fatah may fail to muster the popular support it will need to depose Hamas, whether at the ballot box or in the streets. Meanwhile, the upcoming release of the results of the Winograd Commission's investigation of the Lebanon war hangs like a sword of Damocles over the heads of Olmert, Defense Minister Peretz, and IDF Chief of General Staff Halutz. Peretz and Halutz have both publicly stated that they will resign if the Commission holds them responsible for serious errors in the conduct of the war, but Olmert has refrained from public comments. Olmert is also awaiting the results of several separate investigations involving corruption allegations, any one of which could further damage him severely, if not force his resignation.

4. (S) While Israeli anxiety over a possible dramatic shift of U.S. policy as a result of the Iraq Study Group's report has been allayed by statements by you and the President, there continues to be deep uneasiness here that the Baker-Hamilton recommendations reflect the shape of things to come in U.S. policy. Israelis recognize that U.S. public support for the Iraq war is eroding and are following with interest the President's upcoming articulation of the revamped policy, but they are deeply concerned that Israeli-Palestinian issues not become linked in American minds to creating a more propitious regional environment for whatever steps we decide to take to address the deteriorating situation in Iraq.

5. (S) Iran's nuclear program continues to cause great anxiety in Israel. Given their history, Israelis across the political spectrum take very seriously Ahmadinejad's threats to wipe Israel off the map. Olmert has been quite clear in his public comments that Israel cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran, a position stated even more emphatically by opposition leader Netanyahu, who compares today's Iran to Nazi Germany in 1938. Despite the worst-case assessments of Israeli intelligence, however, there is a range of views about what action Israel should take. The MFA and some of the think tank Iran experts appear increasingly inclined to state that military action must be a last resort and are taking a new interests in other forms of pressure, including but not limited to sanctions, that could force Iran to abandon its military nuclear program. The IDF, however, srikes us as more inclined than ever to look toward a military strike, whether launched by Israel or by us, as the only way to destroy or even delay Iran's plans. Thoughtful

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Israeli analysts point out that even if a nuclear-armed Iran did not immediately launch a strike on the Israeli heartland, the very fact that Iran possesses nuclear weapons would completely transform the Middle East strategic environment in ways that would make Israel's long-term survival as a democratic Jewish state increasingly problematic. That concern is most intensively reflected in open talk by those who say they do not want their children and grandchildren growing up in an Israel threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran.

LIVNI RISING

------------

6. (C) FM Tzipi Livni is frustrated by Olmert's continued refusal to coordinate closely, and -- perhaps with an eye on polls showing her popularity at over double the level of the Prime Minister -- suggested to a Ha'aretz interviewer in late December that she would challenge Olmert for the prime ministership if he continued not to give her his full backing. In the same interview, Livni provided an outline of her thinking, but not a detailed plan, on the way ahead with the Arabs, including negotiating an interim agreement with the Palestinians in which the separation barrier would serve as the border, and refusing to engage with Syria unless Asad takes steps to end support for terrorism and distances himself from Iran. Livni's policy adviser has confirmed to us that she has engaged in her own discrete discussions with Palestinians, but very much in an exploratory mode. Livni told Senators Kerry and Dodd that she doubted that a final status agreement could be reached with Abu Mazen, and therefore the emphasis should be on reforming Fatah so that it could beat Hamas at the polls. MFA officials tell us that Livni is also focused on the need to keep Hamas isolated. She and her senior staff have repeatedly expressed concern that some EU member-states are wobbly on this point. Meanwhile, Livni is keenly aware that unlike Olmert, she has little to fear from the Winograd Commission report (nor is she tainted by the corruption allegations that dog Olmert). Her incipient bid to take Olmert's place could become more serious once the report's preliminary conclusions are released next month.

SHIFTING VIEWS ON SYRIA

-----------------------

7. (S) Olmert and Livni agree that negotiations with Syria would be a trap that Damascus would use to end the international pressure on it and to gain a freer hand in Lebanon. While they see public relations downsides to dismissing Syrian peace overtures out of hand, they continue to insist that no negotiations will be possible until Syria reduces its support for terrorism and/or takes direct steps to secure the release of Israeli prisoners held by Hamas and Hizballah. Olmert and Livni are supported in that view by Mossad chief Dagan, who takes a dim view of Syrian intentions. A significant part of the security establishment, however, appears to be reaching the conclusion that it is in Israel's interest to test Asad's intentions -- possibly through the use of a back channel contact -- and to seek to wean him away from Tehran. They are joined in that view by Defense Minister Peretz, much of the Labor Party and the Israeli left, who argue that Israel cannot afford to refuse to at least explore Asad's offer to negotiate, often comparing that stance to Golda Meir's much-criticized decision to spurn Sadat's offer to negotiate, which then led to the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Press reports January 5 stated that the defense establishment had recommended to Olmert that he open an exploratory channel to Damascus in two months, a timeline reportedly linked to the completion of reviews of U.S. policy toward Iraq and the Middle East, as well as to clearer indications of Abu Mazen's intentions and capabilities vis a vis Hamas.

PERETZ-OLMERT TENSIONS

----------------------

8. (C) According to leaks from a recent Labor Party leadership meeting, Amir Peretz said that he feels completely disconnected from Olmert. Ever since Peretz' telephone conversation with Abu Mazen which infuriated Olmert, the two reportedly barely speak to each other. Television news reports on January 4 trumpeted rumors that Olmert had decided to remove Peretz as Defense Minister and replace him with former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who has already announced plans to challenge Peretz for the Labor Party's leadership in late May primaries. Even though the Prime Minister's Office almost immediately denied the reports, there is little doubt here that someone in the PMO was behind them. While much of the Labor Party feels that Peretz has been a failure, both as Defense Minister and as Party Secretary General, and Peretz' popularity with the general public has hit rock bottom, Labor

TEL AVIV 00000064 003 OF 003

members widely condemned the media trial balloon, which they saw as an unacceptable attempt by Olmert's advisers to intervene in their party's leadership contest. In any event, the incident is yet another indication of the intense degree of personal rancor and dysfunction prevailing at the top of the GOI.

PERETZ AND SNEH OUR AMA PARTNERS

--------------------------------

9. (C) Notwithstanding the GOI's internal discord, there is some good news in our efforts to nudge the GOI toward improvements in Palestinian quality of life issues. Despite his political woes, Peretz has proven himself a serious partner in our efforts to implement the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) and more generally in a slow but steady push by the MOD to force a reluctant IDF to accept steps to reduce barriers to Palestinian movement and to revive the Palestinian economy. Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh, who will likely accompany Peretz to your meeting, has emerged as the point man for these efforts. Sneh shares Peretz' conviction that Israel's security stranglehold on the Palestinians is "winning the battle but losing the war," but Sneh, who in a decades-long career served as a military governor of the West Bank, commanded an elite combat unit, and took part in the famed Entebbe raid, also has both an intimate knowledge of the Palestinians and a combat commander's credibility with the IDF that Peretz sorely lacks. Your meeting with Peretz provides an opportunity to express appreciation for his and Sneh's efforts and to encourage them in their struggle to bring recalcitrant elements in the IDF to heel. The more progress we can achieve with them on AMA implementation now, the easier it will be to achieve meaningful results with both parties in the coming year.

********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES

Wikileaks documents: Bahrain king says Iranian nuclear programme must be stopped

2010-12-02T08:59:00.001-08:00

Wednesday, 04 November 2009, 06:44
S E C R E T MANAMA 000642
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS PREL, MARR, ENRG, BA">BA, AF, IZ, IR, NATO
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS WITH KING HAMAD: IRAQ,
AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, NATO AWACS, ENERGY
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

Summary
King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa tells head of US central command, General David Petraeus, that Arab states need to do more to engage Iraq, and urges American action to stop Iran's nuclear programme. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

1. (C) SUMMARY: In an hour-long meeting on November 1 with CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus, Bahrain's King Hamad said Arab states need to do more to engage Iraq, discussed Afghanistan and the positive role India could play, urged action to stop Iran's nuclear program, and reviewed regional plans for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. END SUMMARY.

2.(C) IRAQ: King Hamad fully endorsed General Petraeus's point that increased Arab engagement and influence would help frustrate Iranian designs in Iraq. He added that the Arabs need Egyptian and Saudi leadership in this matter and that he had tried to make this point to the Saudi government, but with little effect.

3.(C) AFGHANISTAN: General Petraeus praised Bahrain's commitment of a police company for internal security at FOB Leatherneck. King Hamad confirmed that he would personally see the force off at the airport on December 16. This date will be the 10th anniversary of the King's assuming the throne, and General Petraeus said that U.S. air assets would be available on the 16th to transport the company to Afghanistan. King Hamad inquired about the extent of India's involvement in Afghanistan and noted that Bahrain saw India as very positive force in the region. "It's a new era," he said. "They can be of great help."

4.(C) IRAN: King Hamad pointed to Iran as the source of much of the trouble in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He argued forcefully for taking action to terminate their nuclear program, by whatever means necessary. "That program must be stopped," he said. "The danger of letting it go on is greater than the danger of stopping it." King Hamad added that in light of these regional developments, Bahrain was working to strengthen GCC coordination and its relations with allies and international organizations. He specifically mentioned NATO and confirmed that Bahrain had agreed to the Alliance's request to use Isa Airbase for AWACS missions, although the detail on numbers and timing have yet to be discussed.

5.(S/NF) BAHRAIN AIR SHOW AND NUCLEAR ENERGY: King Hamad asked General Petraeus for his help in encouraging U.S. aircraft manufacturers to participate in the inaugural Bahrain Air Show, scheduled for January 2010. He said that France was pushing the Rafale and would be there in force, although he agreed with Petraeus that the French fighter was yesterday's technology. Warming to the subject of French commercial diplomacy and referring to President Sarkozy, King Hamad said, "The UAE will give him a hard time soon," over France's proposed deal for nuclear reactors. "They're not happy with the project he's offered them." King Hamad also mentioned that Bahrain was studying options for using nuclear power to generate electricity. He said he had asked the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Public Works to present him recommendations and invited the Ambassador to discuss with them possible U.S. involvement. Post will do so.

ERELI

US embassy cables: Israel 'can't afford to be wrong about Iran'

2010-12-02T08:58:00.000-08:00

Wednesday, 13 May 2009, 12:20
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001060
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS PREL, MPOS, KNNP, IR, IS
SUBJECT: REP. WEXLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH IDF INTELLIGENCE
CHIEF YADLIN
Classified By: DCM Luis G, Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

Summary
Israel's military intelligence chief, Major General Amos Yadlin, gives visiting US congressman the latest assessment of Iran's nuclear intentions. "Israel is not in a position to underestimate Iran and be surprised like the US was on 11 September 2001," he says. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

1. (S) Representative Robert Wexler (D, Florida), accompanied by Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Rogin and DCM Moreno, met with Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Chief, MG Amos Yadlin, on Sunday 10 May 2009. MG Yadlin focused his discussion on the preparations for the upcoming visit of Prime Minister Netanyahu to the United States and the Iranian nuclear program. MG Yadlin informed Rep. Wexler that the PM was preparing intensely for his upcoming visit to Washington. In addition to hours of policy review, the PM had been provided significant amounts of intelligence from the IDI and Mossad on Iran's nuclear program. The intelligence presented included assessments of the current status of the Iranian program; timelines, effects of sanctions; views of the international community; and outcomes of engagement. The differences that exist between the intelligence community in interpretations of the Iranian nuclear program as well as the relationship between Iran and the Palestinians were also presented. MG Yadlin indicated that the IDF had presented its information last week, leaving the cabinet on Friday 08 May 2009 to consider policy options and how information will be presented during the upcoming visit to Washington. Although no direct feedback was provided, MG Yadlin opined that the PM appears determined on Iran.

2. (S) Rep. Wexler asked MG Yadlin to expand on the differences in the interpretations of the intelligence. MG Yadlin explained that until 2003, Iran had violated the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty by having a weaponization group and although Iran could show civilian uses for a missile program and a fissile program, there was no justification for a weaponization group. He went on to say that Iran halted its program in 2003 after the invasion of Iraq, but reinvigorated the program in 2005. He expressed that some in the US agree with this and others do not. He went on to explain that Israel is not in a position to underestimate Iran and be surprised like the US was on 11 September 2001.

3. (S) MG Yadlin explained that Israel tries to be more precise than the US in estimating Iran's intentions and timeline for obtaining a nuclear bomb. Iran is in the position of wanting to pay only a minimum cost for its current program. It does not want to be North Korea or what Iraq was before 2003. Iran intends to keep resolutions and sanctions at a certain manageable level and continue to produce low enriched uranium until there is enough for several bombs. MG Yadlin stated that Iran could decide to produce a bomb by 2010, but Iran is waiting for the right time in the future and that there are some who will always doubt it despite the evidence.

4. (S) Rep. Wexler then asked about the prospect of engagement. MG Yadlin said he does not oppose engagement, and in fact gave a speech approximately six months ago expressing that Israel needed to find a way to find positives in engagement. He feels there needs to be an agreed upon deadline; a measure for success or failure; and a plan B if engagement does not work in order for engagement to have any chance. He also expressed strongly that engagement should have already started. MG Yadlin outlined four possible outcomes of engagement. Two good outcomes would be the Iranian nuclear program stopped or a failure of engagement that allows Russia and China to see the US made all efforts to prevent the program diplomatically and allows for greater cooperation in the future. Two bad outcomes would be Iran playing for time with no claim of failure on the part of engagement or a bad bargain that still allows Iran to obtain a nuclear bomb even if in a longer timeline. Rep. Wexler went on to discuss that there is a third good option in that the President may have better leverage with the American public to support action if engagement efforts are attempted and failed. Rep Wexler recommended that the Israeli people need to consider the US perspective and public opinion. MG Yadlin responded that he is not recommending the US enter a third front, but it has to be understood that Israel sees things differently and that Israel has to be ready and can not remove the military option from the table. Rep Wexler stated that he expected Israel would be pleasantly surprised by the President's acceptance of all possible options in regards to Iran.

********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM

US embassy cables: Opponents step up pressure on Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

2010-12-02T08:56:00.001-08:00

Wednesday, 22 April 2009, 11:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000177
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 4/22/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ECON, ETRD, KDEM, IR
SUBJECT: IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE--WINDOW ON IRAN--APRIL 22,
2009
DUBAI 00000177 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (S/NF) Game of Attrition. Ahmadinejad's defeats on the budget and his plan to distribute cash payments to lower-income Iranians show that power centers, such as the Majles, are actively working to pressure the President prior to the June election, according to [Source removed]. These power centers are also stepping up their lobbying of Supreme Leader Khamenei to get his backing to stall or overturn some Presidential authorities. This game is increasingly being played out in the media, where the sides openly attack each other, and where the President's public defenses are weakening his hand and depleting political capital that he would prefer to save for the bigger fights ahead. The cash payment plan could have garnered AN additional votes, but he continues to "work the rounds" in the provinces and maintain his base of support where it really matters. By June, the current policy debates will matter less, and it is too early to consider these moves decisive to AN's electoral prospects, according to the economist. Comment: If these power centers can get increased backing from Khamenei, we may see some interesting fireworks in Iranian press in the coming weeks. As IRPO has previously reported, identifying the power centers responsible for AN' setbacks on economic policy last month is difficult but could include a broad spectrum of political factions.

Summary
Gulf-based US diplomats try to decipher complicated political manoeuvring in Tehran ahead of the 2009 elections, noting the efforts of reformist opponents determined to stop the president's bid for a second term. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

Read related article
2. (S/NF) [Name removed] said the MOIS will sometimes help assemble charges against defendants, direct cases to particular judges, and order judges to rule a particular way. Structurally, he said the Revolutionary Courts are similar to other courts, fall under the Judiciary's authority, and are theoretically supposed to follow the same law. Defendants are allowed to have lawyers during their trials, can defend themselves, and can appeal decisions. Asked about Roxanna Saberi, [Name removed] said he was aware of her case, but had no specific information on it. Comment: The Revolutionary Courts' lack of transparency and seemingly baseless decision making make [Name removed] allegations plausible and perhaps probable. [Name removed] work in the judiciary branch as a public prosecutor [Location removed] also gives his assertions some credibility, but he did not work in the Revolutionary Courts. His accusations are more likely to reflect the legal community's assumptions rather than first-hand knowledge of MOIS influence. [Name removed] was also notable for the depth of his anti-regime sentiment, which probably colors his impressions of the Revolutionary Courts.

3. (S/NF) Mousavi's Economic Program. Moderate presidential candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi announced his economic program to the Iranian press this week, emphasizing economic growth and job creation from a rejuvenated and expanded private sector. Mousavi criticized AN's halting steps at privatization, calling them "the institutionalization of non-productive government management." Stability in government policies and a strict adherence to the planning documents of a restored Management and Planning Organization (MPO) and the "rule of law," are other key planks. The best talking point in the plan, "social justice doesn't mean equal distribution of poverty," challenges AN's key economic goal by inserting economic growth into the equation and highlighting his poor economic management. Mousavi's plan only briefly mentions subsidy reforms, stressing the need to implement them gradually, after careful preparation. Comment: Mousavi's plan mentions Article 44 of Iran's constitution, which defines the role of the state, cooperative, and private sectors in Iran's economy, but his emphasis on a strong private sector may open the plan to criticism that it is in conflict with the constitution. Mousavi also threatens to withdraw Iran's Fifth Five Year Development Plan, currently being drafted, if AN submits it to the Majles before the election. An IRPO contact [Source removed], didn't expect the plan to be finished until later this year.

4. (S/NF)[Name removed] said Iran's Ministry of Commerce has approved the creation of an Iran-Americas Chamber of Commerce in anticipation of improved US-Iran ties. Although the chamber's primary focus is the US, due to political sensitivities, it will not be called an Iran-US chamber. [Name removed] made the following points:

-- Khamenei instructed Ahmadinejad to base the Fifth Five Year Development Plan on a draft from the Expediency Council. [Name removed] alleged that both the Expediency Council and the president submitted drafts of the plan to Khamenei and Khamenei favored the Expediency Council's version.

-- The current year will be positive for Iranian businesses. [Name removed] admittedly in contrast with many of his colleagues, is optimistic because the election allows Iran the opportunity to remove Ahmadinejad and because he believes economic ties with the US will be a positive shock to the Iranian economy.

-- Khamenei moderated his support for Ahmadinejad following Khatami's decision to exit the contest. [Name removed] predicts Mir Hossein Mousavi will win the election.

-- The TCC meetings are more productive than the ICCIM meetings. The TCC has a monthly meeting with government representatives, including ministers; the TCC members prepare for the meetings and, typically, complain a great deal during the meetings about government policy. Although the government is not always responsive to their complaints, following a recent meeting, the oil minister appointed a committee to resolve the TCC's concerns. Participants in ICCIM meetings, which include representatives from the provincial chambers, are typically unprepared.

--Iranians seeking an export license must be a member of a chamber of commerce and both the Ministry of Commerce and a chamber must approve the export license.

Comment: [Name removed] seems well placed to comment on economic and political developments in Iran. However, his assertion that the Expediency Council submitted a draft of the next Five Year Development plan is unusual because normally the president's office drafts the plan and submits it to the Majles. The early involvement of the Expediency Council may reflect Rafsanjani's concern over Ahmadinejad's economic policies. Khamenei in a letter to Ahmadinejad in January outlined the general policies to be included in the plan; it is possible the letter is based on a plan from the Expediency Council.

5. (S/NF) IRIG Suspicion Extends to Its Own Official Delegations: [Source removed] hinted to IRPO local staff that official Iranian delegations can be scrutinized as much as exchange groups headed to the US. [Name removed] implied that IRIG officials had carefully vetted members of the IMF delegation. Separately, he told conoff, sotto voce, that the IRIG had only decided to allow some delegation members to travel two weeks ago, although their visa applications had been ready much earlier, and that was why they were late in applying. Comment: The delay in submitting the

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visa applications may have been simple bureaucratic inefficiency, although [Name removed] indicated he strongly believed that security agencies were scrutinizing members of the delegation before permitting them to travel. RICHARDSON

US embassy cables: Prince Andrew hunts with Arab leaders

2010-12-02T08:55:00.001-08:00

Tuesday, 03 June 2003, 12:50
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 002641
SIPDIS
S/S-O PLEASE PASS NEA A/S BURNS
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/ARN AND NEA/ENA
NSC FOR THEROUX
EO 12958 DECL: 06/03/08
TAGS PREL, EPET, EAID, PGOV, JO, MO, SA, KU, TC
SUBJECT: UAE TO SUPPORT JORDAN OIL NEEDS FOR
THREE MORE MONTHS, PROVIDED $40 MILLION TO RABAT AFTER TERROR ATTACKS
REF: Abu Dhabi 1384

Summary
In a report on the UAE's ongoing assistance to Jordan and Morocco, it is mentioned that Prince Andrew often hunts in Morocco and Tanzania with the Jordanian king and UAE armed forces chief of staff. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).

2. (C) MFA Minstate Hamdan bin Zayid contacted the Ambassador on June 2 to convey information about the UAEG's ongoing assistance to Jordan and Morocco. With regard to Jordan, Hamdan reported that the UAE has agreed to continue supporting Jordan's oil needs for the next three months. Hamdan indicated the level of support would continue to be the cash equivalent of 25,000 barrels per day. The UAE began helping to fill Jordan's oil needs at the outbreak of hostilities with Iraq in March. While the Jordanians, in recent representations to the UAE, asked for support to cover the next year, Hamdan advised that the UAE, due to its own financial crunch, would only be able to provide assistance for the next three months.

3. (C) Hamdan also informed the Ambassador that, following the terror attacks in Casablanca, the UAEG provided $40 million in cash assistance to Morocco. The Moroccans intend to use the money to purchase much needed equipment. The Emiratis have asked the Moroccans to provide an accounting for the money spent. Hamdan confided that he had told his Kuwaiti and Saudi counterparts the UAE's donation was $80 million, in an effort to encourage them to give more. He wanted to make sure that the USG knew the real UAE contribution, in the event that this is raised with us.

4. (C) COMMENT: Jordan and Morocco both enjoy extremely close ties to the UAE. The Emiratis have long felt it important to provide economic assistance and support to these two moderate Arab states. The fact that Abu Dhabi is offering cash assistance, vice assistance-in-kind, is a measure of just how close these ties are since the Emiratis usually balk at writing checks. The UAE's strong official ties with Jordan and Morocco are bolstered by personal relationships between the ruling families. Jordanian King Abdullah II is a close friend of UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Muhammad bin Zayid Al-Nahyan (MbZ). The two frequently hunt -- in Morocco and Tanzania -- joined, more often than not, by England's Prince Andrew. The ties with the Moroccan monarch are equally warm. Shaykh Zayid and other Emirati ruling family members maintain vacation palaces in Morocco and have poured money into assistance projects there. END COMMENT.

WAHBA

US embassy cables: Pakistan approves secret US special forces deployment

2010-12-02T08:52:00.000-08:00

Friday, 09 October 2009, 07:25
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002449
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/05/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: (S) PAKISTAN ARMY GHQ AGAIN APPROVES EMBEDDING
U.S. SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS
REF: ISLAMABAD 2116
Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (a)(b)(c), and (d)

1. (S) Summary: The Pakistani Army has for just the second time approved deployment of U.S. special operation elements to support Pakistani military operations. The first deployment, with SOC(FWD)-PAK elements embedded with the Frontier Corps in XXXXXXXXXXXX, occurred in September (reftel). Previously, the Pakistani military leadership adamantly opposed letting us embed our special operations personnel with their military forces. The developments of the past two months thus appear to represent a sea change in their thinking. End Summary.

2. (S) Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) informed ODRP that it approved a request from the Army's 11 Corps Commander, Lt. General Masood Aslam, for U.S. SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to deploy to XXXXXXXXXXXX South Waziristan and XXXXXXXXXXXX North Waziristan, in the FATA, in order to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support and general operational advice to the 11 Corps' XXXXXXXXXXXX. The 11 Corps had informally approached ODRP about our providing such support approximately one week ago; ODRP responded positively.

3. (S) SOC(FWD)-PAK support to 11 Corps would be at the XXXXXXXXXXXX and would include a live downlink of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) full motion video. SOC(FWD)-PAK's initial CONOPs envision deployment of six personnel each to XXXXXXXXXXXX. In order to finalize our planning and obtain formal go-ahead from CENTCOM, ODRP has requested additional information on the timing and purpose of the 11 Corps' planned military operations from Brigadier General Amjad Shabbir, the Army's Director General of Military Operations (DGMO).

4. (S) This is just the second time that GHQ has approved deployment of U.S. special operations elements to support Pakistani military operations. In September 2009, four SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel who were embedded with the Frontier Corps (FC) at XXXXXXXXXXXX in the FATA, provided ISR for an FC operation (reftel). This support was highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy location.

5. (S) In recent days, the FC informally approached ODRP for a repeat deployment of SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to XXXXXXXXXXXX. SOC(FWD)-PAK is preparing a CONOP while the FC obtains approval from GHQ.

6. (S) Comment: U.S. special operation elements have been in Pakistan for more than a year, but were largely limited to a training role. The Pakistani Army leadership previously adamantly opposed letting us embed U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) with their military forces to support their operations. The recent approval by GHQ -- almost certainly with the personal consent of Chief of Army Staff General Kayani -- for SOC(FWD)-PAK deployments to XXXXXXXXXXXX appears to represent a sea change in Pakistani thinking. Patient relationship-building with the military is the key factor that has brought us to this point. The Pakistanis are increasingly confident that we do not have ulterior motives in assisting their operations. In addition, the direct recipients of SOC(FWD)-PAK training appear to have recognized the potential benefits of bringing U.S. SOF personnel into the field with them for operational advice and other support. In addition, the success of the initial deployment to XXXXXXXXXXXX likely helped catalyze the follow-up requests for new and repeat support.

7. (S) Comment Continued: These deployments are highly politically sensitive because of widely-held concerns among the public about Pakistani sovereignty and opposition to allowing foreign military forces to operate in any fashion on Pakistani soil. Should these developments and/or related matters receive any coverage in the Pakistani or U.S. media, the Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance. End Comment.

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PATTERSON

US embassy cables: Despite massive US aid, anti-Americanism rampant in Pakistan

2010-12-02T08:50:00.001-08:00

Saturday, 20 June 2009, 16:06
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ISLAMABAD 001364
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/19/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PHUM, EAID, MARR, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR JONES
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
As Pakistan's reels from the war against the Taliban in Swat, US National Security Advisor Jim Jones arrives in Islamabad. The outlook is grim: the economy is on life support, the US is helping refugees fleeing the fighting, and distrust abounds. Pakistanis suspect the US of seeking to compromise their nuclear weapons programme; some cooperation has been withdrawn. The anti-Americanism is present throughout society. Key passages highlighted in yellow.

1. (C) Summary: Embassy Islamabad warmly welcomes your visit. Your arrival comes at a moment when Pakistan's political leaders, and its people, are united in support of the military campaign to confront extremist militants in Malakand (including the Swat valley) and South Waziristan, where the offensive has just begun. Popular support for the offensive is broad but thin. Pakistan's military has begun its assault in South Waziristan with the goal of capturing or eliminating taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, whose prominence among Pakistani extremist groups has risen during the last two years. After losing strength in his spring match-off with opposition leader (and former Prime Minister) Nawaz Sharif, President Zardari has regained much of his political capital by garnering national support for the military campaign.

2. (C) The USG is providing the lion's share of international humanitarian assistance being provided to the internally displaced who fled the taliban and the military offensives in Malakand. Some eighty percent of the displaced are staying with relatives or in rented accommodations. The GOP and international humanitarian assistance organizations have so far been able to manage provision of assistance to the roughly two million IDPs. The GOP would like the IDPs to return as areas are cleared. But the longer term challenge of building a capable civilian police force and a robust economy mirrors the needs spread across the nation. The campaign in South Waziristan will play out differently; we expect fewer IDPs, more casualties, and less access for the international humanitarian assistance organizations.

3. (C) In the longer term, the GOP is confronted with a weak economy and a lack of government authority (or government provided security) in much of the country apart of the Punjab. We are planning how to spend USG funds to support Pakistan's civilian institutions, bolster budgetary support, strengthen the military's COIN capabilities, build the capacity of the police, and target impoverished areas where youth are susceptible to militancy and extremism.

4. (C) Pakistan is digging its way out of an economic crisis that came to a head in the fall of 2008, caused by poor policy choices which were compounded by the global economic crisis and high international commodity prices. To set the stage for longer-term prosperity, the government must undertake difficult structural reforms such as eliminating subsidies (electricity, wheat) and broadening tax base.

5. (C) Nuclear cooperation on security issues has decreased after wstatements made in the press about purported U.S. plans to seize nuclear facilities surfaced. Despite Zardari's own inclination to improve relations with India, his need to keep the military on his side (and/or his perceived rebuke from Indian PM Singh in Russia) have kept him from agreeing to meet again with Singh in Egypt. While we grant large amount of aid to Pakistan and its military, even with the arrival to office of the well-perceived President Obama, America is viewed with some suspicion by the majority of Pakistan's people and its institutions. End Summary.

Domestic Politics

-----------------

6. (C) The government headed by President Asif Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani, elected in 2008 after eight years of military rule, is stable. The Pakistani People's Party (PPP) and its coalition allies rule in three of the four provinces. Nawaz Sharif is by far the most popular politician in Pakistan (with an 83 percent approval rating compared to Zardari's 20 percent in the latest IRI poll), but he does not have the votes to bring down the government. 7. (C) Zardari signed Shari'a law in Swat, which precipitated the taliban's emboldened attempt to dominate Swat and bordering areas. He also overplayed his hand when Nawaz and Shahbaz were declared ineligible by the Court. This exposed him to the force of Nawaz' ability to bring the populace into the street during the (lawyer's) "long march." Having managed to stay in office by restoring the Chief Justice and maintain civil order during that period, Zardari has recovered through his so far successful (if not robust) management of relations with the Pakistan Military and by

ISLAMABAD 00001364 002 OF 006

piggy-backing on the popular support for the military's offensive against the taliban.

8. (C) While Nawaz is preparing for the next election and appealing directly to the street, a court case considering voiding past convictions against him is winding its way through the Supreme Court. Even though Zardari retains the Presidency, Nawaz can be seen as the real winner of the "long march" stand-off: he demonstrated his popular support; stood firm in his demands; saw the Supreme Court leadership reinstated; and, affirmed his right to run in the next election. During the events leading up to the "long march" there was talk that the Army might feel compelled to step in. Chief of Army Staff General Kayani is determined that a civilian government succeed, however, and while he mistrusts Zardari he despises Nawaz.

9. (C) While far from perfect, you will find Zardari is pro-American, anti-extremist and eager to be seen as working with the USG. Zardari runs the show on the civilian side, although he is not a popular leader and admits himself that he came to high office without previous direct experience as an elected politician. Secular and westernized, Zardari sees himself as viewing the world the way Americans do; this same image works against him with the public.

10. (S) Zardari is less likely to make public announcements chastising the USG for its policies in, and toward Pakistan (including on USG drone activity) than other senior GOP officials. His public (and private) lament is that Pakistan has the will to combat terrorism, but the USG has been miserly in providing resources. In his own fashion, this is Zardari's version of the widely held view that Pakistan has made great sacrifices at the behest of America, for little return and less recognition.

11. (C) Prime Minister Gilani has shown strong leadership skills in building Parliamentary coalitions at times of national crisis and in the absence of public leadership by President Zardari. Gilani has stiched together all party Parliamentary sessions that have forged cross-party unity on the need to tackle terrorism and to endorse the military offensives against Pakistani extremists (often referred to as "miscreants"). He gave the impassioned address to the public May 7 asking the Pakistani people to support military action in Swat and surrounding agrees; a defining moment that marked the beginning of the sea change in public attitudes toward the taliban and granted legitimacy to the military's actions.

12. (C) Gilani was also instrumental in bringing the "long march" crisis to a peaceful resolution, and was the senior GOP official (not Zardari) who announced the reinstatement of the Supreme Court Justice. Like Foreign Minister Qureshi, Gilani comes from the religiously important Multan and is a Sufi saint. His English is somewhat halting and conversation with him can be opaque. He pays great attention to protocol and is an attentive listener, however, when he believes he is being treated as a friend and equal. Reports of Zardari/Gilani tensions are probably exaggerated.

Economic and Structural Challenges

----------------------------------

13. (C) Pakistan is digging its way out of an economic crisis that came to a head in the fall of 2008, caused by poor policy choices which were compounded by the global economic crisis and high international commodity prices. The government sought relief from the International Monetary Fund, and signed a $7.6 billion agreement with them in November 2008. Under the terms of this agreement, the GOP has curtailed borrowing from the central bank and greatly cut back its expenditures, bringing its fiscal deficit down from over 7 percent of GDP to 3.4 percent. The market has responded to these reforms, and foreign exchange reserves, which had fallen to dangerously low levels, have rebounded and the value of the rupee has stabilized.

14. (C) However, to set the stage for longer-term prosperity, the government must undertake more difficult structural reforms such as eliminating unaffordable subsidies (electricity, wheat) and broadening its tax base. The belt-tightening of the past eight months has caused growth to

ISLAMABAD 00001364 003 OF 006

slow, however, and it is estimated to be 2 percent for the current fiscal year, down from original predictions of 4.5 percent. The challenge in the coming year will be to stimulate the economy while maintaining a level of fiscal discipline. The situation is complicated by the financial burden of caring for large numbers of internally displaced persons and by the need to significantly step up civilian law enforcement personnel, especially in NWFP, FATA, but also around the country. The GOP is heavily dependent on donor assistance to pay for its development and humanitarian assistance budget, at least for the foreseeable future.

The Swat Military Campaign and IDPS

-----------------------------------

15. (C) The military's effective campaign against taliban in Bajaur last fall was limited in geographical scope. Rumors that taliban leaders were sitting in Swat festered, and the government entered into a series of ill-advised and half-hearted negotiations with extremist leaders residing in the region. These resulted in Zardari's eventual signing of the Nazm-e-Adl regulation in April, which the government sold as meeting the local population's demand for "speedy justice." Politicians were at pains to explain that Swat, as a princely state, had an historically different history and custom and that the deal did not mark an abdication of government authority or an open door to harsh (by Pakistani standards) interpretation of Shari'a law. The wide-spread release of a video showing taliban flogging a young woman in a public square brought doubts about taliban intent home to the public.

16. (S) Zardari, meanwhile, argued privately that he had to sign the deal in order that the GOP be seen to have been willing to try everything before turning the military against its own people. The shocking flogging video circulated at the same time as suicide bombers and terrorist gunmen took on targets including police stations and main boulevard checkpoints in Lahore and Islamabad. In the rural areas, they blew up Mosques and shrines. Public opinion about the taliban, that it was part of the social fabric of parts of the country and if left unperturbed would not damage public life, started to shift. Once the taliban moved out of Swat, where extremists had overrun the streets and beheaded well-known journalists, the view that the Nazm-e-Adl deal had been breached by the taliban grew. PM Gilani gathered cross-party support in Parliament and appealed to the public to support a military campaign in Swat.

17. (C) After military operations started in May in Swat and neighboring areas, some two million Pakistani citizens moved out of the area and became internally displaced. (The wealthier families of Swat departed a year earlier as taliban violence against the feudal elite and the threat of it forced them to retreat to Islamabad and elsewhere.) Senior GOP officials would be the first to say that it was the hospitality of the Pakistani people which kept the IDPs clothed, fed and sheltered in the first instance. Best estimates are that 80 percent of the displaced have been taken in by Pakistanis, not necessarily relatives. NGOs and the UN are serving the population not in camps. A combination of military-run, community volunteer, and UN agency directed camps are sheltering the other IDPs.

18. (C) We have reports of some IDPs returning, including several hundred thousand in Bajaur and up to half the populations in parts of Buner; families traveling with livestock can be witnessed returning to the Swat area via roads leaving Islamabad. However, we do not have hard figures on returns: lack of security, and families' desire to receive the GOP return fund of USD 312 are two of the reasons IDPs have yet to return. Operations in Malakand, though ongoing in some areas, are said to be in the "mopping-up phase" (even as officials acknowledge that sporadic "spot" fighting is likely to continue for another six months.)

19. (C) All of the big international humanitarian organizations are present in Pakistan. Like our own approach to staffing the Consulate, even the recent terror attacks in Peshawar (in which UN officials were killed) have not dissuaded them. Most humanitarian organizations have withdrawn their international staff to Islamabad; leaving

ISLAMABAD 00001364 004.2 OF 006

local staff to implement programs at the camps and in communities. Security continues to be an issue, even in areas the Army has declared "cleared."

Economic Recovery Key

---------------------

20. (C) The USG and the GOP are in agreement that the key to maintaining security (and keeping extremists from reemerging) is in economic recovery and improving civilian authority -- not least in law enforcement. Prime Minister Gilani calls this the "hearts and minds" campaign necessary to maintain the gains won by the military campaign and to maintain popular support for those campaigns. The GOP is confronted with a weak economy and a lack of government authority (or government provided security) in much of the country outside of the Punjab, and even in the south of the prosperous Punjab we have seen an increasing trend to extremism among youth.

21. (C) We are planning how to spend USG funds to support Pakistan's civilian institutions, bolster budgetary support, strengthen the military's COIN capabilities, build the capacity of the police, and target impoverished areas where the youth are susceptible to militancy and extremism. What the GOP calls "hearts and minds" we see as part of our broader objective of helping the GOP build an effective COIN capability and policy by using USG resources where the GOP is particularly exposed. The GOP will need to focus on recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction if it is to hold its recent gains. Establishing (or reestablishing long-languishing) government authority and services poses one of the greatest challenges to the GOP. Economic development is the key to Pakistan's success in implementing a broad-ranging counterinsurgency policy.

Waziristan

----------

22. (S) Pakistan's military has begun its assault in South Waziristan with the goal of capturing or eliminating taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, whose prominence among Pakistani extremist groups has risen during the last two years. We expect the military campaign in Waziristan to be tougher than in Swat, with the military willing to use air power to an extent it was not in the "settled areas." The military strategy is three pronged: isolate Baitullah by putting intense pressure on the Mehsud tribe; incite inter-tribal violence (the leader of the Bhittani tribe has already come out publicly against Baitullah); make deals with other militants to refrain from supporting Baitullah against the GOP. We have some indications that the separation of Mehsud tribe peoples is already underway.

23. (S) The 2007-2008 blockade of the Mehsud area, which was initially quite severe, produced approximately 200,000 IDPs. However, we expect the attack from the military to be more fearsome by an order of magnitudes; meaning much higher casualty rates and less access for the humanitarian relief agencies. Some "shaping operations" designed to contain and weaken Baitullah Mehsud's sphere of operations were undertaken in advance of the campaign.

24. (C) The GOP is wary of international scrutiny through the United Nations which may embroil it in charges of being in breach of international humanitarian law. The USG has made no judgment on this issue, but the GOP would be well-served by seeking to uphold Geneva Convention standards during the conflict, regardless of its own judgment that the military offensives represent domestic law enforcement activities.

Military Cooperation

--------------------

25. (S) The campaigns in Malakand (including Swat) and now in Waziristan, have demonstrated Pakistan's will to fight extremism. Faced with its weaknesses against a formidable enemy, the Frontier Corps has accepted USG training (if on a limited and highly-controlled basis), and that has given us new access and opportunities to improve Pakistani counter-insurgency capability. Pakistan has agreed to build additional tripartite Border Coordination Centers (BCCs), and we have expanded intelligence sharing through the Torkham

ISLAMABAD 00001364 005.2 OF 006

BCC. The military remains reluctant to expand the U.S. military footprint, but we now have the basis for increased cooperation. USG efforts to provide Mi-17 helicopters have meant an exponential increase in the Pakistan Military's ability to deploy helicopters in its ongoing campaign against extremists.

26. (S) The campaign itself may prove, over time, to be an event that builds trust and increases U.S./Pak military cooperation. Military and civilian authorities underscore, however, that gains made in the campaign will only be supported by the public if they are perceived as having been made by Pakistan alone.

Nuclear Security

----------------

27. (S) Since A.Q Khan's proliferation activities came to light in 2004, Pakistan has sought to rehabilitate its image as a nuclear technology bazaar. The GOP passed laws regulating exports of sensitive technologies and criminalizing proliferation, established an export control mechanism, joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and strengthened its National Command Authority and security apparatus to govern and protect its nuclear weapons. U.S. support has been instrumental to Pakistan's improved nonproliferation practices. U.S. experts have trained Pakistani counterparts in a wide variety of topics ranging from technology controls to physical protection, provided critical equipment, and encouraged Pakistan's adherence to international nonproliferation instruments.

28. (S) Over the last two months, however, local and international media reporting on U.S. and international fears that terrorists would acquire Pakistan's nuclear weapons has put the GOP on the defensive. These concerns centered on the proximity of some nuclear sites to territory under attack by the taliban, the rumored dispersal of Pakistan's nuclear assets, and the vulnerability of weapons and nuclear materials in transit. The GOP is particularly neuralgic to suggestions that its nuclear weapons could fall into terrorist hands and to reports of U.S. plans to seize the weapons in case of emergency. As a result, Pakistan has begun to pull back from some nonproliferation engagement with the USG, including refusing high-level discussions and delaying implementation of some programs. One effort to remove jointly spent nuclear fuel from a Pakistani nuclear research reactor, for instance, has been put on hold for 3-4 months, or until such time as the media attention has abated.

India

-----

29. (C) President Zardari is personally in favor of improving Pakistan's relations with India, but efforts early in his tenure (including on opening trade between Indian and Pakistan-held Kashmir) were overcome by the Mumbai terror attacks and India's reaction to what it perceived as Pakistan's complicity in them and by the Pakistan Military's lack of approval for such initiatives which Zardari can not take on his own. Zardari is conscious that he must not be perceived as reopening negotiations on Kashmir now if he wants to keep Pakistan's military focused on the western campaigns -- and not its institutional enemy, India.

30. (C) The June 16 meeting between President Zardari and Indian Prime Minister Singh in Russia was marred by what the Pakistani side viewed as Singh's "rudeness" in telling the press (in front of Zardari) that he was only charged with speaking to the President about the use of Pakistani soil by terrorists aimed at India. PM Gilani will attend the NAM Summit in Egypt in July, instead of Zardari, thus obviating what the GOP had initially said would be the next opportunity for the leaders to meet. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggests that only USG pressure will cause the GOI to reestablish the "Composite Dialogue" -- the bilateral forum meant to develop a series of confidence building measures between the two nations.

America

-------

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31. (S) While we grant large amounts of aid to Pakistan and its military, even with the arrival to office of the well-perceived President Obama, America is viewed with some suspicion by the majority of Pakistan's people and its institutions. We are viewed at best as a fickle friend, and at worst as the reason why Pakistan is attacking its own (although this view may be changing as the popular picture of the true nature of the taliban has shifted in the last several months). While the Army remains fixated on India as Pakistan's mortal enemy, the common man (and most importantly the youth) is just as likely to point to America as the nation which has twisted Pakistan's collective arm, leaving it weak. Much of the financial support and technical advice we give to the GOP is delivered privately and in a low-key fashion: our goal is to strengthen Pakistani institutions and demonstrable ties to the USG have the opposite effect in the public mind. GOP officials are prickly about issues of sovereignty. They too can't be seen as reliant on U.S. largess. How to support the civilian government, strengthen its institutions, economy, and military capacity to engage in COIN, without further provoking antagonism toward the U.S., remains a central challenge. PATTERSON

US embassy cables: Imran Khan criticises 'dangerous' US policy

2010-12-02T08:49:00.000-08:00

Saturday, 06 February 2010, 11:26
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000301
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/06/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PK, AF
SUBJECT: CODEL LYNCH'S MEETING WITH PAKISTAN
TEHREEK-E-INSAF (PTI) PARTY LEADER IMRAN KHAN
REF: A. 09 ISLAMABAD 03029 B. ISLAMABAD 00183
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)

1. (C) Summary: On January 29, a congressional delegation led by Representative Stephen Lynch met with Imran Khan, a former professional cricket player who heads the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf ("Law and Justice") party, at Khan's residence in the hills overlooking Rawal Lake on the outskirts of Islamabad. The meeting's picturesque setting belied Khan's often pointed and critical statements on U.S. policy, which he characterized as dangerous and in need of change. His litany of criticisms ranged from accusations of U.S. failure to support democracy in Pakistan to drone operations being a driving force of militancy and radicalization. Khan urged the U.S. to seek out "alternative points of views" because the GOP can not be trusted to give it an accurate assessment of the real terrorist threat in Pakistan. He also called on the U.S. to engage local tribes to deal with the Taliban and other militant forces, and argued that the U.S. will have to scale back its operations in Afghanistan in order to make way for talks. End Summary.

2. (C) A congressional delegation led by Representative Stephen Lynch met with Imran Khan, a former professional cricket player who heads the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, on January 29. Khan welcomed the delegation to his home located on the outskirts of Islamabad in the hills overlooking Rawal Lake. The meeting was held outside on the immaculate lawn of Khan's sizeable home against the backdrop of the foothills of the Himalayas. The picturesque setting, however, lay in stark contrast to the often pointed and critical statements that were later to come from Khan. What was initially scheduled to be a 30-minute courtesy call stretched into an hour-long, largely one-sided, and somewhat uncomfortable conversation, with Khan delivering blunt views on what he considers to be failings of U.S. policy in Pakistan and, by extension, in Afghanistan.

3. (C) Representative Lynch opened the meeting noting that with the Obama administration had come a new opportunity for change in U.S. policy toward Pakistan and for "resetting" the relationship between the two allies. Lynch stated that both of our countries are facing "real challenges" that have been exacerbated by the poor global economy. He acknowledged facing questions from his constituents about why the U.S. sends economic assistance to Pakistan ("With no returns," quipped Khan). However, Lynch said he understood that, though it would take much work and patience, it was important "to help Pakistan stabilize itself." He highlighted the need to build trust between the two countries and to have more dialogue.

4. (C) Lynch then yielded the floor to Khan, who took the opening to begin his litany of objections to the conduct of U.S. policy in Pakistan, which he characterized as being dangerous and in need of change. Khan noted that he had been in opposition to former President Pervez Musharraf's government and that he was now also in opposition to President Asif Ali Zardari's government. He stated that he had initially supported Musharraf because Musharraf had promised to bring "real democracy" to Pakistan. However, in the end, "Musharraf took us all for a ride." He stated that Musharraf was initially popular with the people because they were fed up with former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, but he lamented that Musharraf ended up bringing back into his government the same individuals who had served under Benazir and Nawaz.

5. (C) Khan charged that former Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and former Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher endorsed the controversial National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) (reftels) specifically in order to pave the way for Bhutto's return to Pakistan. Khan further argued that there is a common perception that Bhutto decided to run for office under U.S. pressure. Now, "thanks to the NRO, the biggest criminal in the country (i.e., Zardari) has been brought to power," Khan stated. Khan added that U.S. assistance was going to "a known crook" and said the U.S. should not stand with Zardari because "you need a credible partner to deal with our Taliban."

6. (C) Khan went on to chastise the U.S. for repeating with Zardari a key mistake that, he claimed, it had made during Musharraf's government, which was that "it supported the man and not the democratic process." Khan cautioned the U.S. against giving the impression that it is supporting a puppet government in Pakistan, which will only further alienate the people, he added. Khan claimed that evidence of this alienation can be found in the fact that after eight years of U.S. support to Pakistan, 80 percent of Pakistanis believe the U.S. is a greater threat to Pakistan than India is. He insisted the U.S. should always bank on supporting democracy in Pakistan because, ultimately, whatever government comes to power will "want to play ball with the U.S.," as long as it is "sovereign and trustworthy."

7. (C) Lynch told Khan that leadership in Pakistan has been a "moving target," and acknowledged that a lot of hope had been riding on Bhutto's return to power. However, Lynch emphasized that there was never a calculation on the USG's part to support any one leader over another. He added that U.S. policy toward Pakistan, overall, has consistently been driven by the view of Pakistan as a strategic partner.

8. (C) On the current security situation in Pakistan, Khan advised that the USG should use local tribes to deal with Taliban and other militant forces. He said that, in order to be able to work with tribesmen, we have to understand the "tribal character," which, he said, is primarily marked by hospitality and revenge. He denounced the use of aerial bombings and drone operations, arguing that they have created animosity and caused local tribesmen to join militant forces in order to seek revenge. (Note: Khan also pointedly stated that the GOP allows the "drone attacks" to occur, then lies to the Pakistani public that it has no control over them to deflect the public's anger. End Note.) Khan argued that such operations were radicalizing Pakistani youth, not just among the poor but also among the educated, middle classes. Dialogue, policing, and intelligence gathering should be the cornerstone of anti-militancy efforts in the tribal areas instead of the use of military force, Khan contended. Noting that he was recently in Swat, he went on to accuse the Pakistan Army of extrajudicial killings, summary executions, and "sexual humiliation" of residents in some villages.

9. (C) Khan urged the USG to seek "alternative points of views" about what is happening in the tribal areas of Pakistan, and he recommended speaking with General Orakzai, former NWFP Govenor, for starters. Khan charged that the GOP is "blinded by dollars," and consequently lacks an accurate view of what is happening on the ground. He further claimed that the GOP "whips up the threat of the Taliban" in order to get more money from the U.S. He claimed last year's Swat operation, which he termed a "debacle," was one such exaggeration that was "stage managed" in order to gain U.S. funds; there was no imminent threat of militants marching on Islamabad, he said. Khan also claimed that the Lal Masjid operation was similarly stage managed by Musharraf. He called for an end to Pakistan's "insane military action" in the tribal areas, adding that the Army has failed to secure any significant areas of South Waziristan despite GOP statements to the contrary.

10. (C) On current local politics, Khan predicted Pakistan was heading towards mid-term elections. He also claimed that Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was the most popular man in Pakistan at the moment because the people of Pakistan want NRO beneficiaries to be brought to justice. Regarding Afghanistan, Khan argued that a government of consensus is needed in that country, adding that Pakistan can play a credible role there. He asserted that the government in Afghanistan needs to be "perceived as sovereign." He said our mistake in Afghanistan was failing to isolate Al-Qaeda from the Taliban. Khan called on the U.S. to scale back its operations in Afghanistan to make way for talks.

11. (U) This cable was drafted after CODEL Lynch departed Pakistan.

12. (U) Participants

U.S. Representative Stephen Lynch Representative Bob Inglis Representative Todd Platts Representative Betty Sutton Representative Joe Donnelly Scott Lindsay, Professional Staff Member, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee (HOGR) Bruce Fernandez, Professional Staff Member, HOGR Adam Fromm, Professional Staff Member, HOGR DCM Jerry Feierstein

Pakistan Imran Khan, leader of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party PATTERSON

State Department cables: Saudis distrust Pakistan's Shia president Zardari

2010-12-02T08:47:00.001-08:00

Monday, 26 October 2009, 13:18
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 001415
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS SA, PK, AF, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR ON MILITARY OPERATIONS IN
FATA; SAUDI RELATIONS
RIYADH 00001415 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

SUMMARY:

---------

1. (C) During an Oct. 20 courtesy call with the Ambassador, Pakistani Ambassador Umar Khan Alisherzai highlighted the success of recent military operations in Pakistan's tribal areas; lamented strains on the Saudi-Pakistani bilateral relationship; discussed other regional issues affecting Pakistan; and offered his advice on countering extremism in rural tribal regions. End Summary.

WAZIRISTAN: "REASONABLE RESISTANCE, BUT NOT AS MUCH AS WE EXPECTED"

-----------------------------------

2. (C) Alisherzai described the Pakistani military operations in Waziristan as "progressing well," adding that they had encountered "reasonable resistance, but not as much as we expected." The army faced difficult terrain in the region, he continued, but had already killed over 100 militants. Alisherzai described the extremists as a group of "Chechens, Saudis, Uzbeks and others" who had come across the border from Afghanistan and sought refuge with the local population. Although tribal tradition required the Pakistanis to offer them shelter, he explained, "these people turned out to be monsters," and the local population turned against them.

SWAT VALLEY: A SUCCESS STORY?

-----------------------------

3. (C) Alisherzai pointed to the military's advances against the Taliban in the Swat Valley as one example of success in the region. The cooperation of the local people was a decisive factor, as they provided the most effective intelligence to the military after realizing that "the militants were not interested in Islam at all." In addition, the military and police in Swat provided weapons to local tribes. When pressed about conditions in Swat, Alisherzai admitted that the Pakistani military still faced challenges due to their limited resources. He said that 10,000 soldiers had been relocated from the Indian border to Swat and that 100,000 new soldiers were placed there as well. However, Alisherzai was quick to point out that the 100,000 new soldiers were inexperienced.

4. (C) While upbeat that Pakistan's military and civilian leaders were "truly working in tandem for the first time," Alisherzai was disappointed that action was not taken sooner. "All of this would have been easier if done under (former Pakistani President) Musharraf," he concluded.

"WE NEED MORE ARMS, AMMO AND PLANES"

------------------------------------

5. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question about support from CentCom, Alisherzai replied that the U.S. "does a lot for Pakistan." However, it was not enough to fight this problem. All of NATO was fighting the battle in Afghanistan, he complained, while Pakistan alone was standing up to the extremists within its borders. For this reason he insisted that Pakistan needed more material support from the U.S. in the form of "arms, ammo and planes."

REBUILDING OLD RELATIONSHIPS

----------------------------

6. (C) When asked about the Saudi-Pakistani relationship, Alisherzai admitted that it had been strained since Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari's election. Alisherzai blamed the problems on the Saudi perception that Zardari was pro-Iranian and pro-Shia, which made them apprehensive about working with him. "We have been punished by Saudi Arabia because our president talks to the Iranians," Alisherzai lamented. He claimed that his access to Saudi leadership was good, but that he would have to continue to work hard to rebuild Pakistan,s relationship with the SAG. Alisherzai opined

RIYADH 00001415 002.2 OF 002

that the Saudis were more concerned with their own internal problems than with the problems of Pakistan.

IRAN

----

7. (C) Alisherzai accused Russia of "fully supporting the Iranians' nuclear program," adding that all Shia communities in the region supported this program. He described Iranian nuclear ambitions as a move to consolidate domestic political power and stated multiple times, "they will not leave this subject."

INDIA: "WE ARE NOT EXPECTING ANYTHING GOOD"

-------------------------------------------

8. (C) Alisherzai blamed India for helping to train and fund extremist groups fighting against the Government of Pakistan. He said that India also helped support the Taliban in Pakistan, explaining "They (India) will never let a chance to harm Pakistan go." Alisherzai summed up his feelings about India by saying, "We are not expecting anything good from them."

THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM

-----------------------

9. (C) Asked how to stop terrorism and extremism in Pakistan, Alisherzai said that the people living in the tribal areas "don't know the value of life." He blamed this on their lack of education and knowledge of the outside world, and said that they only know fighting and dying. In his view, investment in education and development was the only way to help the tribal areas, and said that years of "bad luck" had redirected development funds from the tribal areas to the urban population centers. He reiterated his support for military operations, but insisted that a program to educate young boys in the region must also be implemented. He noted that this program should be funded by NATO and added, "I am only here today because of my education. Perhaps I would have been Al-Qaeda too, if not for my education."

COMMENT:

--------

10. (C) Alisherzai is from the Kurram Agency, one of the seven tribal agencies that make up the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) along the Afghanistan border. As such, he is able to offer an insider's view of life along the Pakistani-Afghan border. His observation that intelligence and support provided by the local population has been essential to the success of Pakistani military operations is worth noting, as are his suggestions as to how we might counter the growth of extremism in the region. However, his insights about larger regional issues (ie: Iran, India, Saudi Arabia) appear to be much more limited. End comment.

BIOGRAPHIC NOTE

---------------

11. (C) Alisherzai grew up in the FATA bordering the Afghanistan provinces of Khowst and Paktya. His father served in the British military and insisted that his son attend school. Alisherzai says that at the age of five he walked 8km to school everyday. He has six children, all living in the U.S. and all graduates of George Mason University. SMITH

US embassy cables: Saudis fear 'Shia triangle' of Iran, Iraq and Pakistan

2010-12-02T08:46:00.001-08:00

Thursday, 09 April 2009, 04:22
S E C R E T STATE 034688
EO 12958 DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS OVIP">OVIP (CLINTON, HILLARY), UAE
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's April 7, 2009 meeting

with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed

1.(U) Classified by Bureau Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

2. (U) April 7, 2009; 1:30 p.m.; Washington, DC.

3. (U) Participants:

U.S.

----

The Secretary Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman Jake Sullivan, S staff Barbara Masilko, NEA Notetaker

UAE

---

UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) Ambassador Yousef al Otaiba Abdullah al Saboosi, UAE Notetaker

4. (S) SUMMARY. The Secretary reviewed the status of the US-UAE 123 agreement and additional action the UAE can take to encourage a positive Congressional review. The UAE request for participation in the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) is under serious consideration. The Secretary expressed her interest in participating in a GCC plus three meeting in Baghdad in the near future. The UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) also suggested a GCC plus 3 and P5 plus 1 joint meeting to discuss Iran. AbZ confirmed his intention to participate in the Pakistan Donors conference in Tokyo and expressed concerns about Saudi back peddling. The Secretary thanked the UAE for the positive support for both the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Palestinian Authority. AbZ noted that Qatar wants the Arab League to request a meeting with the Quartet focused on settlements and East Jerusalem. END SUMMARY.

--------------------------------------

Nuclear Cooperation and Export Control

--------------------------------------

5. (S) The Secretary expressed the Administration's commitment to the U.S.-UAE Agreement for Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (aka 123 Agreement). She emphasized that our goal is to get the agreement completed as smoothly as possible. AbZ said that he is delighted with the progress on the agreement. He added that the UAE's goal is to create a gold standard for a nuclear power program. Then, because of the strong commitments the UAE has made, it will be impossible to have improper use of its nuclear facilities.

6. (S) Turning to the need to be prepared to respond to Congress, the Secretary committed to form a State Department committee including H, NEA and ISN to work on the notification. The Secretary noted the importance of implementing the UAE export control law and continued UAE efforts against illicit Iranian trade and Iranian front companies. The Secretary encouraged action on nonproliferation treaty commitments as especially helpful actions the UAE could take to support our efforts. AbZ noted that the UAE would formally join the additional protocol on April 8.

7. (S) AbZ agreed that the August 2007 export control law had some "loopholes" and said that the UAE Cabinet "revisited" the issue last week. Otaiba said that AbZ had personally intervened to ensure timely action. Otaiba elaborated that the committee charged with implementing the export control law will have its first meeting later this month to begin operations.

8. (S) Otaiba noted that, even in the absence of a formal implementation committee, the UAE is taking action - citing a recent case involving German-made Siemens computers and a Chinese ship bound for Iran interdicted in port in the UAE.

---------------------

Major Economies Forum

---------------------

9. (S) The Secretary noted UAE interest in the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF). While noting that the UAE does not technically meet the criteria for the meeting, based on size of the economy alone, the Secretary said there are many criteria that make it important for the UAE to attend, adding she will make a recommendation for UAE participation as an observer. AbZ said the UAE bid to host the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) headquarters would be very difficult to achieve if the UAE is locked out of the MEF preparatory meeting in Washington and promised "we will remember your help."

----

Iran

----

10. (S) The Secretary said the U.S. is looking to see if Iran can be engaged in any productive manner and noted that Special Advisor Ross would travel to the region soon for consultations. AbZ told the Secretary that UAE feels threatened by Iran today, even though Iran does not yet have a nuclear capability. AbZ asserted that the UAE is even more worried about Iranian intentions than is Israel. AbZ encouraged the U.S. to consider a GCC plus 3 and P5 plus 1 joint meeting.

----------------

Iraqi GCC plus 3

----------------

11. (S) The Secretary expressed interest in the Iraqi invitations for a GCC plus 3 meeting in Baghdad, at a date to be determined. She noted the value of the GCC plus 3 mechanism not only for furthering Arab engagement with the Iraqi government during a time of transition, but as a way to send a message to Iran that Iraq has broad support in the Arab world.

--------------------

Afghanistan/Pakistan

--------------------

12. (S) The Secretary told AbZ that the U.S. needs help to stem the flow of funds from the Gulf to the Taliban. She noted that one area of potential action is reviving training related to bulk cash smuggling.

13. (S) Thanking the UAE for hosting the Friends of Pakistan preparatory meeting, the Secretary said she hopes AbZ would attend the April donors conference in Tokyo. AbZ confirmed that he plans to attend and said that the UAE will make a "strong" pledge, but no decision has been made on an exact dollar figure.

14. (S) AbZ express concern over Saudi Arabia's decision not to make a pledge at the Tokyo conference. AbZ said that the Saudis have never liked the Pakistan Peoples Party, and support Nawaz Sharif. In addition, AbZ posited that Saudi Arabia suspects that Zardari is Shia, thus creating Saudi concern of a Shia triangle in the region between Iran, the Maliki government in Iraq, and Pakistan under Zardari. Feltman noted a pattern of Saudi behavior of withholding financial assistance - not supporting March 14 in Lebanon, not sending funds to the PA, and not planning a pledge for Pakistan. Otaiba added that Saudi Arabia also failed make a commitment at the G20 meeting.

-------

Lebanon

-------

15. (S) The Secretary noted the need to support Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the run up to the elections with concrete displays of support. Feltman added that the UAE had been particularly helpful already by funding the delivery of the first ten refurbished tanks for the LAF. AbZ noted that he would meet with visiting Lebanese Minister of Defense Murr later on April 7. AbZ said the UAE will purchase additional munitions for LAF helicopters, donated by the UAE to LAF last year, but is waiting for France to provide a price estimate.

-------------------------

Middle East Peace Process

-------------------------

16. (S) The Secretary thanked the UAE for its strong financial support for the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Secretary asked if AbZ had an update on the status of Palestinian unity talks. Acknowledging that Hamas and Fatah are not coming to an agreement, AbZ replied with a smile that things are "going well."

17. (S) AbZ said that in addition to financial support for the PA it is important that the new Israeli government reach out to President Abbas. AbZ said that the Secretary should expect the Qatari Prime Minister to request an Arab League meeting with the Quartet focused on settlements and East Jerusalem. AbZ said the Quartet will need to use the same standards for the new Israel government as already applied to the Palestinians regarding respecting previous agreements. The Secretary agreed. AbZ said that it is important to create a road map of Israeli and Palestinian actions towards an end game. The Secretary agreed on the importance of simultaneous reinforcing actions in support of negotiations. AbZ said that the UAE candidacy to host IRENA could yield political benefits, if successful. Israel is already a signatory to the agreement, so it would have a representative IRENA mission in Abu Dhabi should the UAE be chosen to host headquarters.

CLINTON

US embassy cables: Turkey seen as answer to Saudis' influence in Pakistan

2010-12-02T08:45:00.001-08:00

Sunday, 24 May 2009, 06:23
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001118
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/23/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREF, EAID, MOPS, PHUM, MARR, PREL, PK, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH AMBASSADOR: THEIR TRILATERALS, FRIENDS,
NATO, IDP AID, AND NAWAZ
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador, accompanied by EmbOffs, met May 20 with Turkish Ambassador Soysal and other Turkish counterparts. The Turkish Embassy, which has taken on a coordinating role for NATO in Pakistan, advocated greater cooperation with the U.S. vis-a-vis Pakistan. Soysal described Turkey's own trilateral meetings with Afghanistan and Pakistan. He thought the Af-Pak relationship had improved since the February 2008 elections and credited Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi in particular for this "geographic sensitivity." While Turkey hoped their trilaterals would result in cooperative programs, the real objective was increased trust and transparency between the two neighbors. The trilaterals had matured past joint statements; decisions on specific projects needed to be implemented for the meetings to be worthwhile, Soysal said. Encouragingly, the three countries had already conducted a number of joint training on a range of subjects. Soysal agreed that the "Friends of Democratic Pakistan" initiative should not morph into a donors forum, despite the GOP predilection. He believed a strong secretariat, along the lines of a task force model, was needed to ensure the initiative's policy success. NATO could also contribute to Pakistan's development, sponsoring education initiatives and professional exchanges.

2. (C) Summary continued: Turkish President Gul would call President Zardari May 22 to offer an aid package for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Soysal focused on the July/August timeframe, which this year includes Ramadan, suggesting Turkish aid may be more post-emergency. So far, Turkey was the only Muslim country to contribute to this humanitarian crisis, though Soysal hoped next week's Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) would take action. He was frustrated the GOP had no timeline for the offensive in Swat and thought the Army was moving too slowly to initiate operations in the Waziristans before next year. He was not certain Pakistani politics would be so patient and encouraged international missions to push for a non-partisan climate for as long as possible. Most of the responsibility for this, however, rested with Zardari, who needed to employ confidence building measures within his own party and with other parties, especially leading opposition Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). End summary.

3. (S) Turkish Embassy Participants: Ambassador Engin Soysal, DCM Semih Luffu Turgut, Army/Air Attache Colonel Nuri Gayir, Naval Attache Erhan Sensoy, and Second Secretary Ilker Kucukkurt. US Mission Participants: Ambassador Anne Patterson, DCM Jerry Feierstein, RAO Chief John Bennett, Army Attache Scott Taylor, and PolOff Terry Steers-Gonzalez (notetaker).

Their Trilaterals

- - - - - - - - -

4. (C) Soysal described the trilateral meetings by Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan, dating back to April 2007. Those three meetings had been kept relatively "small and focused," he said; each had its own theme -- (1) dialogue, (2) development, and (3) security and intelligence. The next trilateral meeting, date to be determined, will focus on education. Though Soysal admitted the three countries' education systems were quite different, the exchange was meant to build trust and transparency. He emphasized the meeting would be formatted as parallel bilateral discussions rather than true trilats.

5. (C) The GOT had witnessed first-hand a deterioration in the relationship between the Karzai-Musharraf administrations over the first three trilaterals, Soysal revealed. Since Zardari's presidency, he had observed much improved relations, relatively, between the two countries. While President Asif Zardari deserved some recognition for this positive turn, Soysal credited principally Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani and Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi. They both exhibited "geographic sensitivity," he added, playing up their moderate Sufi credentials and raising universal and/or conciliatory themes.

6. (C) Soysal was proud the Turkish-sponsored trilaterals had

ISLAMABAD 00001118 002 OF 003

matured beyond joint statements; now, the three countries needed to implement their decisions. There had already been trilateral training opportunities, he added, including on crisis response, counter-narcotics, and public affairs topics. He also mentioned a number of proposals he hoped would materialize soon, including a "joint" community center in Peshawar and a development center in Ankara. He thought the latter would welcome the visits of American experts. Turkey was additionally proposing a trilateral military exercise or war game.

7. (S) Ambassador Patterson briefed Soysal on our own recent trilateral summit. The U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan meetings complemented Turkey's process begun years before. President Zardari had performed well in a high-stakes situation. The Ambassador thought President Obama's focus on counter-insurgency, good governance, and overall support had been received well by the Pakistanis. The RAO Chief noted that Turkey's trilateral on Af-Pak intelligence cooperation may have gone better than our own trilateral consultations. The Ambassador highlighted the transit trade agreement and the commitment to increased border controls and cross-border training. Our next trilateral would likely come in October, the Ambassador mentioned.

8. (C) Turkey was receptive to Zardari's suggestion for a regional summit, not just trilateral, to include all of Afghanistan's neighbors, said Soysal. He confirmed the Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan summit set for May 19 had been postponed to May 24. He recommended Pakistan reach out to even more international partners and suggested Pakistani parliamentarians, not just GOP officials, travel abroad to push Pakistan's case. Zardari would address NATO members at a special session in June. Of course, Soysal added, Zardari might demur depending on how the Army offensive was going in Swat.

Friends of Pakistan

- - - - - - - - - -

9. (C) Speaking of the calendar, Soysal turned to the "Friends of Democratic Pakistan" initiative, informing the Ambassador that the GOP aimed for a July ministerial in Istanbul. (Comment: We have conveyed to the Turks our own concerns that there is not sufficient time to prepare for a ministerial in mid-July. We will continue to discuss.) The British would likely propose a Friends summit on the margins of the usual September UN General Assembly session of heads of government, Soysal relayed. U.N. Assistant Secretary General Jean Arnault would arrive in Pakistan on May 21; he had attended the Friends/Donors meeting hosted by Japan in late April. Soysal hoped he, as well as the Ambassador, would encourage the GOP to stand-up a secretariat for "Friends." While the assignment of Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Basit as GOP POC was positive, Soysal really advocated a taskforce.

10. (C) The DCM stressed that Friends not morph in to a donors forum, which was the GOP's inclination. Also, membership in the group had expanded and may now be too broad to work as a coherent group, he added. Lastly, it would be up to the GOP to provide the initiative its "strategic vision." The DCM encouraged the Turkish Ambassador to convey similar messages to the GOP. Soysal concurred: "They have to hear from us."

Initiatives for NATO

- - - - - - - - - - -

11. (C) The Turkish Embassy in Islamabad has taken on the task of NATO coordinator, at least on political issues, among members' missions and with the GOP. In that informal role, Soysal recommended a number of joint initiatives and exchanges. He thought members' respective ambassadors to NATO should jointly visit Pakistan soon. He also noted Pakistani journalists and academics were being sent on study tours (similar to our International Visitors Program) to NATO headquarters in Brussels. Soysal welcomed U.S. suggestions on suitable Pakistani candidates for the trips. Lastly, he had recently learned that a number of Pakistani universities conducted model U.N. competitions; he felt his and other NATO members' missions could sponsor such events.

ISLAMABAD 00001118 003 OF 003

12. (C) Turkish Ambassador Soysal noted President Obama's recent trip to Turkey had been very positive and hoped for increased coordination between our two countries and embassies on a spectrum of issues and beyond traditional fora. He also noted his government's recent hosting of other Special Representatives to this region.

The IDP Challenge

- - - - - - - - -

13. (C) The Turkish Ambassador complimented the U.S. on its May 19 announcement to provide $110 million in direct assistance to Pakistan's internally displaced (IDPs). He revealed Turkish President Abdullah Gul would call Zardari May 22 to offer a support package as well. He hinted that Turkish aid may be geared to the post-emergency phase in August/September, which would also coincide this year with the holy month of Ramadan. Soysal noted that Turkey would be the first (and so far only) Muslim country to assist Pakistan with this humanitarian crisis; he was perplexed that Saudi Arabia had not ponied up yet. The GOT would encourage, at the least, a strong statement of support by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) summit during the week of May 25 and was hoping other OIC members would kick in contributions, Soysal said.

14. (C) However, it appeared the GOP did not have a clear timeline for the offensive operations in Swat, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Soysal complained. He agreed with the Ambassador that the GOP also needed to identify competent civil administrators to enter recently cleared towns. Soysal was also concerned that the Pakistan Army was moving too slowly to clear militants from other districts and the Waziristan Agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). GOP plans were still "broad brush" and may not realistically be implemented, if at all, until the new year, he analyzed. The Ambassador added that 2500 Waziri families had already reportedly fled their homes in anticipation of Army action, but yet, the GOP refused to give international aid organizations access to the nearest settled district of D.I. Khan, forcing families to move north to Peshawar or farther east into Punjab.

Thoughts on Nawaz

- - - - - - - - -

15. (C) Soysal met one-on-one with opposition Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) leader Nawaz Sharif in Lahore the week of May 11. Nawaz understood the seriousness of the situation in Swat, Soysal concluded. He reported that Nawaz stated the Taliban should be "eliminated." Nawaz warned, however, that Pakistan's democracy needed to deliver soon before the public looked again to alternatives; Soysal did not specify whether Nawaz implied the military or the militants as the likely alternates.

16. (C) While tit-for-tat politics would eventually return, Soysal thought the international community should encourage for as long as possible a non-partisan stance by Pakistan's political parties. But Zardari held much of the responsibility for setting the tone, Soysal argued. He should bring all parties into major decision-making, host party leaders for a session of the next "Friends" meeting, and reconcile with factions inside his own Pakistan People's Party (PPP).

17. (C) Comment: This was the first meeting between the two embassies in this format, which parallels a similar dialogue we have with the U.K. High Commission. But with the Turks playing an increasingly high profile, constructive role in Pakistan, we will continue to develop our dialogue and find opportunities to work together in areas of mutual interest. As a moderate, progressive Muslim state featuring relatively stable, democratic governance, Turkey is well-positioned to be a much more positive role model for the Pakistanis and to neutralize somewhat the more negative influence on Pakistani politics and society exercised by Saudi Arabia. End comment.

PATTERSON

US embassy cables: Saudi influence in Pakistan

2010-12-02T08:44:00.001-08:00

Tuesday, 20 November 2007, 16:17
S E C R E T RIYADH 002320
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, SCA, AND P STAFF
EO 12958 DECL: 11/18/2017
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, PK, PREL, PTER, SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE US ON PAKISTANI
PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES MICHAEL GFOELLER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) A ND (D)

1. (S) On November 20, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the US Adel al-Jubeir invited the Charge d'Affaires and Executive Office Staff Assistant (note taker) to his residence for lunch. During the meal, Ambassador al-Jubeir said that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf arrived in Saudi Arabia, today, November 20, and will meet with King Abdullah, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, and head of the General Intelligence Presidency Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz after he completes Umra in Mecca. He noted that Musharraf will meet with the Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin first and thereafter see King Abdullah sometime in the evening. "The purpose of these meetings," said al-Jubeir, "is to get a readout of the situation and present our point of view to him."

2. (S) Al-Jubeir denied that Musharraf had come to the Kingdom to meet with exiled former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, although he carefully avoided ruling out such a meeting. Instead, he boldly asserted that, "We in Saudi Arabia are not observers in Pakistan, we are participants." He asserted that the Saudi government (SAG) had offered Sharif a pledge of protection and asylum in the Kingdom after his ouster by Musharraf in return for a promise that he would refrain from political activity for ten years. He added that Sharif had begun to attempt to test the limits of this promise five or six years in his exile. "Sharif broke his promise by conducting political activity while in the Kingdom," al-Jubeir charged. He added that when the SAG had permitted Sharif to travel to London, he first promised the Saudis not to engage in political activity or return to Pakistan, but he then flew to Pakistan from London in a direct violation of his commitment.

3. (S) Al-Jubeir expressed considerable "disappointment" in Sharif's broken pledges to the SAG. He stated very clearly that the SAG has worked directly with Musharraf to have Sharif arrested on his return to Pakistan and immediately deported to the Kingdom. "We told Musharraf that we would receive him back and then keep him here as an 'honored guest'," al-Jubeir said. He added that Prince Muqrin had been the SAG's point man in restraining Sharif. Prince Muqrin was allowed to reveal the terms of Sharif's asylum agreement, he noted. Al-Jubeir made it very clear that the SAG would seek to control Sharif's movements in he future, even suggesting that he would be kept in a state only a little less severe than house arrest.

4. (S) Al-Jubeir added that he sees neither Sharif nor former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto as a viable replacement for Musharraf. "With all his flaws," he said of Musharraf, "he is the only person that you or we have to work with now." He claimed that Sharif would be unable to control the Pushtun-dominated Islamic insurgency in the tribal region near Afghanistan, while Bhutto would prove to be too divisive a figure to rule the country, which he characterized as "very tribal, much like our own country."

5. (S) Al-Jubeir added that for the SAG, stability in Pakistan is an essential strategic matter. Since Pakistan possesses both nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, from the Saudi point of view, the policy choice to be made there boils down to a drastic choice: "We can either support Musharraf and stability, or we can allow bin Laden to get the bomb, "he told the Charge'.

6. (S) Comment: As a senior royal advisor who has worked for King Abdullah for eight years now, al-Jubeir's views generally track very closely with those of the King. It seems likely that King Abdullah, Prince Muqrin, and Prince Saud al-Faisal will offer Musharraf pledges of strong support in their meetings today. We note that the Saudis have an economic hold on Nawaz Sharif, sine he was reportedly the first non-Saudi to receive a special economic development loan from the SAG, with which to develop a business while here in exile. We will report further information on these meetings as it develops. End Comment. GFOELLER

US embassy cables: Pakistan army angry at US aid bill but helping Israel

2010-12-02T08:43:00.001-08:00

Wednesday, 07 October 2009, 13:31
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002427
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/06/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH KAYANI AND PASHA ABOUT
KERRY-LUGAR
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
In a private meeting with the US ambassador, Pakistan's army chief and head spy complain vociferously about the provisions of a massive American aid package that requires military accountability towards the civilian government. As a measure of his good will, Gen Pasha, the ISI chief, says he has been offering intelligence tip-offs about impending attacks to India, and even Israel. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

1. (S) Summary: Ambassador heard a number of complaints about the Kerry-Lugar bill from COAS General Kayani and DGISI Pasha in a two-hour meeting October 6. These focused on the history of Pressler sanctions, particularly a fear that the waiver in Kerry-Lugar would not be used and aid would be suspended. There were several clauses in the bill, such as an American assessment of civilian control over military promotions and the chain of command, that rankled COAS Kayani. DGISI Pasha said Kayani was receiving criticism on the bill from the Corps Commanders. Ambassador emphasized the bill's long-term commitment to Pakistan and made three points: provisions of the bill could be waived; the bill only requires certifications and "assessments;" and the bill does not apply to the large amounts in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund or Coalition Support Fund but only, so far, to non-appropriated Foreign Military Financing. Pasha and Kayani repeated that the Army had taken huge steps this year in its bilateral cooperation with the US and in its campaign in Swat and Bajaur and was getting little public (or private) credit from the US for these historic steps. Kayani said he was considering a statement on the bill, but he was struggling with what to say. He realized that Senator Kerry and Vice President Biden, the original sponsor of the bill, were among Pakistan,s best friends. He predicted the parliamentary debate would be tough, but in the final analysis the government controlled the agenda. Kayani said the language in the bill could undermine political support for the Army's anti-terrorist effort.

2. (S) Kayani said the Pakmil was going into Waziristan in force in two-four weeks. (It is not entirely clear what this meant.) He said Zardari had advised against it for political reasons and wanted to wait until spring. (Ambassador will follow up with Zardari.) Kayani said he had met with PMLN Punjab Chief Minister Shabaz Sharif and PMLN opposition leader Chaudrey Nisar in a much publicized "clandestine8 meeting solely to bring them on board for the Waziristan operation, not to discuss politics.

3. (S) Kayani said we should talk to President Zardari about moving forward the back-channel with India, starting with the provisions agreed to in 2006. Kayani did not have a problem but thought Zardari was unwilling to take it on at this time.

4. (S) Kayani said the most important element for the US in Afghanistan, and for Pakistan, was a &perception of winning.8 There was no incentive for either reintegration or reconciliation without it.

5. (S) DGISI Pasha said that he wanted to convey to Washington agencies that he had been to Oman and Iran to follow up on reports which he received in Washington about a terrorist attack on India. He also had been in touch with the Israelis about information about attacks against Israeli targets in India. His intelligence counterparts in Oman and Iran did not know anything so far but were on alert. Pasha indicated he was willing to meet with his Indian counterpart at any time. End Summary.

6. (S) Ambassador called on General Kayani late evening October 6 to discuss the Kerry-Lugar bill. (Kayani had spoken to Chairman Mullen and General McChrystal earlier in the day.) DGISI Pasha joined most of the two-hour meeting. General Kayani said there were elements in the bill that would set back the bilateral relationship, and critical provisions were almost entirely directed against the Army. Both he and Pasha claimed the bill refused to recognize the enormous progress which had been made bilaterally with the US military and against terrorism within Pakistan: he was particularly irritated at the assessment required on civilian control of the military since he had no intention of taking over the government. "If I had wanted to do this, I would have done it during the long march.8

7. (S) Pasha, who is usually more emotional than Kayani, said the bill had caused a negative reaction among the Corps Commanders and younger officers. Pasha said they could not figure out why these "conditions" on assistance had been raised now when the anti-terrorist efforts had improved so

ISLAMABAD 00002427 002 OF 003

much. The &conditions8 were much tougher now than in previous legislation, despite the different situation on the ground.

8. (S) Ambassador said there were no conditions on the assistance, only a requirement for certifications and assessments. We saw the bill as a major victory since it represented a long-term commitment to Pakistan's development. The bill had a provision for waivers, which in her judgment would be exercised if necessary. Kayani replied that the Pressler amendment had a waiver, too, but President Bush had refused to sign it.

9. (S) But most importantly, the Ambassador said, the provisions in the bill did not affect &real8 money going to the security forces: it did not apply to the FY 09 Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund, nor to the FY 10 Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund. (There is a waivable condition in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund FY 10 that the funds cannot be used for F16s). The provisions do not apply to Coalition Support Funds; and Kerry-Lugar would only apply to Foreign Military Financing funds not yet appropriated. Kayani said he understood that, just as he understood that the amount of funding available to the Pakistani military had increased very substantially under the new Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund.

10. (S) Kayani said the Corps Commanders would press him to make a statement about the bill during their October 7 meeting: he had been struggling with how to handle this. He said he recognized and appreciated that Vice President Biden, the original sponsor of the bill, and Senator Kerry were great friends of Pakistan. Ambassador said any negative statements would affect Pakistan,s improving relations with our Congress. Ambassador noted that the Prime Minister had told her that the parliamentary debate on Kerry-Lugar would run for a few days, but it would not result in a vote. The government had defended the Kerry-Lugar bill very aggressively in recent days. Kayani thought the government would have a harder time in the assembly than the Prime Minister had predicted, but he agreed that the government could prevent a vote. Kayani had recommended the government bring the issue before the national assembly, it would enable the government to say it had been "informed" by the debate.

11. (S) DGISI Pasha asked Ambassador to convey to Washington that he had followed up on threat information that an attack would be launched against India between September-November. He had been in direct touch with the Israelis on possible threats against Israeli targets in India. He had also gone to Muscat and Tehran to engage those intelligence services on threats, and they were alerted and working with Pakistan. He reminded Ambassador that information about an attack on India had come his way and he had asked CIA to convey it to the Indians through CIA channels. (Further details about these cases available in other channels.) He said he would meet his Indian counterpart any time, noting that it was critically important that any threat information be shared with him. He emphasized that ISI was doing everything possible to reduce the possibility of an attack on India.

12. (S) Ambassador asked about the likelihood for restarting the back-channel with India, noting that we had received a good readout from former Foreign Minister Kasuri, who was enthusiastic about the appointment of former Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan as the back-channel negotiator. Kayani said that Ambassador should talk to Zardari about restarting the back-channel where it "left off:" he was not sure that Zardari was quite willing to wade into these political waters yet. Kayani and Pasha both said that they wanted this channel to succeed, and Kayani expressed his confidence in Riaz Khan's integrity and intelligence.

13. (S) Kayani said the military was going to move into Waziristan in two-four weeks, although President Zardari had wanted him to delay. (We will discuss this with Zardari.) He had met with PMLN Chief Minister of the Punjab Shabaz Sharif and with PMLN opposition leader Chaudrey Nisar to obtain their support for the Waziristan operation, not for political reasons. (Note: This outreach appears to have been successful. In a recent meeting with PolCouns, Shahbaz

ISLAMABAD 00002427 003 OF 003

stated that the Waziristan operation was critical and needed to move forward immediately. End Note.)

14. (S) Kayani went over some of the discussion he had had with General McChrystal about counter-insurgency but said that the most important issue in Afghanistan was the "perception that the US was winning." There was no chance for reintegration or reconciliation unless this took place. PATTERSON

US embassy cables: Embassy displays impatience with Pakistan's failure to crack down on 'terrorist' charity Jamaat ud Dawa

2010-12-02T08:42:00.000-08:00

Monday, 27 November 2006, 09:55
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 022174
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/25/2016
TAGS AF, EFIN, PK, PREL, PTER, KTFN, UN
SUBJECT: TERROR FINANCE: EMBASSY PRESSES GOP ON UN 1267
COMMITTEE CASES
REF: ISLAMABAD 22000
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
The US ambassador presents Pakistani officials with evidence that senior ministers and government officials had publicly supporting charities subject to UN sanctions. Those named include the information minister and a defence minister official. The ambassador also produces newspaper advertisements for the same groups in government-run media, and threatens to notify the UN sanctions committee. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

1. (C) Summary: As noted in Ref A, post has raised the ongoing operations of two UN 1267 Committee-designated entities -- Al Rashid Trust, Al Akhtar Trust and Lashkar-e-Tayyba/Jamaat ud-Dawa (LeT/JuD) -- with contacts throughout the Government of Pakistan (GOP). While the Ambassador has pressed the issue with the Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor, emboffs have engaged the MFA's UN Directorate and the Information Ministry. The GOP has responded by reviewing its procedures to disseminate information on the prohibitions that accompany UN 1267 designation to ensure that broadcasters and print media are aware that they should decline requests to purchase advertising space. No GOP official, however, has committed to taking direct action to close the operations of these entities. In addition to raising the issue with GOP officials, post has also shared open source reports of these entities fund-raising activities with like-minded missions in the Islamabad diplomatic community, as well as with the visiting UNSC Counterterrorism Executive Directorate delegation. End summary.

2. (C) In a November 17 meeting, the Ambassador presented Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan with open source material detailing Al Rashid's television solicitations for Zakat donations, a website highlighting federal Minister of Information Durrani's participation in an Al Akhtar Trust Ramadan event, and a press report on the declaration of the Ministry of Defense Parliamentary Secretary that he was proud to be a member of LeT and that he seeks to extend support to jihadi organizations when they seek his "cooperation." Each of these reports is disturbing in itself, the Ambassador said, as they seriously damage Pakistan's image in the international community. These incidents point to a more fundamental question: is the GOP is committed to implementing the sanctions that follow a UN 1267 Committee designation?

3. (S) While the Foreign Secretary recognized the detrimental consequences of the news reports of these incidents, he cited Al Rashid's pending challenge to the GOP's implementation of 1267 sanctions (freezing accounts, closing offices, etc.) as an impediment to more active government intervention. The Ambassador emphasized that this series of incidents could lead reasonable observers to conclude that the GOP is not serious about its UN 1267 obligations; he urged the GOP to take immediate and definitive steps against the designated entities. The Ambassador concluded by stating that without strong public action by the GOP, the U.S. will be forced to formally bring these incidents to the attention of the UN 1267 Committee. (Note: In an aside, the Foreign Secretary asked the Ambassador whether the U.S, has evidence linking JuD to terrorist activity. The Ambassador replied affirmatively, noting that the USG has shared such information with GOP intelligence agencies. The Ambassador also advised the Foreign Secretary that there is a growing concern in the USG about LeT/JuD support to the insurgency in Afghanistan. End note.)

4. (C) A week later, in a November 24 meeting with National Security Advisor Tariq Aziz, the Ambassador presented the same points, supported by copies of the open source reports. (Note: This package of open source material included a

ISLAMABAD 00022174 002 OF 003

November 20 report of a full page Al Akhtar advertisement in a Karachi Urdu-language paper solicit donations of meat for the poor during the coming Eid-al-Adha holiday. End note.) The Ambassador reported that he had also raised the issue with the Foreign Secretary, but was not certain that the gravity of these UN 1267 Committee violations had registered with the MFA. The Ambassador observed that the bilateral relationship would not be helped if the U.S. is forced to formally notify the UN 1267 Committee of Pakistan's lax implementation of its international obligations. NSA Aziz agreed that the GOP wished to avoid a formal referral to the UN 1267 committee, expressing serious concern over the broadcast and publication of the Al Akhtar and Al Rashid zakat solicitations and particular irritation over the remarks by the Parliamentary Secretary for Defense. While saying that the GOP cannot close down the accounts and operations of JuD, as the entity is not yet the subject of a 1267 designation, Aziz agreed that there is no similar impediment to taking firm action against designees Al Akhtar and Al Rashid Trusts. Aziz promised the Ambassador that he would pursue the matter within the GOP interagency.

5. (C) Complementing the Ambassador's outreach, Public Affairs Counselor and econoff have raised the issue of 1267 designees' published and broadcast fund-raising solicitations with the Information Secretary and with the MFA Spokesperson and Director General (UN). The Information Secretary pleaded ignorance that UN 1267 sanctions applied to broadcast and print media; once the matter was brought to his attention by the Embassy, he said that he ordered the Information Ministry to advise all state-affiliated media outlets that they must not/not to accept advertising or public service solicitations from any of the 1267 designees. (Note: According to the MFA, a similar effort to reach private media outlets is said to be underway by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority. End note.) Tasneem Aslam, the MFA spokesperson and UN Director General, reaffirmed the GOP's commitment to honoring its UN obligations, but noted that a way must be found to "rehabilitate" designated entities, as their charitable and humanitarian activities are a vital part of Pakistani society.

6. (C) The Ambassador discussed the recent spate of public reports on 1267 designee solicitations with Ambassador Ruperez, who led the UNSC Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) delegation on a November 17-24 mission to assess Pakistan's commitment to combat terrorism. PolCouns also privately briefed the senior legal advisor on USG concerns over the continued operation of these entities in Pakistan. PolCouns has also shared the open source reports of the 1267-designated entities with like-minded colleagues in the diplomatic community whose Embassies' also engage the GOP on terror finance issues.

7. (SBU) Post's efforts have not gone unnoticed: the November 25 edition of the English-language "The Pakistan Post" carried a front-page article with the headline "Banned Outfits' Ads Annoy US." The article said that the Interior Ministry has instructed relevant government departments "to create awareness" within the press that media should not accept advertising by organization designated by the UN. The Pakistan Post says that the Interior Ministry's report notes that "our each and every paper is monitored by the U.S. State Department that (sic) has a separate section to monitor Urdu newspapers." The Post article also reviews alleged U.S. efforts to include JuD in the LeT 1267 designation, a campaign the paper describes as stymied after China demanded

ISLAMABAD 00022174 003 OF 003

evidence that JuD is connected to terror finance activities. (Note: The Post's story coincided with banner headlines describing dozens of new bilateral Pak-Chinese initiatives announced during Chinese President Hu's November 23-26 state visit to Pakistan. End note.)

8. (C) Comment: Emboffs will continue to engage GOP officials and contacts in the press, financial community, political parties and the diplomatic community to raise awareness and generate multiple points of pressure to demand that the GOP take firm action to terminate the operations of 1267-designated entities. Post recommends reassessing GOP progress on this issue in late December, with an eye to formal notification to the UN 1267 Committee in early 2007 if the GOP response is unsatisfactory. End comment. CROCKER

US embassy cables: Relationship with Pakistan based on 'mutual distrust', says US

2010-12-02T08:39:00.000-08:00

Saturday, 21 February 2009, 12:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000385
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y
CLASSIFCATION MISMATCH ERROR IN PARAGRAPH 8, 9, 10
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: FOCUSING THE U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
ISLAMABAD 00000385 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

Summary
US officials think about how to maximise their influence in Pakistan on foot of a doubling of US assistance from $2 billion to $4 billion annually. But the relationship is fraught with distrust. They aim to foster 'regional approach' to conflict and to change the mindsets of Pakistani leaders. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

1. (C) Summary. As Foreign Minister Qureshi and his team arrive in Washington for coordination on the Holbrooke/Riedel strategic review, Post offers the following thoughts on issues for strategic engagement. In the coming weeks, Post will detail our suggestions on how to expand political, economic, security, and intelligence engagement with Pakistan from the current $2 billion annually to $4 billion beginning in FY2011. End Summary.

2. (C) As we work to prevent Pakistan-based attacks on the U.S. and its forces, we should be clear that al-Qaida (AQ) now wants more than just a safe-haven in Pakistan, and defeating a growing witches' brew of AQ, Taliban, local extremists and criminals will be a long 10-15 year fight. President Zardari has summed it up by saying, "the militants now are after me and my job." The militant takeover of Swat in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) is the most striking example of how far and how fast the government is losing control over its territory. As the fight continues, we expect AQ to increase both its offensive and defensive operations to protect its equities. It simply has nowhere else to go.

Understanding Swat

3. (C) Talks continue between Tehrik Nizam Shariat Mohammed (Movement for Shari'a or TNSM) leader Sufi Mohammad and his son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah, who works with the Tehrik-e-Taliban movement headed by Baitullah Mehsud. The Army appears unwilling or unable to control the area, and the population is fed up with both indiscriminate Army shelling and taliban-imposed terror. So, the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Army are trying a new version of a failed strategy. Through Sufi Mohammad, the NWFP provincial government is trying to split the population from Fazlullah's taliban by offering adherence to a form of Shari'a law, interpreted locally as swift justice. The NWFP offer on Shari'a has not been signed by President Zardari and is conditioned on establishment of peace in Swat. The Army has not withdrawn from its positions, and it insists it will not withdraw until peace is established.

4. (C) Few Pakistanis believe the deal will hold for more than two-three weeks. A similar deal failed in 2008; Post does not believe that Sufi has the clout to deliver. Fazlullah's taliban are not going to lay down their arms--they have already violated their alleged cease-fire. ANP's weak argument is that even a failed deal will expose Fazlullah's real intentions; the Army's view is that the deal at least buys them some time to regroup forces. Post's concern is that by signaling its willingness to surrender, the deal has made it even harder for the inevitable Army re-engagement in Swat. While talks continue, however, we are working through State/USAID/DOD with UN agencies and ICRC to get relief supplies to the beleaguered Swati population. We also are working with the Ministry of Interior to provide the NWFP police with short-term support (salary supplements/death benefits, hardening police stations) while we implement a longer-term plan to deliver additional equipment and training needed to back up Army action.

Establishing Trust

5. (C) The Pakistani team will come hoping, once again, to forge long-lasting ties with the U.S. As Vice President Biden has noted, however, the relationship for too long has been transactional in nature. It also has been based on mutual mistrust. Pakistan hedges its bets on cooperation because it fears the U.S. will again desert Islamabad after we get Osama Bin Laden; Washington sees this hesitancy as duplicity that requires we take unilateral action to protect U.S. interests. After 9/11, then President Musharraf made a strategic shift to abandon the Taliban and support the U.S. in the war on terror, but neither side believes the other has lived up to expectations flowing from that decision. The relationship is one of co-dependency we grudgingly admit--Pakistan knows the U.S. cannot afford to walk away; the U.S. knows Pakistan cannot survive without our support.

Supporting Democracy/Defeating Extremism

ISLAMABAD 00000385 002.3 OF 003

6. (C) Militants will exploit either weak civilian government or a return to military rule that lacks popular legitimacy, so we should help the Zardari/Gilani government complete its full five-year term in office. We can work with Nawaz Sharif if he wins the next election, but Zardari is our best ally in Pakistan right now, and U.S. interests are best served by preventing another cycle of military rule. Qureshi will remind us that the GOP needs an international democracy dividend in the form of economic aid, improved governance, and effective law enforcement.

7. (C) We can respond first by offering robust U.S. support at the IMF/World Bank Donors' Conference in April. We now are providing approximately $2 billion annually to Pakistan, including: $1.2 billion in Coalition Support Fund reimbursements; $150 million to improve socio-economic conditions in FATA; $300 million in ESF aid for the rest of Pakistan; over $10 million for internally displaced persons fleeing combat in Bajaur, Mohmand and Swat; $300 million (not yet received); and an imminent $15 million in aid to the NWFP police.

8. (C) If approved and financed, the Kerry-Lugar legislation will enable us to triple non-military aid to $1.5 billion per year. We will plan in FY 2010 to spend over $100 million to augment civilian police and $873 million to build counter-insurgency capability. This means giving police protective vests and rapid reaction capability, teaching the military how to coordinate ground and air operations and helping the Army keep more than two attack helicopters in the air at one time. We can build trust, address the issue of alleged U.S. strikes, and help Pakistanis target militants through enhanced DOD-based intelligence cooperation at the Torkham Joint Coordination Center. We need to help the GOP implement an effective strategic communications plan.

Changing Mindsets

9. (C) President Zardari and PM Gilani recognize Pakistan's greatest threat has shifted from India to militancy concentrated on the Pak-Afghan border but is spreading to NWFP and beyond. The Army and ISI, however, have not turned that corner. We should press the GOP on the need to stop using militant/tribal proxies as foreign policy tools. It is now counterproductive to Pakistan's own interests and directly conflicts with USG objectives in Afghanistan--where Haqqani's network is killing American soldiers and Afghan civilians--and the region--where Mumbai exposed the fruits of previous ISI policy to create Lashkar-e-Taiba and still threatens potential conflict between nuclear powers. However, we should preface this conversation with a pledge to open a new page in relations. Chief of Army Staff General Kayani, who headed ISI from 2004-2007, in particular wants to avoid a reckoning with the past, and we will not shift Pakistani military/ISI policy without his support.

10. (C) Given recent events in Swat, the Army needs to decide if it is truly prepared to commit the troops and suffer the casualties required to win and accept the training needed to shift from a conventional war with India to a COIN-based strategy along the Pak-Afghan border. We should probe the team for what Pakistan needs from India to enable it to redeploy badly-needed Pakistani forces from its eastern to its western border.

Making Afghanistan a Success

11. (C) We should ask what kind of government Islamabad can accept in Kabul and how Pakistan plans to help the U.S./NATO succeed in Afghanistan. The team will be concerned about the effect of a troop build-up in southern Afghanistan across from Balochistan, where Pakistan has meager forces to defend a long and unpopulated border. We should discuss the reality that the U.S. will be doubling cargo shipments through Pakistan (both the Torkham and Chaman crossings) in support of our troop build-up in Afghanistan.

12. (C) As ISI General Director Pasha has said, "we can't kill all the militants." Qureshi, noting recent comments by Defense Secretary Gates, will suggest it is time to review efforts to reach out to Taliban "reconcilables" on both sides

ISLAMABAD 00000385 003.2 OF 003

of the border. If this initiative progresses, we should consider establishing a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process in both Pakistan and Afghanistan for Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other militant fighters.

Thinking Regionally

13. (C) Pakistan's principal strategic focus remains fixated on India, Afghanistan as strategic depth in the fight against India, and the core Kashmir issue. However, the current civilian and military leadership is the most pro-Indian that New Delhi is likely to see, and we should not allow Mumbai to derail rapprochement. Both sides should resume Composite Dialogue negotiations, re-establish back-channel negotiations, and increase trade across both the Wagah border and the Kashmir Line of Control.

14. (C) This presumes that Pakistan, with continued USG pressure, proceeds with prosecution of the Mumbai suspects. Pakistan also needs more clearly to shut down its support for Lashkar-e-Taiba militancy in Kashmir. Qureshi will want to hear a USG commitment to press the Indians to respond to the GOP's list of follow-up questions on the investigation. We should encourage Islamabad to send, and New Delhi to receive, a Pakistani police investigatory team to collect evidence in support of successful Mumbai prosecutions.

15. (C) Qureshi likely will repeat Zardari's pleas for USG intervention with Saudi Arabia, UAE and other Gulf states to deliver oil at concessional prices; to date, our efforts have been rebuffed but the upcoming Donors' Conference would provide another avenue to press for assistance.

16. (C) We should leverage China's interest in a stable Pakistan by urging its continued support at the Donors' Conference but reminding Beijing that efforts to block 1267 designations and give Pakistan two unsanctioned civilian nuclear reactors are not helpful. Zardari would like to accept Iran's offer of financial assistance but we doubt he will proceed without U.S. blessing.

PATTERSON

US embassy cables: Qatar urges Israeli-Palestinian peace effort

2010-12-02T08:35:00.001-08:00

Tuesday, 23 February 2010, 10:47
C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 000070
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/13/2020
TAGS PREL, KWBG, KPAL, IR, QA
SUBJECT: SENATOR KERRY'S MEETING WITH QATAR'S AMIR
Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

Summary
Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, the amir of Qatar, tells Senator John Kerry, chairman of the senate foreign relations committee, that the US must do everything in its power to find a lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He suggests the best way is to reach out to Syria and insists Iran cannot be trusted. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

--------------

(C) KEY POINTS

--------------

-- The Amir of Qatar urged the U.S. in his February 14 meeting with Senator John Kerry (D-MA) to do everything in its power to find a lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Amir said the best way to begin is by moving first on the Syrian track.

-- In Qatar's view, now is the time to reach out to Damascus. The Syrian Government can help Arab extremists make tough choices, but only if the U.S., whose involvement is essential, demonstrates to Syria early on a willingness to address the return of the Golan Heights and supports Turkey's mediation efforts between Israel and Syria.

-- According to the Amir, Hamas will accept the 1967 border with Israel, but will not say it publicly so as to lose popular Palestinian support.

-- The Egyptians' goal, according to the Amir, is to stay in the game and maintain their relationship with the U.S., which is built around brokering regional peace, for as long as possible.

-- The Amir recommended that the U.S. and Qatar establish a small bilateral committee to discuss how to advance regional peace. Qatar can help move Hamas, because Qatar does not "play in their internal politics." That does not mean Qatar shares Hamas' ideology, stressed the Amir.

-- On Iran, the Amir said President Ahmadinejad is strong because he is uncorrupted. The Amir also advised the U.S. to continue ts efforts to open a dialogue with the Iranian ladership.

End Key Points.

1. (C) Senator Joh Kerry (D-MA), the Chairman of the Senate Foreig Relations Committee(SFRC), joined by Ambassador,P/E Chief, and SFRC staff member Dr. Jonah Blank met February 14 with the Amir of Qatar, Hamad bn Khalifa Al Thani. The meeting took place at Waba Palace, the residence of the Amir, and the Amir began the meeting by pointing out that the comfortable chairs on which the U.S. party was seated were made in Syria.

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IMPORTANCE OF THE SYRIAN TRACK

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2. (C) This opening led Senator Kerry to remark that he had held great discussions with Syria's President, Bashar Al-Asad, when he met him in Damascus some months ago. The Amir said President Asad is committed to "big change," but Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri's death and complications resulting from Syria's alleged involvement in it had brought about "complications" for Asad. The Amir added that "Bashar is still young and can grow."

3. (C) Senator Kerry said he took away from his visit to Damascus that Asad wants change. The Amir added that the Syrian President also wants peace with Israel and that the arrival of a U.S. Ambassador in Damascus would help in this regard. Senator Kerry said he had wanted a U.S. Ambassador in Syria a year ago, but agreed that the naming of an Ambassador is a positive development.

4. (C) The Amir cautioned that the Syrians will not accept everything the U.S. proposes, stressing that the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights continues and that the return of this land to Syria is paramount for Damascus. The Amir observed that the "Syrians have lost confidence in the U.S. and that the Israelis now have the upper hand in the region because of the support of the United States." The Israeli leaders need to represent the people of Israel, who themselves do not trust Arabs. The Amir said this is understandable and "we can't blame them" because the Israelis have been "under threat" for a long time.

5. (C) What has changed, continued the Amir, is that Arabs "for sure" now want two states -- Israel and Palestine. When you consider that many in the region perceive that Hizballah drove Israel out of Lebanon and Hamas kicked them (at least initially) out "of the small piece of land called Gaza," it is actually surprising that the Israelis still want peace. The region, however, is still "far away" from peace, concluded the Amir.

6. (C) Senator Kerry responded that in his long experience with the region, it was not unusual for people to take positions adverse to their own interests. Yasser Arafat went from living as a terrorist in Tunisia to signing an agreement with Israel on the White House lawn. The transformation of Arafat is an example of how actors in the region need to take risks if we are to move forward in advancing regional peace. Turning the conversation back to Syria, Chairman Kerry pointed out that Syria's facilitation of arms to Hizballah and its turning a blind eye to missile upgrades in Lebanon do not represent risk-taking in the promotion of peace.

7. (C) The Amir pointed out that any progress toward regional peace had come about due to American involvement. He implied that it would take U.S. intervention on the Syrian-Israeli track to address these issues and asked Senator Kerry what he would have Damascus do.

8. (C) The Chairman responded that President Asad needs to make a bolder move and take risks. He observed that if the Syrian President wants peace and economic development for his country, he needs to be more statesman-like, which would in turn help Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu engage him.

9. (C) The Amir agreed with Senator Kerry's assessment of Asad's aims and said he is ready for peace, but asked if the Israelis are ready. Would Israel accept to resume Turkey's mediation between Syria and Israel? Would the U.S. play a role in advancing the Syria track?

10. (C) If we can get Abu Mazen back to the negotiating table, we can engage on border issues -- including Israel's borders with Syria, advised Senator Kerry. Abu Mazen right now is not strong enough, though, to make necessary compromises with Israel because the Palestinian people have wanted him to stick to his guns on a settlement freeze and the Goldstone Report. The Chairman added that Netanyahu also needs to compromise and work the return of the Golan Heights into a formula for peace.

11. (C) The Amir encouraged the U.S. to work the Golan Heights issue first. He stressed that Syrians are very different from Iranians in "mentality," and said the Syrians turned to Iran for support only because they had nowhere else to go. Now is the time, the Amir told Senator Kerry, to reach out to Damascus.

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PARAMETERS FOR DISCUSSION

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12. (C) Senator Kerry responded that the U.S. is prepared to play a strong role in bringing about peace in the region. President Obama, said the Chairman, understands that he personally must engage and do so strongly. The Senator told the Amir that in his speech to the U.S.-Islamic Forum the previous evening, the Senator had focused on former President Clinton's parameters for peace and the 2002 Arab League peace initiative. Now, said the Senator, is the time to put those back on the table and resume talking, with the U.S. acting as a legitimate agent of peace. Chairman Kerry told the Amir he is convinced that we can see great progress in the coming year by moving swiftly from proximity talks, to direct talks between the parties and ending with final status discussions.

13. (C) To be successful, continued Senator Kerry, we must begin by agreeing at the outset the amount of land each side (Israelis and Palestinians) will obtain in the end and use that understanding to draw the borders. If both sides make good compromises, we can address the settlement issues in the context of giving something up so that the borders, when drawn, contain the agreed-upon amounts of land for both sides. The Amir agreed with the Senator's assessment and complimented President Obama for being the first U.S. President to take on the Middle East conflict in the first year of his term.

14. (C) Continuing the presentation of his ideas on the parameters of peace between Israel and the Palestinians, Senator Kerry noted that one of the biggest problems for Israel is the potential return of 5-6 million Palestinian refugees. The parties broached the return issue in discussions at Taba and agreed that the right of Palestinian return would be subject to later negotiation, pointed out the Chairman. If we can proceed from that point on the right of return, the Senator believes there is an "artful way" to frame the negotiations on borders, land swaps, and Jerusalem as a shared capital. 15. (C) Any negotiation has its limits, added Senator Kerry, and we know for the Palestinians that control of Al-Aqsa mosque and the establishment of some kind of capital for the Palestinians in East Jerusalem are not negotiable. For the Israelis, the Senator continued, Israel's character as a Jewish state is not open for negotiation. The non-militarization of an eventual Palestinian state and its borders can nonetheless be resolved through negotiation.

16. (C) The Amir underscored that Abu Mazen needs Arab support to make the above happen. Hamas "for sure," he said, will accept the 1967 border but will not say it publicly so as to lose popular Palestinian support.

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DEALING WITH THE EXTREMISTS

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17. (C) Senator Kerry told the Amir he knew Qatar could help the U.S. but asked how we deal with those who advocate violence. The Amir said the short answer is to work the Syrian track, which means pushing for Israel's return of the Golan Heights to Syria. The Amir said return of the Golan is important not just to Syria but also to Hizballah and Iran. The U.S. must bear in mind that Misha'al, a leader of Hamas based in Damascus, has drawn the conclusion that the Oslo accords were bad for Arafat. He lost the support of his own people and died living under Israeli siege. The Syrians can help Misha'al and others make tough choices, but only if the U.S. demonstrates to Syria early on a willingness to address the Golan. Senator Kerry responded that the U.S. would accept a legitimate discussion of the Golan Heights.

18. (C) What is more, said the Amir, the U.S. needs to support Turkey's mediation between Israel and Syria. It is important that the U.S. encourage Israel to understand that that resolving the status of the Golan Heights is very important to the United States.

19. (C) Senator Kerry asked the Amir if Hamas is under pressure given the circumstances in Gaza. The Amir answered by saying that Hamas needs Iranian support. He added that the biggest misconception in the region is that the Syrians, who host Hamas leaders in Damascus, go to Iran because they like the Iranians. This is wrong. Syria goes to those who will not shun them.

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ROLE OF EGYPT

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20. (C) Returning to the pressure Hamas is facing, Senator Kerry observed that economic development in the West Bank is taking place, but not in Gaza. The Palestinian reconciliation that would make possible developmental assistance in Gaza has not happened. The Egyptians have not delivered, said Senator Kerry.

21. (C) The Amir said the Egyptians' goal is to stay in the game and maintain their relationship with the U.S., which is built around brokering Middle East peace, for as long as possible. According to the Amir, Fatah and Hamas agreed on a memorandum of understanding, but the Egyptians wanted it changed. The Amir remarked that he has a feeling he knows which capital (Cairo) is the source of reports that Gaza is under pressure. He said the economic pressure in Gaza on families is not what it was. He offered as an example that Qatar Charity recently offered a family in Gaza 500 USD, but the family declined the gift saying its members had enough to get by and suggested another family that was in more dire need of assistance. The Amir said the notion that a family would turn down money is new.

22. (C) The Amir told Senator Kerry that everyone knows "Egypt has a problem with the Muslim Brotherhood. Okay, we understand. But Egypt should not expect the world to take external actions that would help it internally."

23. (C) Asked his advice for President Obama, the Amir recommended the establishment of a small U.S.-Qatar committee to discuss how to proceed. Qatar is close to Hamas, emphasized the Amir, because "we don't play in their internal politics." That does not mean we share their ideology or do not disagree with them. "I can remember many arguments with them (Hamas) on the 1967 border with Israel." The Amir noted that he had mediated with Hamas previously at the U.S. request, namely when he urged Hamas at the previous Administration's request to participate in Palestinian elections.

24. (C) Returning to the leadership of Hamas, Senator Kerry asked the Amir for his insights into how the leadership, with leaders sitting in both Gaza and Syria, makes decisions. The Amir said the impression that Misha'al sits in Damascus and others take orders from him is wrong. Several key players within Hamas are involved in decisions. They have differences over policy, but "the bottom line is that they all want the Palestinians to take their rights from Israel."

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IRAN

----

25. (C) Senator Kerry observed that the international community is moving toward imposing additional economic sanctions on Iran. Understanding and respecting that Qatar needs to balance its relationships with regional powers, including Iran, the Chairman asked the Amir for his perspective on where we are going on Iran.

26. (C) The Amir answered by affirming that his first obligation is to defend the interests of Qatar. Due to the natural gas field Iran shares with Qatar, Qatar will not "provoke a fight" with Iran. He added that in the history of the two countries, "Iran has not bothered us." That said, the Amir noted that Iran is an important country in the Middle East. He faulted the U.S. for "making the mistake of speaking up for protesters" after the disputed Iranian presidential elections.

27. (C) The Iranian regime is strong, continued the Amir, because President Ahmadinejad is uncorrupted. "That is the secret to his success." Khatami is also not corrupted, but as a reformer he is in a weak position. Rafsanjani, on the other hand, is corrupt.

28. (C) Senator Kerry lamented that every communication the current Administration has attempted to the Government of Iran has gone back channel and been met with no response. There have been non-U.S. initiatives, too. Again, no success. The Chairman observed that the Iranians are scared to talk. The Supreme Ayatollah had met with Russian President Putin, but seems not inclined to meet with other political leaders. Our instinct is that we need to find a way to talk to him.

29. (C) Your instinct is right, replied the Amir. The U.S. needs to talk directly with senior Iranian officials. The Amir then asked, "What if I talk to the Iranian President. What would you have me say?"

30. (C) Senator Kerry responded, "The U.S. seeks serious discussion and sought to create a new foundation for a relationship based on Iran's non-confrontational compliance with IAEA requirements and other mutual interests." Those interests include dealing with drug-running, the Taliban, and illicit trade. The Chairman told the Amir he feared that Iran still thinks it is dealing with the 1953 America that tried to overthrow the Iranian government.

31. (C) The Amir responded that you cannot blame them for having that attitude, and Senator Kerry agreed, adding that the U.S. has a very different posture in the post-Cold War world of today. Iran has ambitions; I know this from other regional leaders, said the Senator. These are the first words that come out of their mouths.

32. (C) Iran wants to be a "big power," agreed the Amir, but what sort? He reminded Senator Kerry the U.S. should not forget that Iranians are Persian and the U.S. needs to approach them in that framework.

33. (C) Senator Kerry stressed that the U.S. "would love to have that dialogue." The U.S. respects Iranian civilization -- talent, art, culture, etc. It is crazy to continue on this collision course. The region needs schools and jobs, emphasized the Chairman, not another war. The Amir agreed that "demographics are a big worry." Not just for the countries in the region but for the U.S. too.

34. (C) Many scientific and technological transformations are underway, noted the Senator, "but Iran misinterprets the road to being a great power and the degree to which the international community is concerned about Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons." We are at a "fork in the road," and Iran must choose between confrontation or building partnerships. If the latter, we can open up new opportunities for cooperation in the sciences, technology, education, robotics, energy and other ongoing transformations.

35. (C) Going back to the speech he had delivered in Doha the previous evening, Senator Kerry told the Amir that 17 former U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense had come out in favor of eliminating nuclear weapons. Every stop closer to realizing that goal is a sign of progress, but "no one believes Iranian nukes get us closer to that goal."

36. (C) Senator Kerry reported that leaders of regional Arab countries tell me they want nuclear weapons if the Iranians have them. The Amir responded that he did not believe they were serious, but are saying this to put additional pressure on Iran.

37. (C) The Chairman noted that the disputed Iranian presidential elections may have derailed U.S. efforts to have serious dialogue with Tehran. The Amir agreed, offering that the Israelis are also using Iran's quest for nuclear weapons as a diversion from settling matters with the Palestinians. The historical backdrop of Arab-Persian relations does not help, the Amir added.

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FINAL THOUGHTS

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38. (C) The Amir advised the U.S. to continue trying to open a dialogue with the Iranian leadership. He also told Senator Kerry the U.S. needs to tell the Israelis they are causing the U.S. to lose the hearts and minds of Muslims. There was a time, such as during the Suez Canal crisis, when the Arabs loved the Americans and disliked the British and French, he said.

39. (C) Senator Kerry asked the Amir how the U.S. goes about changing its reputation. The Amir said first and foremost the U.S. must do everything in its power to find a lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the best way to begin is by moving first on the Syrian track.

40. (C) The Chairman of the SFRC said he expects a genuine effort by the President this year on an agreement and expressed his hope that Iranian issues would not complicate matters. The Amir agreed, adding that China likes the distraction for the U.S. as its forces fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.

41. (C) Senator Kerry concurred, noting that China is lending the U.S. money and expanding its influence at U.S. expense. He added that he ran against President George W. Bush saying the war with Iraq was the wrong war in the wrong place and time.

42. (C) The Amir closed the meeting by offering that based on 30 years of experience with the Iranians, they will give you 100 words. Trust only one of the 100.

43. (U) CODEL Kerry has cleared this message.

Lebaron

Margaret Scobey, the US ambassador in Cairo, described Mubarak as having "a visceral hatred for the Islamic Republic"

2010-12-02T08:32:00.000-08:00

US embassy cables:
Monday, 09 February 2009, 16:10
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 000231
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
EO 12958 DECL: 02/09/2019
TAGS PREL, KPAL, EG, IS, QA, IR, SY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR REQUESTED EGYPTIAN FM ABOUL GHEIT 
MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary

US secretary of state briefed by ambassador Margaret Scobie on key Arab ally, which feels it did not receive fair treatment from the Bush administration. President Hosni Mubarak told Senator George Mitchell that he did not oppose Washington talking with the Iranians, as long as "you don't believe a word they say". Key passage highlighted in yellow.

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Summary

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1. (S/NF) Madame Secretary, Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit has been looking forward to meeting you since your nomination was first announced. The Egyptian leadership, including President Mubarak, are encouraged by the Administration's immediate attention to theMiddle East and your and the President's early outreach to them. Overall, the Egyptians believe they did not receive fair treatment from the previous Administration and hope to see improvements. Aboul Gheit likely will explain Egypt's "soft power"--its ability to influence regional events without benefit of deep pockets. He likely will focus more on the strategic challenges of the region--the peace process and Iran--but may also address some pending bilateral matters. He may ask for your support for Egypt to be part of an expanded G8 or G20 and press the candidacy of Egyptian Culture Minister Farouq Hosny for Director General of UNESCO. He may not raise human rights (specifically Ayman Nour), political reform, or democratization; but you should. Aboul Gheit will want to discuss Gaza, including smuggling and counter-tunneling; Iran; and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. On Iraq and counter-terrorism, we and the Egyptians see largely eye-to-eye; intelligence cooperation is close and effective; and our military-to-military relationship is durable but stuck in a force-on-force mindset.

2. (S/NF) Summary continued: Aboul Gheit is smart, urbane, with a tendency to lecture and to avoid discussing Egyptian failings with all-purpose recourse to Egyptian sovereign pride. However, because this is his first meeting with you and it is in Washington, he may be more inclined to listen. You should thank him for Egypt's continuing regional leadership, in particular regarding their efforts to bring about a ceasefire in Gaza, and press him for Egypt to continue to use their influence and good offices to achieve a permanent solution to intra-Palestinian infighting and conflict. You should also stress the need for Egypt to more effectively insure that Hamas cannot rearm via smuggling across -- or tunneling under -- the border with Gaza. Aboul Gheit will press for your attendance at the March 2 Gaza Donors Conference in Cairo, and may complain about unhelpful Qatari and Syrian behavior. He will also want to explore US intentions towards Iran; President Mubarak told Senator Mitchell during his recent visit here that he did not oppose our talking with the Iranians, as long as "you don't believe a word they say." End summary.

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Respect and Appreciation

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3. (S/NF) In terms of regional affairs, Special Middle East Envoy Senator George Mitchell struck the right chord during his recent visit to Cairo when he told President Mubarak that he was here to "listen and hear your advice." The Egyptians have long felt that, at best, we take them for granted; and at worst, we deliberately ignore their advice while trying to force our point of view on them. You may wish to thank Aboul Gheit for the vital role Egypt played in bringing about a ceasefire in Gaza, and its efforts at making it last. You should ask him what the current state of play is between Hamas and Fatah and have him describe Egypt's vision of the future for the Palestinians, both among their factions, and vis a visIsrael. Note: Although the Egyptians will react well to overtures of respect and appreciation, Egypt is very often a stubborn and recalcitrant ally. In addition, Egypt's self-perception as the "indispensable Arab state" is contingent on Egyptian effectiveness on regional issues, including Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.

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Egypt and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict

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4. (S/NF) Although Aboul Gheit was never enthusiastic about the Annapolis Peace process, resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the primary strategic political goal for the Egyptians. They are proud of their role as intermediary, well aware that they are perhaps the only player that can talk with us, the Israelis, and all Palestinian factions. Mubarak hates Hamas, and considers them the same as Egypt's own Muslim Brotherhood, which he sees as his own most dangerous political threat. Since the

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June 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza, the Egyptians, under the leadership of intelligence chief Omar Soliman (the de facto national security advisor with direct responsibility for the Israeli-Palestinian account) have shifted their focus to intra-Palestinian reconciliation and establishment of the Hamas-Israel ceasefire. Soliman brokered a half-year-long truce last year, which Hamas broke in December, leading to the Israeli invasion of Gaza. He has recently re-started those efforts, with the goal of getting Hamas to agree to a year-long ceasefire, which should give the Egyptians space to bring about their political goal of Palestinian reconciliation under a technocratic, non-partisan government headed by President Mahmoud Abbas.

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Gaza and Tunnels

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5. (S/NF) Smuggling through the Sinai Peninsula and into Gaza is an old and complicated problem for Egypt. Egypt views a well-armed and powerful Hamas as a national security threat, a point driven home in dramatic fashion by the January 2008 border breach when Hamas bulldozed the old border fence and more than half a million Palestinians poured into Egypt, unchecked and hungry. Since the closure of the Egypt-Gaza border following the June 2007 Gaza takeover by Hamas, most smuggling of consumer goods and weapons has gone underground. The narrow corridor between Egypt and Gaza is as honey-combed with subterranean passageways as a gigantic ant colony.

6. (S/NF) Although it is not directly in Aboul Gheit's bailiwick, belonging more to the security and intelligence forces, nonetheless the issue of tunnels and rearming Hamas is the subject of intense scrutiny (by Israel and the Congress), and sensitivity (by the Egyptians). Long criticized by Israel for "not doing enough" to halt arms smuggling via tunnels, the Egyptians have stopped complaining and started acting. Egypt has increased efforts to counter arms smuggling by accelerating its $23 million FMF-funded tunnel detection program along the Egypt-Gaza border and requesting U.S. support to purchase four backscatter X-Ray machines to scan vehicles entering the Sinai for weapons and explosives (note Aboul Ghait may not be of this EGIS-originated request). Egypt also continues to cooperate with Israel, especially via intelligence sharing, to prevent militants from Hamas and other extremist organizations from crossing the Gaza border, and on thwarting militant activity in Egypt. Egyptian efforts are all justified under President Mubarak's pledge that Egypt with "protect its borders."

7. (S/NF) Egypt will not take any action that could be perceived as collaboration in Israel's siege of Gaza, and they have been hyper-sensitive to any suggestion that foreigners are assisting them or overseeing their efforts to counter smuggling. Aboul Gheit publicly distanced Egypt from our January MOU with Israel to combat arms smuggling into Gaza, although he knew about it in advance and consulted with Secretary Rice and me about its contents. The Egyptians do not want to be stuck holding the Gaza bag, and must be able to point the finger of blame at Israel for the plight of the Palestinians. At the same time, Egypt has withstood scathing and widespread criticism in the Arab world for refusing to open the Rafah border crossing to supply Gaza. Even during the height of the December fighting, the Egyptians only sent medicine and medical supplies through the Rafah border; all other humanitarian goods went through the Israeli crossing at Kerem Shalom. They likewise insist that Rafah will only reopen to handle Gazan travellers when the Gazan side is under PAcontrol with EU observers according to the 2005 AMA.

8. (S/NF) Ultimately, Egypt believes that the only realistic and viable solution to erode Hamas' power and stop arms smuggling is the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza and the opening of Gaza's border to legitimate trade. While in the short term we can best assist the Egyptians with technical know-how and training, long term counter smuggling success will depend on reducing the financial incentives to smuggling by providing the Sinai Bedouin with legitimate economic opportunities and by regularly opening the Gaza borders to trade, thereby reducing economic incentives to smuggle.

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The March 2 Gaza Donors Conference

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9. (S/NF) President Mubarak told Senator Mitchell that he

CAIRO 00000231 003 OF 004

wanted to personally invite you to the March 2 Gaza Donors Conference in Cairo. Aboul Gheit will press hard for you to accept this invitation. He is keen to keep up the momentum on Gaza reconstruction and for Egypt to be seen as taking the lead in helping the Palestinians. It is very important to him that this conference be at the ministerial level, and he will be disappointed if you are unable to accept.

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Iraq and Iran

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10. (S/NF) President Mubarak enjoys recounting for visiting members of Congress how he warned former President Bush against invading Iraq, ending with, "I told you so!" and a wag of his finger. In addition, there are Egyptian misgivings about Nuri Al-Maliki and Shia majority rule in Iraq. Egypt therefore will need additional prodding to continue to take steps to help rehabilitate Iraq into the greater Arab world. You should ask Aboul Gheit when he plans to fully open the Egyptian embassy in Baghdad and exchange accredited ambassadors with Iraq (the first Egyptian ambassador to post-Saddam Iraq was assassinated). As for Iran, Mubarak has a visceral hatred for the Islamic Republic, referring repeatedly to Iranians as "liars," and denouncing them for seeking to destabilize Egypt and the region. He sees the Syrians and Qataris as sycophants to Tehran and liars themselves. There is no doubt that Egypt sees Iran and its greatest long-term threat, both as it develops a nuclear capability and as it seeks to export its "Shia revolution." Nonetheless, Mubarak told Mitchell pointedly that he did not oppose the U.S. speaking to the Iranians, as long as we did not "believe a single word they say." Aboul Gheit will be keen to hear your description of U.S. intentions towards Iran. In his conversation with Senator Mitchell, Aboul Gheit carefully noting he was speaking personally, expressed more interest into bringing the Syrians into negotiations again; President Mubarak was not enthusiastic about dealing with the Syrians at this time.

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U.S. Assistance to Egypt

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11. (S/NF) The greatest Egyptian outrage a year ago -- Congressional conditioning of $100 million of U.S. assistance to Egypt -- may now be moot, according to our latest understanding of the state of play with the FY2009 appropriations language. Beyond the issue of conditioning, the Egyptians resent the U.S. unilateral decision to cut ESF in half, from $415 million in FY-08 to $200 million in FY-09, a level which the Egyptians find embarrassing, not because they need the money (they say), but because it shows our diminished view of the value of our relationship. In my view, it is important to the U.S. to continue an ESF program aimed at health, education, and poverty eradication to demonstrate concern for the Egyptian people as opposed to a strictly military assistance program. Egypt has also been unhappy with the use of these funds to support democracy in Egypt. It would be useful if you could urge that Egypt accept the FY 2009 levels so that we can proceed to program funds to benefit Egypt, while promising to engage in a serious review of the conflicts that exist and a desire to resolve them as soon as possible.

12. (S/NF) Concerning military assistance, the Egyptian political and military leadership feel that they have been "short changed" by our holding to an FMF level of $1.3 billion, (the same level for 30 years despite inflation), and which they contrast with increases to our military assistance to Israel. Finally, Egypt seeks a higher profile in international financial circles (Finance Minister Youssef Boutros Ghali was recently named Chairman of the IMF's policy-setting committee, the IMFC, the first from a developing country), and Aboul Gheit is likely to ask for your support to include Egypt in expanded G8 and G20 fora.

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Ayman Nour and Saad Eddin Ibrahim

---------------------------------

13. (S/NF) Egypt's political leadership considers our public chastisement of their treatment of jailed former opposition Al Ghad party leader Ayman Nour as interfering with internal affairs and infringement on national sovereignty. Mubarak takes this issue personally, and it makes him seethe when we raise it, particularly in public. Aboul Gheit's view is that we have made Ayman Nour a freedom martyr, and a damaging (and

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distorting) prism through which we view our relationship with Egypt. Much the same can be said about Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the outspoken political science professor and democracy activist who is in self-imposed exile in the U.S. because of spurious law suits brought against him for allegedly defaming Egypt. In a negative development in late January, Egypt,s Attorney General-equivalent took action to advance the only criminal case pending against Ibrahim. You should press Aboul Gheit hard on Nour and Ibrahim, and also urge the GOE to stop arresting other less prominent political activists. Nour's health is bad and he has served more than half his sentence; he deserves a humanitarian pardon. You may wish to lay down a marker for a future discussion on democratization and human rights concerns. You might note that although you and the President want to improve the relationship, Egypt could take some steps to remove these very volatile issues from the agenda.

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Farouq Hosny

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13. (S/NF) Egypt has mounted a full-scale international campaign to support the candidacy of Culture Minister Farouq Hosny for Director General of UNESCO. The Arab League and the African Union have already publicly stated their commitment to Hosny, and the Egyptians believe they also have the support of several Europeans, notably the French. Aboul Gheit will also seek US support -- or, at least, not to actively oppose -- the candidacy of Farouq Hosny as the next Director General of UNESCO. The U.S. informed him last year that we could not support the candidacy and urged Egypt to put forward another name. Abould Gheit will argue Hosny's merits for facing down the Islamic extremists who want to narrow the space in Egypt for artistic expression. U.S. objections have been to statements Hosny has made that "Israel had no culture. . .it stole cultural ideas from others and claimed them as its own" and other objectionable remarks. If we plan to derail the Hosny candidacy, we must provide a credible alternate, preferably an Arab and/or Muslim. SCOBEY

US credibility in the Islamic world hinges on consistent & principled diplomacy - National International Affairs | Examiner.com

2010-12-02T08:04:00.000-08:00

US credibility in the Islamic world hinges on consistent & principled diplomacy - National International Affairs | Examiner.com

The Obama administration promised a new era with the Islamic world based on mutual respect and common interests. The US and the Islamic world must work together to end deadly extremism and dislocating suspicions.

The global relations can be balanced when each side of the equation is also balanced. While the US administration must respect the will and interests of its people, the Arab and Muslim leaders, too, must be asked to respect the interests of their peoples. Lasting relations are achieved when peoples feel connected, not just leaders do. When it comes to the Islamic world, the US is seen as a friend of some regimes not of the people. A couple of examples will illustrate the problem.

Nearly two years ago, the US condemned the Iranian regime for holding an election that did not meet the “standards.” Western media ran daily stories about protests and the government crackdown. The US and its Western allies continue to criticize the Iranian government arguing that it does not represent the will of all Iranians. Let’s assume that this true the purpose of this article; and see if US holds the same standard when dealing with other Muslim leaders.

This Sunday, the Egyptian regime held national elections where less than 15% of the 40 million registered voters participated. International observers were barred from monitoring the process. Before and during the elections, more than 700 members of the main opposition group (the Muslims Brethren) were arrested and several people were killed. Just today, Arab media reported that protests are still underway and at least one more person was killed. The regime harassed voters and relied on hired criminals to intimidate opposition figures. The outcome so far: all but half a dozen of the 508 seats went to the ruling party. The main opposition block (Muslims Brethren that won 20% of the seats in the 2005 elections) did not win a single seat in the first round held on Sunday.

Next fall, Egypt will hold its presidential elections and it is safe to predict that Mubarak or whomever Mubarak appoints to succeed him will win. The US will, again, release a statement saying that it is disappointed and Western media will ignore the story. But the peoples in the Islamic world want more than statements; they want consistency: the US should either hold all Muslim leaders to the same standard or keep quiet and let the peoples fight their own battles.

Surely, Iranians may have some problems with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; but here is the difference: In two years,Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, cannot and will not run again. Iranians will be electing their fifth different president in just 29 years. Egyptians, on the other hand, will be electing the same president who has been ruling for 29 years.